EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2014
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A global study on threats or deliberate use of force against students, teachers, academics, education trade union members and government officials, aid workers and other education staff, and on schools, universities and other educational institutions, carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic or religious reasons in 2009-2013.
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It was 9 October 2012. The school bus, a converted truck, had travelled only a few hundred yards from Khushal school in Mingora, north-west Pakistan, when a masked man stepped in front of the vehicle. An accomplice armed with a pistol climbed onto the tailgate at the rear, leaned over and asked which of the 20 schoolgirls huddled inside was Malala. When the driver stepped on the accelerator, the gunman opened fire, shooting Malala in the head.1

Malala Yousafzai, 15, had become well known in the area — and a Taliban target — because she had dared to speak out against the fear and suffering caused by the Pakistani Taliban’s edict banning girls from going to school.2 Critically wounded by a bullet that tore through her head and shoulder and lodged near her spine, she was rushed by helicopter to a military hospital in Peshawar, along with two wounded school friends. From there, she was taken to England, where she has made a remarkable recovery and now lives.

Hailed by international media and feted by human rights groups for her courage, Malala is today famous around the world. But she is just one of the many thousands of students, teachers, academics and other education personnel in dozens of countries targeted with violence.

This global study charts the scale and nature of attacks on education; highlights its impact on education — including on students, teachers and facilities; and documents the ways that governments, local communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies try to reduce the impact of such violence and prevent future attacks.

In doing so, it provides the most comprehensive examination of attacks on education to date.

Following earlier studies that UNESCO published in 2007 and 2010,3 it not only examines attacks on schools, as previous research has done, but also considers military use of education facilities and more closely examines attacks on higher education.

The study has four main aims: to better inform international and national efforts to prevent schools, universities, students, teachers, academics and other education staff from being attacked; encourage the investigation, prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of attacks; share knowledge about effective responses; and help those who have been attacked to recover and rebuild their lives — as Malala is doing — by providing recommendations for action that the international community, governments and armed non-state groups should adopt and implement.

In July 2013, Malala addressed the UN General Assembly and stressed the importance of protecting education. ‘The terrorists thought that they would change my aims and stop my ambitions’, she said, ‘but nothing changed in my life, except this: weakness, fear and hopelessness died. Let us pick up our books and pens. They are our most powerful weapons.’4

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The main parts of *Education under Attack 2014* are:

- an executive summary providing a short overview of the main points and key recommendations;
- a methodology section outlining the methods used in the research and the principal challenges faced;
- a global overview providing a more detailed picture of the scale, nature, motives and impact of attacks on education and the variety of responses that are being, or could be, made;
- three thematic essays offering more depth about how schools and universities can best be protected;
- profiles of the 30 most seriously affected countries, providing an insight into the context in which attacks take place, a detailed record of reported attacks on education during 2009-2012 and an outline of attacks during the first nine months of 2013; and
- endnotes providing citations for every piece of information used in the study.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This global study examines threats or deliberate use of force against students, teachers, academics, education trade union members, government officials, aid workers and other education staff, and on schools, universities and other educational institutions, carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic or religious reasons in 2009-2013; and military use of education buildings and facilities.

It focuses on targeted attacks by state military and security forces and armed non-state groups on education facilities, students or staff, not death, injury or destruction resulting from being caught in crossfire.

It does not examine school attacks by lone armed individuals with none of the above-listed motives or affiliations, such as the school shooting at Sandy Hook in the United States in 2012.
An Afghan youth looks through burnt textbooks damaged during a bomb blast that killed the principal and wounded another employee at a school in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, 15 March 2011.

© 2011 AP Photo/Rohmat Gul
This study, which follows earlier studies published by UNESCO in 2007 and 2010, is the most comprehensive examination of attacks on education to date. Based on extensive data gathering for the period 2009-2012 and information on key incidents in the first nine months of 2013, it finds that over the past five years, armed non-state groups, state military and security forces, and armed criminal groups have attacked thousands of schoolchildren, university students, teachers, academics and education establishments in at least 70 countries worldwide.

The study reports in detail on 30 countries where there was a significant pattern of attacks in the four-year reporting period and lists 40 other countries where isolated attacks took place.

It concludes that targeted attacks on education and incidents of military use of schools and universities are occurring in far more countries and far more extensively than previously documented. It is not known whether this reflects growing awareness of the problem and more and better reporting of such attacks since the earlier studies were published or an actual increase in the number of attacks.

Many attacks involve bombing or burning schools or universities, or killing, injuring, kidnapping, or illegally arresting, detaining or torturing students, teachers and academics. Hundreds have died as a result and hundreds of thousands more have missed out on the right to an education. In many places, children and young people, and those who teach them, live in fear of attacks.

The 30 countries profiled all have five or more incidents or victims including at least one direct attack on a school or the killing of at least one teacher, student or academic. They are: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

The 40 other countries where isolated attacks were reported are: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea,
School teachers: ‘We will kill them!’

In Nigeria, from January to September 2013, some 30 teachers were reported shot dead, sometimes during class. Associated Press reported that in a video statement made in July 2013, Abubakar Shekau, leader of the militant Islamist group Boko Haram, threatened teachers, saying: ‘School teachers who are teaching Western education? We will kill them! We will kill them!’; he also endorsed recent school attacks and claimed that non-Islamic schools should be burned down. Boko Haram, a militant Islamist group whose commonly used name means ‘Western education is a sin’ in Hausa, has sought to impose a strict form of Sharia, or Islamic law, in northern Nigeria and partially destroyed or burned down 50 schools in 2013, according to Amnesty International.
A woman walks past a fire-gutted Islamic school in Meiktila, Myanmar. In March 2013, a mob of more than 200 Buddhists torched the school and killed 32 Muslim students and 4 teachers.

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The study differs from earlier publications of *Education under Attack* in 2007 and 2010: it covers a different length of time; significantly more resources were employed to undertake the research; and it set out to provide extensive coverage of a wider range of incidents. In particular, there is an additional focus on military use of education buildings and facilities and on attacks on higher education, compared to the two earlier studies. It is difficult, therefore, to draw conclusions about trends over time when comparing the data of this study with those of earlier studies.

The research team gathered data for this study from a wide range of secondary sources – including United Nations monitoring and reporting, research by human rights groups and media reports – with differing purposes and varying levels and methods of verification. Additional research was gathered by information requests sent to UN agencies and international and local NGOs; phone interviews with in-country experts; and in some cases via further in-country research by experienced human rights researchers and journalists. The findings from the different sources have been collated, summarized and cross-checked against each other for reliability and accuracy. The study was also extensively reviewed by experts in human rights, international law, education-in-emergencies and research methodology. However, it has not been possible to verify every incident.

The study gauges the scale and nature of violent attacks on education in the 30 profiled countries, as well as military use of schools and universities. It then examines their impact on education and the responses that communities and governments, with support from national and international agencies, have taken to address the problem, drawing upon a cumulative understanding of the impact of attacks since the issue was first studied globally and examining good practices across the world.

School torched by a sectarian mob

Education in Myanmar faced a new and violent threat from Buddhist nationalists in 2013 as schools and students were attacked in outbursts of sectarian violence. In one incident in March 2013, a 200-strong mob of Buddhists marched on a Muslim school in Meiktila in Myanmar. The teachers heard that they were coming and took the students out into a patch of bush near the school to hide. When the mob reached the school they torched it and went looking for the students. When they found them, they clubbed them with staves and, in some cases, poured petrol on them and set them alight. They decapitated one student after they caught him hiding in the undergrowth. In total, 32 students and four teachers were killed. Seven Buddhists were later jailed in connection with the school massacre.
Profiled countries with reports of attacks on education, 2009-2012

- **Very Heavily affected**
  Reports documented 1,000 or more attacks on schools, universities, staff and students or 1,000 or more students, teachers or other education personnel attacked or education buildings attacked or used for military purposes.

- **Heavily affected**
  Reports documented between 500 and 999 attacks on schools, universities, staff and students or between 500 and 999 students, teachers or other education personnel attacked or education buildings attacked or used for military purposes.

- **Other affected**
  Reports documented less than 500 attacks on schools, universities, staff and students or less than 500 students, teachers or other education personnel attacked or education buildings attacked or used for military purposes.
The countries very heavily affected — where reports documented 1,000 or more attacks on schools, universities, staff and students or 1,000 or more students, teachers or other education personnel attacked or education buildings attacked or used for military purposes in 2009–2012 — were Afghanistan, Colombia, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan. For example, during that time period:

- In Afghanistan, according to the UN, there were 1,110 or more attacks on school-level education, including arson attacks, explosions and suicide bombings. Staff were threatened, killed and kidnapped.

- In Colombia, one of the most dangerous places to be a teacher, 140 teachers were killed over these four years and 1,086 received death threats, according to the Ministry of Education. In addition, 305 were forced to leave their homes because their lives were at risk, according to Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), a prominent Colombian NGO monitoring labour rights.

- In Pakistan, armed groups, particularly the Pakistani Taliban, attacked at least 838 schools, mostly by blowing up school buildings, and deprived hundreds of thousands of children of access to education, according to primary research by the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Some 30 school students and 20 teachers were killed, and 97 school students and eight teachers injured; 138 school students and staff were kidnapped. One higher education student and four academics were killed, and dozens of university students were injured.

Other heavily affected countries — where reports documented between 500 and 999 attacks on schools, universities, staff and students or between 500 and 999 teachers or other education personnel attacked or education buildings attacked or used for military purposes in 2009-2012 — were Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Libya, Mexico, Syria and Yemen.

For instance, in Yemen there were 720 incidents involving the use of force or violence affecting schools in 2009-2012, and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-2011, 50 university students were attacked and several university facilities occupied and, in 2011, armed groups destroyed, damaged, looted or used at least 477 schools during post-election violence.

However, in all of these countries it is unclear exactly how many attacks were targeted against education, due to the lack of specificity of available information.

Some individual incidents resulted in large numbers of casualties. For instance, in Somalia in October 2011, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber exploded a truck filled with drums of fuel outside a compound in Mogadishu housing the education ministry and other ministries, killing 100 or more people, many of whom were students and parents. In a pre-recorded message, the bomber reportedly said he was targeting the students, who were due to gather at the Ministry of Education to obtain examination results needed for scholarships to study abroad.

The reported motives for targeting schools, students, teachers and other education staff include the desire to:

- destroy symbols of government control or demonstrate control over an area by an anti-government group;
- block the education of girls, or any type of education perceived to teach or impose alien religious or cultural values, biased history or an unfamiliar language of instruction;
- restrict teacher trade union activity and academic freedom;
- abduct children for use as combatants, sex slaves or logistical support in military operations, or abduct students and teachers for ransom; or
- seize schools for use as barracks and bases or firing positions.
Schoolchildren sit in a makeshift classroom in the courtyard of the Bhirni Middle School, Aurangabad district, Bihar state, India. The school was bombed by Maoist guerillas on 27 December 2009.

© 2010 Moises Saman/Magnum Photos for Human Rights Watch
After seizing the town, a Congolese rebel fighter walks through an abandoned classroom, used as an armoury by the Congolese army, in Bunagana, DRC, 7 July 2012.

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Profiled countries with reports of military use of schools and universities, 2009-2012
Military use of education institutions

School and university facilities were used for military purposes in 24 of the 30 countries profiled during 2009-2012: Afghanistan, CAR, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

The country with by far the most reported incidents was Syria where military use from the conflict spiked in 2011-2012. Although it does not specify numbers, the UN reported numerous incidents of government forces using schools as temporary bases or detention centres and there were allegations that the Free Syrian Army used schools in a number of areas as bases and as places to store ammunition during this period. Furthermore, the Syrian Network for Human Rights alleged in mid-January 2013 that government forces had used approximately 1,000 schools as detention and torture centres and used schools to house security and intelligence personnel or as positions from which to shell the surrounding area, which suggests that in most cases they were used for such purposes in 2011-2012.

Beyond Syria, in the other 14 countries with the highest incidence of military use in 2009-2012 – Afghanistan, CAR, Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia, DRC, India, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand and Yemen – armed groups, armed forces, police forces and international forces used a total of 923 or more schools and universities for military purposes in those four years. In Libya, for example, armed groups used 221 schools during the 2011 uprising; and in eastern and north-eastern India in 2010, government forces used at least 129 schools as barracks or bases in their conflict with Maoist insurgents and other armed groups.

Across the countries where military use occurred, schools and universities were used as barracks to house soldiers or fighters or as bases to mount security operations. They also served as fighting positions, prisons or detention centres, interrogation or torture sites and places to store weapons. School buildings were additionally used as places to indoctrinate, recruit and train students in some places. In Mali, for instance, children as young as 11 were being trained by armed groups in private, public and Koranic schools.

State armed forces and armed non-state groups jeopardize the lives of students and teachers or other personnel when they use schools and universities for military purposes without evacuating them first, because the military presence could well draw enemy fire. In many cases, military use leads to learning being disrupted or halted altogether, as parents withdraw their children, fearing for their safety, or the school is closed. Even if the schools are empty, military use can damage facilities or lead to those schools being destroyed in subsequent attacks.

Students used as human shields

In Somalia, armed militants used schools as a base to launch attacks on opposing forces, making the school a target for attack while students and teachers were still inside. According to Human Rights Watch in their report No place for children: Child recruitment, forced marriage and attacks on schools in Somalia, in some cases the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab locked frightened students and teachers in school using them as human shields while they launched artillery attacks from behind the school or from school grounds against forces of the Transitional Federal Government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). One primary student reported in 2010 that he was in class when Al-Shabaab fighters started firing what seemed to be rockets from just behind the school while classes were ongoing. ‘AMISOM/TFG started responding…. The school was hit by a weapon that sounded like a thunder when coming and then made a big explosion,’ he told Human Rights Watch. Three children died in the attack and six were injured.

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Recruitment of children and sexual violence at schools or along school routes

This study addresses child recruitment and sexual violence only to the extent that such abuses happened at schools or along school routes. Armed groups and armed forces sometimes specifically target such locations because children are known to concentrate there.

Reported evidence of armed groups and armed criminal groups recruiting children while they were in school or as they travelled to or from school was found in six countries during 2009-2012: Colombia, DRC, Pakistan, Somalia, Thailand and Yemen.

Recruitment happened for a variety of reasons. In Colombia, for example, child recruits were used by armed groups as spies or to transport arms or pass on messages to other students in schools, as well as to run their drug business inside schools. In Pakistan, militants recruited, lured or abducted children from mainstream schools and madrassas (religious schools), in some cases to train as suicide bombers.

Recruitment methods included indoctrination programmes at school, threatening to kill students if they did not join, abduction en route to schools and rounding up students at schools. In Colombia, armed groups waited outside schools to talk to children, find out information, and recruit and control them; in Yemen, Houthi rebels used students and teachers to recruit children; and in DRC, a breakaway rebel group seized 32 boys from a school, tied them up and marched them off to military camp to train to fight.

The strongest evidence of systematic recruitment from schools was found in Somalia, where the UN reported that Al-Shabaab abducted 2,000 children for military training in 2010 and recruited another 948 in 2011, mostly from schools. Human Rights Watch reported cases of Al-Shabaab abducting girls from schools for forced marriage to fighters. In one case, militants beheaded a 16-year-old who refused to marry a commander much older than her and brought her head back to be shown to the remaining girls at the school as a warning.

There were also isolated reports of sexual violence by armed forces or armed groups at or en route to or from schools in DRC and Somalia in 2009-2012. Two incidents in CAR and India also were reported in 2012-2013. These types of attacks may be more widespread, but public reporting of sexual violence often lacks information about the location where the violence occurred.

Children seized at school

According to Human Rights Watch, in April 2012 in DRC, followers of the rebel general Bosco Ntaganda, formerly of the Congolese Army, raided Mapendano secondary school, in North Kivu province, as one of their methods of forcibly recruiting school students when villagers refused to hand over their sons. A 17-year-old student told Human Rights Watch that fighters entered his school at the end of classes, took them out outside, tied up their hands and marched them off the premises to join the forces fighting for Ntaganda. At a military camp they were given some training. Recruits who resisted were beaten, and others were told they would be killed if they tried to escape. In one case, a 16-year-old recruit told Human Rights Watch that at night Ntaganda’s men ‘put grenades on us and told us that if we moved, they would explode’. Back in the villages, fear of recruitment led many boys and young men to flee across the border with Rwanda.
Attacks on higher education

The study found attacks on higher education facilities, students and academics and military use of universities were reported in 28 of the 30 profiled countries in 2009-2012. The exceptions were CAR and Mali.

Unlike most attacks on schools, violent attacks on higher education frequently take place in non-conflict situations – although they do also occur in countries affected by war – and more often involve arbitrarily arresting or persecuting particular students and teachers.

Many attacks on higher education are linked to government attempts to prevent the growth of opposition movements; restrict political protests, including those related to education policy; stop anti-government protests on campus; quell education trade union activity; or curtail the freedom of lecturers and researchers to explore or discuss sensitive subjects or alternative views to government policy. As with violence against school students and teachers, attacks on higher education can also involve sectarian bias and targeting ethnic groups.

During 2009-2013, most attacks on educational buildings were directed at school facilities rather than those used for higher education. However, higher education facilities were attacked in at least 17 countries: Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. In Mexico, for example, a group opposing nanotechnology research apparently bombed or issued bomb threats against six campuses and research laboratories; and in Syria, two explosions killed at least 82 and wounded dozens more, possibly as many as 150, at Aleppo University on the first day of mid-term examinations in January 2013.
Students’ convoy targeted

In 2010, at least 100 students were injured when a convoy of buses, escorted by Iraqi forces and transporting college students from Christian towns and villages in the Nineveh Plain back to classes at the University of Mosul, was attacked, according to UNAMI. A car bomb exploded as the first buses crossed a checkpoint along the internal border between the semi-autonomous Kurdish region and the rest of the country. Shortly afterwards, another roadside bomb went off, according to the New York Times. The area around Mosul University had already experienced several attacks and threats of attacks in 2009, which is why students travelled in these types of convoys. The attacks on Christian students were part of a spate of dozens of attacks against Christians in general in 2010. According to Worldwatch Monitor, nearly 1,000 students stayed away from class for the rest of the semester as a result of the attack.
Where armed groups were the perpetrators, bombings were among the most common incidents, along with assassinations and kidnappings. State security forces also resorted to arbitrary arrest or detention and excessive force that, at times, resulted in death and injury. There were incidents of state armed forces or security services, rebel groups and guerrillas taking over or shutting down universities as well.

The largest number of higher education student casualties during 2009–2012 was in Yemen where more than 73 were killed and more than 139 injured in 2011, although it is not known how many were targeted. The largest number of arbitrary arrests of students was reported in Sudan where more than 1,040 were arrested by security agents, the majority of them in protests related to education or which began at, or took place at, education institutions, according to human rights and media reports.

Some of the most serious incidents involved raids by security forces or armed groups on student dormitories or other forms of campus residence in Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria. In September 2013, gunmen stormed a dormitory in the middle of the night at a college in Yobe, Nigeria, killing as many as 50 students. In 2011 and 2012, security forces in Syria raided dormitories at Aleppo and Damascus universities, killing seven students, injuring 49 and arresting 330, according to media reports. In Sudan, some 450 student rooms at Omdurman Islamic University in Khartoum were reportedly set on fire by security agents and supporters of the National Congress Party in December 2012.

**Long-term impact of attacks**

In some countries, education authorities or NGOs have documented the number of schools damaged or destroyed, or the number of teachers or students killed or injured. But information is scant regarding the way such attacks affect the provision of education in the long term, let alone their wider social and economic impact. The study’s discussion of long-term impacts, therefore, is not restricted to situations where attacks took place during the reporting period but draws on experiences in countries where attacks have been documented in the past as well.

Where attacks on schools, students and teachers are persistent or the use of force – real or threatened – blocks recovery from attacks, the effects, which impinge on student attainment and access to good-quality education, can include:

- persistent demotivation and distraction of students, teachers and other education staff by fear or psychological distress or trauma;
- chronic disruption of attendance or permanent drop-out of students, teachers and other education staff;
- falling recruitment of staff, leading to teacher shortages, and declining enrolment of students, hindering national and global attempts to achieve Education for All (EFA), the drive to achieve universal primary education and other important educational goals.

All these effects have short-, medium- and long-term dimensions but the longer attacks persist or violence blocks recovery, the deeper and more lasting the effects are likely to be.

In countries where attacks have persisted on a significant scale year after year – many countries experienced attacks on education long before the start of this study’s reporting period – lengthy school closure has meant that hundreds of thousands of children have been denied access to education, sometimes for months or sometimes for years. For instance, in Yemen, 54 schools were closed for up to two months after 143 attacks on education in 2011, affecting 182,000 students. In Afghanistan, the Ministry of Education reported that more than 590 schools were closed in vulnerable areas as of May 2012, compared to 800 or more in 2009. In some cases, security threats or prolonged military use block them from being rebuilt or reopened, as in India where by 2009 police had occupied some schools for three years and one for a decade, and South Sudan, where armed forces occupied some schools for up to five years. Often, the government lacks the capacity to rebuild in a timely manner.

In higher education, attacks may not only endanger lives and disrupt education, but also prove devastating for research and teaching by triggering fear, flight and self-censorship among whole academic communities. They also disrupt training of teachers, education planners and managers.

Attacks on education can also exact a psychological toll, in the short or long term, including distraction, distress and impaired ability to study or teach.

Wider and long-term consequences for society include restricting development – particularly the emergence and strengthening of political plurality, accountable government and open democracy.
Response and prevention

So what can be done to stop attacks on education and how can we limit their impact? Although more information has been gathered on prevention and response since the last Education under Attack study was published in 2010, rigorous empirical and comparative research into the effectiveness of different measures is still lacking, in part due to the major methodological challenges of conducting such research. A clearer understanding is still needed of exactly what the relative advantages of one intervention over another are, given the nature of attacks, their perpetrators and motives; the particular context; and the potential negative side effects and unintended consequences. Nevertheless, there are examples of measures that have been taken to respond to and prevent attacks, both before and during this study’s reporting period, by international agencies, national governments, NGOs and communities.

Monitoring and reporting

Effective monitoring, assessment and reporting are crucial for ensuring that governments, UN agencies and NGOs take appropriate prevention and response measures. One of the most significant developments during the reporting period was the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1998 in July 2011, which made attacks on schools and school personnel a trigger for listing in the annexes to the UN Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict. This, in turn, requires the violating parties to develop action plans to end such attacks or face consequences that can include targeted sanctions applied by the UN Security Council.

The passing of Resolution 1998 has ensured that the UN pays greater attention to attacks on schools and teachers in monitoring and reporting carried out by Country Task Forces of the UN-led Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict. However, so far the MRM has operated in a limited number of countries – typically around 13-14 in any given year. It did operate in many of the very heavily or heavily affected countries in 2009-2012, but because the activation of the MRM requires a high standard of UN verification of incidents and identification of perpetrators it did not operate in all of them, or in a number of our other profiled countries in which a pattern of attacks on education took place. Moreover, its remit only allows it to operate in situations of armed conflict and a number of countries with a significant number of attacks on education are not recognized as situations of conflict, such as Mexico and Zimbabwe.

In most countries affected by attacks on education, there is still a need to strengthen monitoring and reporting partnerships between UN agencies, international and national NGOs and education ministries and district education offices to improve data collection on attacks on schools (including data on the long-term impact on education) and verification.

There is also a pressing need to fill the gap in global monitoring and reporting of attacks on higher education. Monitoring such attacks is not part of the remit of the UN-led MRM, which focuses on grave violations against children and therefore school-level incidents only.

Accountability and ending impunity

International human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law provide a strong legal framework for protecting education, depending on the context. However, impunity for those responsible for attacking education is a persistent problem and urgently needs to be addressed at national and international levels. Very few investigations of attacks or prosecutions of perpetrators have been documented.

Achieving a reduction in or an end to the use of schools and universities for military purposes may significantly reduce the number of educational institutions put at risk of attack, because military use makes them a potential target.

International humanitarian law restricts the use of schools and universities in support of a military effort, but it does not prohibit such use in all circumstances.

Some countries have taken the important step of introducing legislation, jurisprudence or military policies restricting, and in some cases completely prohibiting, the military use of schools or universities, although this injunction is not consistently enforced. Examples include Colombia, India, the Philippines, and most recently South Sudan, which in August 2013 issued a military order prohibiting its armed forces from using schools for military purposes.

A positive step is the current effort, which the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) has galvanized, to develop international guidelines – the Lucens Guidelines – to protect schools and universities from military use during armed conflict. The intention is that when a state adopts the Guidelines they will incorporate them into their domestic legislation and military doctrine, thereby making them binding.
Partnerships for monitoring and reporting

During the post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire from December 2010 to June 2011, dozens of schools were attacked. The Education Cluster worked with the Ministry of Education to set up a national survey of 9,000 schools to assess the impact of attacks on education nationally.

According to the Global Education Cluster, the education ministry and district education authorities encouraged the involvement of teachers in every village to collect data for the survey by hand and by email. They looked for information on schools being used for military purposes or as shelters for internally displaced people, the destruction and looting of schools, forced closure of schools due to threats of violence, incidents of explosions and attacks on students.

The survey found 477 schools had been destroyed, damaged or looted, or used by armed and military groups: 180 schools were looted, 173 destroyed, burned down or damaged and 20 schools were attacked by bombs. The information was later used to press for an end to military use of schools.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Police officer in front of a school pockmarked with bullet holes, Pasto, Colombia, 2010.

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through domestic law. If many countries can be persuaded to follow suit, significant progress could be made towards reducing the number of schools put at risk of attack and the number of students whose safety is threatened – and whose learning is compromised – by the presence of troops and weapons in their classrooms.

**Military and security responses**
Some military forces, education authorities and communities have taken physical protection measures to secure schools and teachers against attack. These include assigning armed or unarmed guards to education institutions; establishing checkpoints near schools; reinforcing school infrastructure such as building walls around school perimeters; providing housing for students or personnel on campus or nearby; providing a protective presence or escorts to accompany students or teachers en route to and from schools; offering safer modes of transportation; and arming teachers. Many of these measures have been taken in Thailand’s far south, for instance. Unarmed guards have been used in Afghanistan.

Not all measures have proven effective. In some contexts, measures such as security escorts may be counterproductive and increase the likelihood of teachers or schools being targeted because it offers armed groups the opportunity to target both soldiers and teachers in the same incident. In southern Thailand, for instance, there have been many attacks against troops providing protection for teachers en route to school in which either troops or troops and teachers have been killed.

**Negotiated solutions**
In some cases, local community leaders, armed groups or government forces, government officials or external actors have negotiated with attacking parties to prevent or end attacks or military use of education facilities, for example, in DRC and South Sudan where occupying forces agreed to vacate schools.

**Community responses**
Communities have contributed to protection in a range of ways. In Afghanistan, this has involved school management committees in protecting schools, students and teachers; setting up school defence committees; providing night-watchmen; and running community schools or offering classes in people’s homes, which are less likely to be attacked. In Liberia, it has involved parents providing student escorts; in Gaza, a community alert system was established; in Mexico, teacher trade unions led protests demanding better security measures; in Nepal, community members led negotiations to ensure schools were respected by both sides in the conflict as zones of peace; and in Côte d’Ivoire local head teachers helped in the monitoring of attacks.

**Tailored protection for teachers at risk**
In Colombia, a Working Group on the Human Rights of Teachers composed of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and representatives from the Colombian government and the teacher trade unions provided threatened or targeted teachers, university academics and trade union leaders support for protection measures. Working on a case-by-case basis, special committees studied the type and degree of risk and the mode of protection that would be most effective, including armed escorts or guards, mobile phones, bulletproof vehicles and temporary relocation, an Education International study reported. In 2010, the government offered teachers at risk ‘provisional status’ so that they could relocate rapidly while they waited for police to carry out a risk assessment. According to the National Ministry of Education, of the 600 teaching staff who reported receiving death threats in 2011, 38 left the country, 282 were given temporary transfers and 38 were transferred permanently.
Addressing education’s role in conflict

In the far south of Thailand, ethnic Malay Muslim insurgent groups have attacked schools at least in part due to their perception that schools have in the past been used as a means to impose Buddhism, Thai language and Thai versions of history on ethnic Malay Muslims. Some 59 teachers were assassinated in 2009-2012.

The education authorities decided that protection against attacks on schools and assassinations of teachers could be increased by making changes to the curriculum and adopting staffing policies that help build relations with the local community.

Major changes included increasing by five-fold the number of hours of Islamic religious instruction and switching from a five-day to a six-day week to accommodate the extra lessons; recruiting thousands of Malay Muslim teachers locally instead of relying on bringing in Thai Buddhist teachers from outside the area, who are the main targets of attack; and incorporating the teaching of English and the local Malay language.
Education policy and planning

In countries at risk of conflict, addressing education-related grievances can play an important part in reducing the risk of attacks on schools, students and education personnel. Where unequal access is a source of tension, education authorities should ensure that there are fair criteria for allocating resources. Where curricula are perceived to be biased against one ethnic group because classes are taught in an alien language or because alien cultural values, a different religion or distorted history are being taught, curriculum reform can reduce the potential motives for attack. Strengthening education for peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for human rights and responsible citizenship in the curriculum may also help reduce conflict and build peace.

In countries where attacks on education have taken place, every year that passes without a school being rehabilitated and reopened after an attack can mean a lost year of education for its students. While conflict is ongoing, it is often too dangerous to attempt to rebuild schools, but also when it ends, governments frequently lack the funds or capacity to repair and rehabilitate schools quickly, as has been the case in Afghanistan and earlier in Sierra Leone, for instance. As a result, it can take many years to overcome the impact of attacks. Repair and rebuilding of education facilities may therefore require sustained, large-scale collaboration with international donors and NGOs to fill funding and capacity gaps.

Protecting higher education

Protecting higher education can include some measures similar to those used within primary and secondary schools, such as using on-campus security guards or escorts and strengthening gates, walls, fences and windows. But it can also include other types of measures. Distance learning programmes and scholarship schemes for studying, teaching or researching abroad, for instance, have enabled education to continue away from the source of threats. GCPEA’s recent research examining the relationship between autonomy and security concluded that enhancing university autonomy vis-à-vis the state can also contribute to reducing the risk of attacks, particularly where universities provide their own security guards, by reducing the likelihood of confrontation between students and the forces of the state and the likelihood of arbitrary arrest over issues of academic freedom.
Advocacy

Reporting and advocacy by international human rights organizations, NGOs and UN agencies have increased awareness of attacks and encouraged improved response and prevention. Data from monitoring have been used to press military forces to vacate schools that they have been using for military purposes in Afghanistan, DRC and South Sudan, for example, and to seek funds for repairing and resupplying damaged schools. In some countries, such as India, organizations have tried to persuade governments to stop using schools as voting stations or teachers as polling officers during political elections, which can heighten their vulnerability to attack. Human rights organizations and trade union movements have advocated internationally for the release of arbitrarily detained, tortured or imprisoned students and academics in countries such as Colombia, Iran, Iraq and Turkey.
Key recommendations

Attacking schools, universities, students, teachers and academics is a common tactic in situations of conflict and insecurity around the world. While some progress has been made, much more can and should be done to protect education:

• States should investigate, prosecute and, if guilt is proven, punish individuals responsible for ordering, bearing command responsibility for, or taking part in, attacks on education. Regional and international tribunals should, similarly, give specific consideration to the range of violations that constitute attacks against education.

• Governments, the United Nations, regional peacekeepers and armed non-state groups should refrain from using schools and universities for military purposes; they should endorse the Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict and incorporate them into their doctrine and policies.

• Government leaders and leaders of armed non-state groups should make clear public statements that attacks on education are prohibited and issue clear military orders to this effect. States should also ensure that their domestic law criminalizes all elements of attacks on education in line with international humanitarian and human rights law.

• Governments of states where attacks occur should rigorously monitor and investigate attacks against students, teachers, academics and other education personnel, and schools and universities, as well as the impact of such attacks, and use that information to coordinate responses. At the international level, the human rights treaty monitoring bodies should more systematically raise the issue of attacks on education and military use of schools in their examination of states, and governments and civil society should provide more information about these violations in their submissions.

• Where safety concerns allow, UN agencies, NGOs, peace-keeping forces and governments should undertake or support negotiations with parties to a conflict in order to reach agreement regarding respect for schools as safe sanctuaries and re-opening closed schools.

• Governments should ensure education facilities, staff and students are not used for electoral tasks and political events whenever it can be reasonably expected that such use would heighten the risk of attack.

• Education ministries should adopt conflict-sensitive curricula and resourcing policies to ensure that education does not trigger tensions and become a target for attack.

• States should protect higher education institutions at all times and prevent violence and intimidation against academics by introducing and implementing policies, regulations and laws that promote both institutional autonomy and the security of higher education communities.
This study, undertaken under the auspices of GCPEA, builds on the previous two Education under Attack studies published by UNESCO in 2007 and 2010. For the first time, it is published by a group of agencies rather than a single agency. Since the last study, which covered incidents up to mid-2009, there has been a huge increase in reporting of attacks and, in turn, our understanding of the problem and what should be done about it has deepened and changed. This study aims to make new information and analysis available, extensively covering four years of attacks on education from January 2009 to December 2012, but also including information on key incidents in the first nine months of 2013. Changes in the amount of information available and the scope and research resources of the study make it impossible to determine whether there has been an increase in attacks or, rather, more extensive monitoring or reporting of them.
Palestinian schoolgirls write on the blackboard of a classroom, damaged during Operation Pillar of Defence, at a school in Gaza City on 24 November 2012.

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Definitions of terms for data collection purposes

Types of attacks
This study focuses on violent attacks on education: threats or deliberate use of force against students, teachers, academics and any other education personnel, as well as attacks on educational buildings, resources, materials and facilities, including transport. These attacks may be carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic or religious reasons.

The common thread is that these incidents involve the deliberate use of, or threat to use, force in ways that disrupt, harm or deter the provision of education and enjoyment of the right to education.

The study additionally reports on the use of schools for military or security operations by armed forces, or police or other security forces, or by armed non-state groups, including rebel forces or any other armed military, ethnic, political, religious or sectarian group. This is an issue of concern because the military use of education buildings and facilities can turn them into a target for attack and can displace students, teachers, academics and other education personnel, thereby serving to deny students access to education.

It also reports on systematic denial of the right to education by the state or armed non-state groups, for instance, where a government punishes student involvement in political protests by preventing participants from continuing their studies or where armed groups issue edicts ordering schools to close or stay closed.

Some incidents that do not involve direct violence are reported if they represent a denial of education imposed by force. An illustrative example is the unilateral imposition by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) of a firing range within a few hundred metres of a school in Janiba village in the West Bank putting children at risk and the future of the school in doubt; teachers were arrested on their way to classes because they had entered the firing zone even though the IDF had not informed them that the firing range had been established near their school.6

The study does not count general collateral damage as an attack on education, except regarding incidents in the vicinity of education buildings and facilities where the likely effect of intentional violence is harm to students, education personnel or facilities. For instance, if a bomb is detonated alongside a school with the intention of harming a passing military patrol and the school is damaged or students are killed, that would be counted.

Moreover, the study does not include one-off, non-politically motivated violence by students or individual adults, such as the killing of 20 children and six staff members at Sandy Hook Elementary School by a lone gunman in Newtown, Connecticut, United States on 14 December 2012. Such incidents, while devastating, are not addressed by this study because they are not carried out by armed groups or armed forces, or individuals associated with them, for ideological, political, military, religious or sectarian motives.

Targets of attack
Victims may include students, teachers, academics and all other education personnel, including support and transport staff (e.g. janitors, bus drivers, building contractors); education officials (local and national); education trade unionists; and education aid workers. ‘Personnel’ includes anyone working to support education, paid or unpaid, short-term or long-term.

Other targets include educational structures and buildings (e.g. temporary learning spaces, schools, colleges, universities, district education offices, education ministry offices, temporary and permanent examination halls, educational printers’ and publishers’ offices, warehouses or printing works), education resources, materials and facilities, and transport and supply vehicles. Targets also include education-related occasions or special events which may or may not take place in a recognized education building, such as graduation ceremonies; school/university festivals or celebrations; education conferences; or education protests, sit-ins and demonstrations. These may have special symbolic importance and put high numbers at risk.
Motives

Although the study focuses on deliberate attacks against students, education personnel and facilities, the inclusion of incidents among the data presented in the study is not dependent on establishing motive, since this is difficult to prove in many cases through simple data collection unless there are published or publicly broadcasted orders or threats. Instead, data collection has focused on the type of target and effect or likely effect. However, motives have been included in the analysis when they are sufficiently clear or could be reasonably inferred from the data.

Perpetrators

The types of perpetrator covered by the study include armed forces (including international armed forces), police forces, intelligence services, paramilitaries and militias acting on behalf of the state, and armed non-state groups, including rebel forces or any other armed military, ethnic, political, religious or sectarian group. Perpetrators may also include violent mobs that are not organized as an armed group but are animated by similar motives. Although the study does not generally include attacks of a criminal nature, it does look at the phenomenon of attacks by armed organized criminal groups, including drug cartels, and the impact of related security operations in those situations where violence is widespread and there is a pattern of attacking education targets. These are included where the criminal organizations operate on a scale comparable to some armed groups, using military grade weapons, seeking to control or dominate areas of territory, perhaps provoking a military response, or extending their violence beyond pure criminality to include political targets.

Schools

For the purposes of this study, ‘school’ is often used as shorthand for a recognizable education facility or place of learning. In other places, the short form ‘schools and universities’ is used to refer to the whole gamut of early learning centres, schools, colleges and universities.

Students

‘Student’ refers to anyone being taught or studying at any level, from kindergarten to university, or in adult learning, in both formal and non-formal programmes.

Disappearances

In this study the terms ‘were disappeared’ or ‘was disappeared’ or ‘forcibly disappeared’ or ‘enforced disappearance’ apply only to disappearances with the participation of agents of the state, whether state forces or proxies such as paramilitary forces or militia. Disappearances of people where there is no participation by agents of the state are referred to in this study as ‘abductions with whereabouts unknown’ or ‘abducted and remain missing’ or simply ‘disappearances’.

Criteria for including country profiles

A significant number of attacks on education occur in countries where there is conflict. But incidents, notably those targeting higher education, also occur in countries not affected by conflict, particularly those where fundamental freedoms are restricted. Therefore, the focus of the study is not restricted to situations of armed conflict.

Although all countries where known attacks have been committed during the reporting period are included in the study, only those countries in which a minimum threshold of attacks has been documented are analysed in depth in the Country profiles section of the report. The threshold is an approximate measure, referring to countries where at least five incidents have taken place or five people have been harmed, and where either at least one of those incidents is a direct attack on a school or university or at least one student, teacher or academic has been killed from 2009 to 2013.

Use of education data

The statistical information on enrolment and literacy rates in profiled countries should be treated with caution, especially in the case of those countries that have experienced considerable disruption due to armed conflict, insecurity or instability. Though formally correct, such statistical data may contain outdated information and may not capture with full accuracy the actual educational situation of a country or of a particular area where attacks are occurring within a country.
Methods of data collection and analysis

The research team undertook a comprehensive review of the literature in English and conducted research into and analysis of information made available by UN agencies, human rights and development organizations, government bodies, scholar rescue organizations and trade unions as well in media reports, using standard sets of research terms. To research specific incidents, online searches were carried out using a detailed list of combinations of search terms for each country. The terms included the name of the country or geographic area, year, type of victim or target and type or method of attack. The resulting information was then screened for reliability and compatibility with the study’s definitions and terms of reference. For media and human rights sources, reliability was assessed using a range of criteria, including in the case of media reports, whether a professional news agency was used, whether the language was objective, whether professional standards of good-quality journalism had been observed, and whether there appeared to be any political bias. Where there was uncertainty about the quality or independence of the source, we sought advice on its reliability from in-country researchers, and development and human rights experts.

Tailored online research was carried out in four languages: English, French, Spanish and, to a limited extent, Arabic. In addition, a detailed questionnaire was sent to selected field offices of some GCPEA member agencies to complement information culled during the extensive review of government, UN, NGO and media reports covering all years of the reporting period.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of human rights and development organizations and relevant trade unions in affected countries, as well as those monitoring particular countries. Focused follow-up investigations were carried out by researchers based in a small number of affected countries, including Colombia, Egypt, Mexico, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

Where numbers of attacks are cited in the study, they are drawn either from a particular reliable source such as the UN, in which case the source is cited, or they are a tally of reported individual incidents compiled from other secondary sources, including media reports and reports by human rights organizations of individual attacks, each of which is cited.

A summary of incidents for each country was prepared and a tally produced for broad categories of incident, target or victim. From this information, and in some cases from complementary interviews, data were triangulated, where possible, to avoid double counting of incidents. A chronological list of reported incidents for each country was created, along with citations. All reports of incidents concerning the same named victim, or same named target in the same location within several days, were compared to remove duplication and ensure reliable reporting. Where figures for the same incident differed, the more conservative count was used.

The study was extensively reviewed by experts in human rights, international law, education-in-emergencies, and research methodology.

Challenges and limitations of data collection and analysis

Monitoring and reporting of attacks on education are improving but, without a global system for systematically gathering data, all figures on attacks should be treated with caution. The figures in this study are compiled from a wide range of sources of varying quality – from UN monitoring to human rights and media reports – each of which has its own limitations. For example, data in the UN Secretary-General’s reports on children and armed conflict include only those incidents that the UN has been able to verify, which are typically a small sub-set of the number of violations actually taking place. The researchers for Education under Attack have striven to present a minimum count of the number of attacks. However, in many places, attacks simply are not being reported consistently or even at all; in others, the dearth of official information necessitates a heavy reliance on media and human rights sources. From those sources, we used only those that we judged to be reliable. The research team, however, did not seek to verify each case presented in this study. What the figures presented in this study do indicate – with all their
limitations – is that the problem is serious and widespread.

Among organizations collecting information on attacks on education there is no commonly agreed data set that would enable accurate analysis of trends across countries. The lack of reliable baselines from which to monitor trends over time, even within the same country, makes it difficult to know with certainty whether attacks in general, and specific types of attack in particular, have increased or decreased over time or have changed in nature or geographic distribution or whether observed changes are more likely to be attributable to increases, decreases or other inconsistencies in reporting.

The nature of the situations in which many attacks on education occur – where armed conflicts are ongoing or security constraints limit the availability of information – places heavy restrictions on how many incidents can be verified or even reported. In many locations, victims are afraid to report to international NGOs on education-related or other types of incident because they are scared of retribution if they are identified. For instance, in Gaza, many human rights groups are reluctant to report on child recruitment by Palestinian armed groups for fear of reprisals. In many parts of Afghanistan, it is too dangerous for community elders to visit the offices of NGOs to provide information lest they be tracked back to their villages by anti-government groups. And the local staff of those NGOs may themselves be reluctant to report what information they do receive for fear of reprisals. For these reasons, the picture presented by the study is inevitably incomplete.

In some locations, there is limited access to mobile phone networks, telephone landlines, faxes or email to report information, along with a lack of information management systems in which to store it and compare sources. For example, the Nigerian military banned the use of satellite phones in north-east Nigeria because, they claimed, the group Boko Haram had used satellite phones to plan attacks on schools. Rigorous collection and verification of data are similarly complicated in some contexts where governments tightly control the flow of information and may themselves be perpetrators of attacks. Often, in these situations, there are very few sources of information and the few organizations that may be monitoring attacks may sympathize with the opposition group being targeted by the government and therefore may be biased in their reporting. Even where governments are not responsible for committing attacks and may be taking measures to prevent them, there may be political sensitivities that make them reluctant to publicly share data about attacks.

For some types of attack, there appear to be systematic gaps in information. For example, data collected on child recruitment and sexual violence do not always specify the location in which these violations occur; consequently, it is more difficult, in some cases, to determine whether there may be a pattern of these kinds of incidents occurring in schools or along school routes. In cases where teachers, academics or other personnel are killed, wounded or arrested, information is often missing that would help to distinguish whether or not they were targeted because of their professional status or the exercise of their profession, or for unrelated reasons that fall outside the scope of this study. The same is true of students, particularly in higher education. When figures are provided for the number of schools damaged or destroyed, typically there is no information on how many of these were targeted and how many were incidents of collateral damage. In this study, it is specified when it is unknown whether attacks are targeted and those incidents are not counted in any aggregate figures of attacks. As a result, the aggregate figures are likely to be undercounts.

The difficulty of cross-checking incidents across different sources, with the exception of major incidents that have drawn considerable national or international attention, is also a limitation of the study’s data collection and analysis. Even where electronic information management systems are being used to assist verification and are able to draw on data from a number of systems, as they are in Palestine, it may not be possible to match up data from different sources unless the same unique identities are assigned to the same schools where attacks have occurred or the same spelling is used.
To date, rigorous research whether quantitative or qualitative into the impact of attacks, particularly the long-term impact, is lacking. So, too, are in-depth evaluations studying the outcomes of measures taken by governments, NGOs and communities aimed at preventing or responding to attacks. As a result, for the sections on the impact of attacks and responses to attacks, the study has had to rely primarily on case study evidence and reports of measures undertaken and challenges faced.

Finally, due to time and resource constraints, field-based country research, particularly into the impacts of attacks and the outcomes of prevention and response measures at local and national levels, was extremely limited. For this study, it was not possible to undertake in-depth discussions with students, teachers and other education personnel, and the families and communities of which they are a part. Consequently, these important voices are often missing from the analysis. However, interviews with country-level informants, including ministry staff in a small number of cases, human rights researchers, and NGO and UN programme staff, as well as data provided in response to requests for information and a thorough review of existing literature, have helped to provide a more complete picture.

5 The reporting period overlaps with that of Education under Attack 2010, which covered the period from 1 January 2007 to mid-2009. The reporting period for Education under Attack 2014 was set at the beginning of 2009 to enable full reporting for the four calendar years 2009 to 2012. Research and production schedules and associated time constraints did not allow full reporting of incidents in 2013.


7 There are other limitations on which countries the UN Secretary-General’s reports cover. See ‘Monitoring, assessment and reporting’ in Part I of this study.

8 Interviews with human rights groups by Brendan O’Malley in Gaza, May 2012.

9 “Nigeria bans sat phones in northeast after attacks,” AFP, 19 June 2013.
Female students stand in the doorway of a burnt classroom at Maiduguri Experimental School, a private school attacked by the armed Islamist group Boko Haram, in Maiduguri, Nigeria, 12 May 2012.

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Scale and nature of attacks on education

Thousands of targeted attacks on education have been reported across dozens of countries and spanning most regions of the world in the period covered by this study, 2009-2013.

The vast majority of these attacks involved either the bombing, shelling or burning of schools or universities, or the killing, injury, kidnapping, abduction or arbitrary arrest of students, teachers and academics. Some were carried out by armed forces or security forces, others by armed non-state groups or in some cases by armed criminal groups.

In addition, education facilities were used as bases, barracks or detention centres by armed groups and armed forces. Moreover, there was significant evidence of children being recruited for use as combatants from schools and some instances of sexual violence by military forces and armed groups against students and teachers.
This study reports on incidents in 30 countries in which a significant pattern of attacks has been found. These are Afghanistan, Bahrain, Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

The 30 countries profiled all have five or more incidents or victims including at least one direct attack on a school or the killing of at least one teacher, student or academic. There are other countries in which evidence of isolated or sporadic attacks on education have been found. For instance, attacks on higher education have also been reported in Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Maldives, Malaysia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Togo, Tunísia, Turkmenistan, UAE, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Vietnam, according to the Scholars at Risk Network. Countries where isolated or sporadic attacks on primary and secondary education were reported include Algeria, Chad, Chile, China, Dominican Republic, France, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunísia and the UK.

The countries very heavily affected — where reports documented 1,000 or more attacks on schools, universities, staff and students or 1,000 or more students, teachers or other education personnel attacked or education buildings attacked or used for military purposes in 2009-2012 — were Afghanistan, Colombia, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan.

In Afghanistan, according to the UN, there were 1,110 or more attacks on school-level education, including arson attacks, explosions and suicide bombings. Staff were threatened, killed and kidnapped.

In Pakistan, armed groups, particularly the Pakistani Taliban, attacked at least 838 schools, mostly by blowing up school buildings, according to primary research by the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. In the vast majority of cases, school buildings were blown up at night using explosives detonated remotely or by timers. Others were shelled or subjected to grenade or armed attacks. Few of the perpetrators were arrested or...
prosecuted yet hundreds of schools were destroyed, depriving hundreds of thousands of children of an education. A compilation of human rights and media reports suggests that at least 30 schoolchildren were killed and 102 injured in attacks at or en route to school in Pakistan from 2009 to 2012, and at least 138 school students and staff were reported to have been kidnapped.

Colombia was one the most dangerous places in the world to be a teacher, with the highest reported number of teachers killed or receiving death threats: some 140 teachers were killed from 2009 to 2012, 1,086 received death threats, and 305 were forced to leave their homes because their lives were at risk, according to the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), a prominent Colombian NGO monitoring labour rights.
In Sudan, there were sustained attacks on higher education: at least 15 university students were reported killed, at least 479 injured, and more than 1,040 arrested or detained during 2009-2012. Most of these violations occurred during student demonstrations at universities, though several of those students injured or arrested were involved in protests on wider political issues. In one incident, some 450 student rooms at Omdurman Islamic University in Khartoum were set on fire by security agents and supporters of the National Congress Party. Some students were reported to have been abducted by security agents and tortured.

In some countries, there were more than a thousand schools destroyed but it was not clear how many were targeted deliberately. During the civil conflict in Syria, by April 2013 it was estimated that close to 2,500 schools had been damaged or destroyed. Both sides used schools either as military headquarters, military bases or detention centres, and the Syrian Network for Human Rights alleged that the government had turned a thousand schools into detention and torture centres. Human Rights Watch presented evidence that schools had been deliberately targeted, in one case causing the death of 12 students. During Libya’s civil war in 2011, some 1,900 schools were damaged or destroyed. It is not known how many were deliberately targeted, but at least 221 were reportedly used by armed groups, making them a potential target, and 27 deliberate attacks on schools were documented.

There were other heavily affected countries where 500 or more of attacks took place. For instance, in Yemen, there were more than 720 incidents involving the use of force affecting schools, school teachers and school students, although not all of them were targeted attacks. These incidents included looting, shelling, bombardment, military use by armed forces or armed groups, arson and threats to personnel. In Côte d’Ivoire, armed groups and military forces destroyed, damaged, looted or used 480 schools and universities during the 2010-2011 and 50 university students were attacked.

Some of the most devastating and high profile single incidents occurred in Somalia, where a suicide attack at a compound containing the Ministry of Education and other ministries in October 2011 killed more than 100 people, many of whom were students and their parents. They were gathering to obtain examination results needed for scholarships to study abroad. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. In a pre-recorded interview, their suicide bomber reportedly condemned the education system and criticized students for wanting to study abroad. Another suicide bombing at Benadir University’s graduation ceremony in Mogadishu in 2009 killed 22 people, including the ministers of education, higher education and health, the dean of the medical school, professors, students and their relatives.

Death threats and the threat of kidnap were mostly directed at individuals but some were also directed at large groups of students or teachers. In Mexico, for instance, armed criminal groups threatened teachers with kidnapping or other violence if they did not hand over a portion of their salaries. In some cases, individuals or individual schools were targeted while, in another, the entire teaching staff of a specific education district was threatened.

Since the first global study on attacks on education was published in 2007, increases or decreases in the reported number of attacks in individual countries have been observed, often because of changes in the conflicts or in the political situations in which they occur. In Afghanistan, for instance, the total number of attacks on education fell dramatically after 2009. According to one piece of research, an apparent change in the Taliban’s policy on attacking schools was believed to have resulted from the Taliban’s gradual transformation into a military-political insurgency, its concern to respond to community pressure regarding schools, and an apparent increasing willingness on the government’s part to negotiate with the Taliban and agree concessions on education. However, evidence that attacks on schools increased in 2012 and spread to new areas threw into question the reality of that supposed policy change.

Some countries that were previously heavily affected, such as Nepal, are no longer experiencing a pattern of attacks on education. In Nepal’s case, the number of incidents decreased very significantly when the
Maoist insurgency ended in 2006 and, although attacks flared up in the Terai region after that, they petered out at the start of 2009. By contrast, in many Middle Eastern and North African countries, there was a sharp rise in attacks and in the military use of schools as Arab Spring protests and uprisings took hold from December 2010 onwards.

In collecting and analysing data from the period 2009-2012, this study has found a significantly greater number of countries in which there is evidence of very high or high levels of attack on education compared with the periods covered by the previous two Education under Attack studies published in 2010 and 2007. It is difficult to know whether this represents an actual increase in incidence or whether increased attention to this issue among media, human rights groups, and humanitarian and development organizations since the publication of the last two studies, combined with improved access to local media sources via the internet, has simply resulted in the availability of more and better information.
Soldiers inspect the site where an Israeli teenager was critically wounded when a projectile from Gaza slammed into a bus taking children home from school on 7 April 2011 near the southern Israeli Kibbutz of Nahal Oz, Israel.

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Reported motives and perpetrators of attacks

The reported motives for attacks on schools, students and teachers include, in no particular order, to:

- destroy symbols of government control or demonstrate control over an area by the anti-government element;
- block the education of girls;
- block education that is perceived to impose alien religious or cultural values;
- react against curricula that are perceived to meet the preferences of the elite or the majority group, or that portray certain identity groups in an inferior or hostile way;
- prevent schools teaching a language, religion, culture or history alien to the particular identity group;
- restrict teacher trade union activity;
- threaten a particular ethnic group;
- abduct children for use as combatants, sex slaves or logistical support for military operations;
- cover up the theft of funds or other resources;
- raise money by extortion or ransom; or
- settle or extend local disputes, e.g. over land taken for use by a school.

The reported motives vary according to each context, but also may vary within each situation and there may be multiple motives for any single attack. For instance, in southern Thailand, the motive of ethnic Malay Muslim insurgent groups in attacking schools may stem from their perception that schools are being or have been used as a means to impose Thai language, Buddhism and Thai versions of history on ethnic Malay Muslims, but it may also be a means of challenging government control of the area.60

Depending on the context, attacks may be carried out by any number of the following groups: armed forces (including international armed forces), police forces, intelligence services, paramilitaries and militias acting on behalf of the state, and armed non-state groups including rebel forces and any other armed military, ethnic, political, religious or sectarian group; or in some cases by armed criminal groups. Attacks
Children and schools are often the first to suffer the consequences of armed conflict. Mines and unexploded ordnance pose a continuing danger to children, including on their way to school. In Misrata, Libya, a female student attends class in an environment still marked by the fighting.

© 2009 AP Photo/Mustafa Quraishi
may also be carried out by violent mobs that are not organized as an armed group.

In reviewing available evidence, it appears that certain types of attacks are more likely to be carried out by government or government-backed forces, such as arrests, imprisonment, torture and attacks on higher education. These government-instigated attacks are typically linked to motives such as restricting trade union activity, quelling dissent and controlling information, or marginalizing a particular ethnic or political group. Other types of attack may sometimes be performed by government forces but are more likely to be carried out by armed groups including pro-government paramilitaries and militia or anti-government forces, such as abduction of students and teachers and attacks on government schools. They are often linked to motives that may include spreading fear among civilians. When perpetrated by anti-government groups the motives may include undermining government control over an area or community, preventing the education of certain groups such as girls, or reacting against perceived bias in curricula and teaching that may reflect wider social, religious or ethnic discrimination or conflict.

In some cases, there is a blurring of the line between armed groups and armed criminal groups, and between military and criminal motives. In some countries, such as the Philippines, armed groups have kidnapped teachers as a means to secure ransom money to fund their activities. In Mexico, killings, kidnappings and threats, particularly against teachers, have reportedly been carried out by armed criminal gangs. In Colombia, criminal groups have attacked schools in similar ways to armed groups, seeking to control territory and using schools as recruitment grounds. In Medellín, for instance, criminal groups, linked to paramilitary successor groups, for ideological and economic motives have threatened or killed students en route to or from school.

The study has found a wide range of motives ascribed to the various attacks on education, but it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions because it is difficult to find solid evidence for the motive behind many individual incidents.
Syrian rebels take position in a classroom at an empty school to observe the movement of regime forces nearby in the Bustan al-Basha district in the northern city of Aleppo on 26 October 2012.

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Military use of schools

Military use of school and university facilities was reported in at least 24 of the 30 countries profiled during the 2009-2013 period: Afghanistan, CAR, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Indonesia, Israel/Palestine, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

Education buildings were used as barracks to house soldiers/fighters, bases to mount security operations, fighting positions, prisons or detention centres, interrogation centres, torture centres, training grounds for soldiers and places to store weapons. Schools were also used to indoctrinate, recruit and train students.

The forces using the schools included armed groups, paramilitaries, armed forces, police forces and international forces – the UN recorded five incidents of school occupation by international military forces in Afghanistan in 2010, for instance.66

The country with by far the most reported incidents in 2009-2012 was Syria where military use arising from the conflict spiked in 2011-2012. Although it does not specify exact figures, the UN reported numerous incidents of government forces using schools as temporary bases or detention centres and there were allegations that the Free Syrian Army used schools in a number of areas as bases and as places to store ammunition during this period. Furthermore, the Syrian Network for Human Rights alleged in mid-January 2013 that government forces had used approximately 1,000 schools as detention and torture centres and used schools to house security and intelligence personnel or as positions from which to shell the surrounding area. Across 14 other countries with the highest incidence of military use in 2009-2012 – Afghanistan, CAR, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, India, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand and Yemen – 923 schools and universities were reported as being used for military purposes.67 In Libya, 221 schools were used by armed groups during the 2011 uprising, according to a UN respondent,68 and at least one school was used to detain hundreds of prisoners.69 In India in 2010, more than 129 schools were used as
A police bunker set up atop a school where children were studying in Eragaon, Dantewada, India, 10 November 2009.

© 2009 AP Photo/Mustafa Quraishi
barracks or bases in operations, particularly in states most affected by the Maoist insurgency. Police and paramilitary forces occupied school buildings, either temporarily or for extended periods ranging from six months to three years during their counter-insurgency operations. Some were occupied for over a decade. In Thailand, security forces occupied at least 79 schools in 2010 and continued to use schools as barracks and bases for at least the next year, Human Rights Watch reported.

Colombia and the Philippines specifically prohibit the military use of schools in military policy, and national legislation bans the practice unequivocally in the Philippines. Yet in Colombia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recorded 75 cases of occupation of school facilities by all armed actors during 2009-2012; and in the Philippines, the military were responsible for most of the 56 incidents of military use of schools in 2010 to 2012 recorded by the UN. They used some schools as barracks or bases for over a year; used functioning schools as weapons and ammunition stores in 2010, and, in 2011, used at least 14 schools during the course of counter-insurgency operations.

In many countries, the military use of schools led to them being attacked or was employed as a justification by perpetrators of attacks. In Somalia, for instance, Al-Shabaab fighters used a school in Mogadishu as a firing position while the students were still in the classrooms, drawing return fire from pro-government forces. Five rockets hit the school compound, with one striking and killing eight people just as the students were leaving the school.

In some places, such as India, rebels claimed they were attacking schools because they were or had been occupied by security forces even though this was not always the case. When using schools, police often fortified the buildings, set up sentry boxes and lookout shelters and dug trenches or created barriers from rings of barbed wire and sandbags, leaving schools resembling military installations rather than neutral places of learning. This may have increased the risk that they might be viewed as legitimate military targets even after the troops had left.
Recruitment of children and sexual violence at schools or along school routes

Recruitment of children for military purposes and sexual violence are addressed in this study only insofar as they amount to a type of attack on schools and students. While forced recruitment and sexual violence happen in a range of settings during conflict, parties may specifically target schools or school routes because they are places where children are known to be concentrated. Although child recruitment and sexual violence are regularly reported by the UN, there is very little reporting on how many of these violations take place at school or along school routes.

This study found evidence of recruitment of children from school, or en route to or from school, during the 2009-2012 period in at least six countries: Colombia, DRC, Pakistan, Somalia, Thailand and Yemen. In Colombia, guerrilla and paramilitary groups were reported to recruit children at schools; child recruits were used as spies or to transport arms or pass on messages to other students in schools, as well as to run their drug business inside schools. In Pakistan, children were recruited from madrassas (religious schools) and mainstream schools. In some cases, they were lured or abducted from schools and madrassas to train to become suicide bombers.

Recruitment methods varied across countries and ranged from selection through indoctrination programmes at school and the offering of inducements, to abduction en route, the use of death threats and the rounding up of whole groups of students at schools.

For example, in Colombia, armed groups waited outside schools to talk to children, find out information, and recruit and control them. In Yemen, Houthi rebels used students and teachers to recruit children at schools for them. In DRC, a breakaway rebel group seized 32 boys from a school, tied them up and marched them off to military camp to train to fight.

In Somalia, where thousands of children were given military training or recruited, mostly from schools, teachers were ordered by the armed group Al-Shabaab to enlist them or release them for training. One witness told Human Rights Watch how students scrambled to jump out of school windows on the second and third storey to escape Al-Shabaab members when they came to their school.

Isolated cases of sexual violence against students and teachers perpetrated by armed forces or armed groups at, or en route to or from, schools or universities were also reported in DRC and Somalia. Two incidents in CAR and India also were reported in 2012-2013.

Human Rights Watch research in Somalia found evidence of girls being lined up at schools and taken to be ‘wives’ of Al-Shabaab fighters. In one case, the girls were selected at gunpoint; one who refused to be taken was shot dead in front of her classmates. In another incident, after 12 girls were taken by Al-Shabaab, the teacher reported that some 150 female students dropped out of school. One of the 12 taken, a 16-year-old, was beheaded after refusing to marry a fighter much older than her, and her head was brought back to be shown to the remaining girls at the school as a warning.

The number of incidents is likely to be underreported, especially for incidents en route to or from school.

Attacks on higher education

The study found attacks on higher education facilities, students and academics and military use of universities were reported in 28 of the 30 profiled countries in 2009-2012. The exceptions were CAR and Mali. Attacks on higher education over the reporting period included assassination, killing or injury of students and academics, arbitrary arrest, torture, abduction, kidnapping, imprisonment, and the bombing of groups of students, individual academics and higher education facilities. There were also incidents of universities being taken over or shut down by force. These attacks on higher education were carried out both by government armed forces, security forces or police and by armed non-state groups, including guerrillas, rebels, paramilitaries and militias. The difference from school-level attacks is that, in higher education, a greater proportion of attacks involve arbitrary arrest or forms of persecution of named individuals and there are far fewer attacks on
buildings. In this regard, they are closer in type to attacks on teacher trade unionists.

The countries with the highest number of reported attacks on higher education included Sudan and Yemen. The largest number of university students killed was reported in Yemen, where 73 higher education students were killed during the 2011 uprising and 139 were injured, 38 of whom were permanently disabled as a result of their injury, according to the Wafa Organization for Martyrs’ Families and Wounded Care. However, it is not known how many of these killings and injuries occurred on campus or in the vicinity of universities, or because the victims were being targeted as students. By contrast in Sudan, far fewer university students were reportedly killed (15), but far more were injured (479), many when police and security forces used excessive force against students demonstrating on campus over university policies.

The largest number of university student arrests was reported in Sudan – with more than a thousand arrested, mostly in incidents directly related to protests on education issues or carried out at university dormitories or other education facilities. Where killings took place, in many cases they were related to excessive use of force by security forces against student demonstrators or were targeted killings of individual academics and students. Some of the most serious incidents involved raids carried out on student dormitories or other forms of campus residence in Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria,
Police officers stand guard after a mail bomb exploded at the Monterrey Institute of Technology, on the outskirts of Mexico City, Mexico, 8 August 2011.

© 2011 AP Photo/Arnulfo Franco
Pakistan, Sudan and Syria. For instance, in September 2013, gunmen stormed a dormitory in the middle of the night at a college in Yobe, Nigeria, and opened fire, killing at least 50 students; and security forces killed seven students, injured 49 and arrested 330 in two raids on dormitories at Damascus and Aleppo universities in Syria in 2011 and 2012.

Cases of abduction and torture were also reported in some countries. In Sudan, a Darfuri student at the University of Khartoum’s Department of Education was reportedly seized by National Intelligence and Security Service agents in front of the university on 10 February 2010. His body was found the next day in a street in Khartoum and showed signs of torture.

Attacks on higher education facilities – damaging, destroying or threatening university buildings and campuses – occurred in at least 10 countries during 2009-2012. In Nigeria, at least 15 universities were reported to have received an email message in September 2011, apparently from the violent jihadist movement, Boko Haram, warning them that their campuses were on a target list for bombings. In Mexico, bombs were sent to six university campuses or research institutes, sometimes causing injury, and six were listed as targets, reportedly by a group opposing nanotechnology research.

Military use of higher education facilities

Military use of higher education facilities appears to be less pervasive than military use of school facilities, but has been a problem in several countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Yemen, where the breakaway First Armoured Division forces occupied Sana’a University Old Campus in 2011, halting university life for 10 months. In Somalia, university campuses were used by the armed group Al-Shabaab, as well as by African Union forces in the international peacekeeping force, AMISOM, and government troops, particularly during 2012 military campaigns that drove Al-Shabaab out of their strongholds.

Motives and targets

The motives for attacks on higher education also varied from one context to another, but were often quite different from those for attacks on school-level
education, and bore a closer resemblance to those for attacks on teacher trade unionists. Many attacks on higher education were connected to a government’s desire to prevent the growth of opposition movements, restrict political debate or criticism of policies, and prevent alternative points of view from being expressed or gaining support. Others related to government authorities’ wish to restrict education trade union activity, silence student protests, prevent certain subjects being researched by academics (ranging from human rights issues to concerns about HIV/AIDS) or limit the influence of, or exposure to, foreign ideas.

As with attacks on schools, students and teachers, there were also cases of sectarian attacks and ethnic groups being targeted. In Sudan, for example, unknown men attacked 15 Darfuri students in their dormitory at Khartoum University in 2009. In Ethiopia, in June 2012, security forces reportedly stormed dormitories and arrested engineering students at Haromaya University in Oromia to break up a demonstration and held them outside without food for two days.

In addition, attacks on higher education were carried out as a show of strength or in retaliation for military gains unrelated to education. The Taliban said they launched a double suicide bombing on the International Islamic University in Islamabad on 20 October 2009, which killed two female and three male students, in retaliation for a Pakistani army offensive in South Waziristan. During Operation Cast Lead in Gaza at the turn of 2008-2009, Israeli forces damaged 14 of the 15 higher education institutions in the Gaza Strip, destroying three colleges and six university buildings. The action appeared to be part of a strategy of destroying enemy infrastructure, as reportedly declared by the Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff.

**Long-term impact of attacks on education**

There is a dearth of research quantifying the long-term impact on education of the types of attack documented in this study. In some countries, education authorities or international NGOs have documented the immediate impact, such as the number of schools damaged or destroyed, or the number of teachers or students killed or injured, but information on how the provision of education is affected, let alone the wider social and economic impact, is scant. However, a wide range of potential effects can be hypothesized from individual effects documented in media and human rights reports and research into attacks on education.

Where attacks on education are persistent in an area or the threat of force is used to block recovery from attacks, the effects may well include any number of the following effects which impinge on student attainment, and access to good-quality education:

- chronic disruption of attendance by students, teachers and other education staff;
- permanent drop-out of students, teachers and other education staff;
- falling recruitment of staff, leading to teacher shortages, and declining enrolment of students, hindering attempts to achieve Education for All;
- persistent demotivation and distraction of students, teachers and other education staff by fear or trauma, and other factors that lower the quality of teaching, impinge on students’ ability to learn;
- damage to or failure to repair or resupply infrastructure, textbooks and other learning materials that reduces access, reduces the quality of teaching and learning, and potentially puts students, teachers and other education staff at risk;
- reduced government capacity to deliver education or develop the education system;
- suspension or reduction in international aid for education;
- falling recruitment of teacher trade unionists, reducing their capacity to provide a teachers’ viewpoint on the development of education.

Across countries where attacks are persistent, UN, media and human rights reports indicate that hundreds of thousands of children have been denied access to education, in some cases for years, because
of the length of time schools are closed: either the reopening or rebuilding of schools is blocked by the security threat or the government does not have the capacity to rebuild in a timely way. For instance, in Yemen, 54 schools were closed for up to two months after 143 attacks on education in 2011, affecting 182,000 children. In Afghanistan, the Ministry of Education reported that more than 590 schools were closed in vulnerable areas as of May 2012, compared to 800 or more in 2009.\textsuperscript{114} In some cases, security threats or prolonged military use block them being rebuilt or reopened, as in India where by 2009 police had occupied some schools for three years and one for a decade,\textsuperscript{115} and South Sudan, where armed forces occupied some schools for up to five years.\textsuperscript{116} Often, the government lacks the capacity to rebuild in a timely manner.

A particularly stark example of this problem was found in Sierra Leone, prior to this study’s reporting period, where pupils and teachers were abducted from schools and where schools and symbols of education were widely targeted for destruction: by the time the decade-long conflict ended in 2002, 87 per cent of schools were unusable due in part to damage caused
by attacks. Three years later, 60 per cent of primary schools and 40 per cent of secondary schools still required major rehabilitation or reconstruction. It is not known for how many years during the conflict those particular schools were out of use but the figures suggest that entire cohorts of children in many areas missed out on between three and 13 years of schooling.117

In those schools that do continue to operate after attacks or threats of attack, the quality of the education provided and the quality of the learning experienced may be greatly reduced. A commonly reported problem is teachers fleeing the area or giving up their jobs. Similarly, students may be withdrawn from school or not sent back to school because of parental fears for their safety. Attacks on schools and recruitment from schools may also be a cause for families or communities uprooting and seeking a place of safety.

Destruction of infrastructure may lead to overcrowding in remaining classrooms and may put children at risk in unsafe learning environments if damage has not been repaired or schools and school grounds not cleared of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous objects. Some schools may be forced to organize double shifts to accommodate students from other schools that have been damaged, reducing the number of classroom hours and subjecting facilities to additional wear-and-tear. Looting and damage of classroom materials may leave students without textbooks and other items that facilitate learning, further affecting the quality of education.

Where schools are damaged, the impact of the resulting lowering of quality of the education offered will be extended for all the time that the schools are not repaired. For example, in Gaza, according to the
damaged (including 18 completely destroyed) in the Israeli military incursion that ended in January 2009 had been repaired by February 2010 because an Israeli blockade prevented construction materials from entering the territory. The effects of the damage therefore continued for at least one year after the damage occurred.

In addition, students and staff may experience prolonged psychological distress, ranging from distraction to trauma, that impairs their ability to study or teach to their full potential, as is the case with students who witness other acts of violence in conflict. A field study in Yemen found that 54 per cent of 1,100 children surveyed had had nightmares after witnessing conflict in their schools or villages, 35 per cent had been aggressive towards their relatives or peers, 22 per cent had considered dropping out of school and 22 per cent were prone to bed-wetting or unconscious urination.

Military use of schools not only makes them a target for attack, but leads to degradation of facilities and furniture. Where classes are ongoing, students and teachers are put at risk from attacks or crossfire or the presence of weapons and are vulnerable to misconduct by troops and security forces, including sexual advances. In many cases, parents withdraw their children from school – and girls are typically the first to be kept at home. Where they do not, dual use of the facilities can lead to overcrowding and a lowered quality of education provided, particularly where military use lasts for long periods – for example, some schools were occupied for three years in India and five years in South Sudan.

Repeated attacks, and the associated security threat, can challenge the capacity of the state to manage or provide education services – ranging from paying teachers and rebuilding or re-supplying education facilities to holding examinations and inspecting schools. Recurrent attacks undermine or halt social and economic development, for which education is a key enabling provision, and can threaten the stability of particular villages, regions or even whole states, undermining government control of the country. This may be a key reason why schools are systematically attacked in some countries.

The destruction of schools in Pakistan was seen as a powerful symbol of the Taliban insurgents’ ability to operate in the border areas with impunity, thereby undermining people’s sense of the government’s ability to assure their safety. A Taliban campaign of assassination of anyone seen to be helping rebuild schools hampered the recovery effort.

Due to the interdependence and interconnectedness of the various components of an education system, attacks on higher education communities and institutions have an impact on all levels of education and society. As with attacks at other levels of education, they put students’ and academics’ lives and liberty at grave risk, as well as those of their families, and may also cause falling enrolment, withdrawal from education and flight of teaching staff. The effects of attacks can be devastating for research and teaching because they trigger retreat, fear and flight and may silence a whole academic community. Attacks on higher education can also limit the subjects that can be studied or researched, restrict international collaboration and undermine the university as a learning institution. They have wider consequences for society, too, in restricting development, particularly the emergence or strengthening of political plurality, accountable government and open democracy.

Response and prevention

So what can be done to stop attacks on education and how can we limit their impact? There are many ways in which the problem is already being addressed. An important first step is to gather more information about the nature, scale and location of the threat through monitoring, assessment and reporting. There are ways to deter attacks by holding perpetrators to account and to avoid military use through laws and policies that prohibit the practice. Numerous ways of improving security for schools have been attempted. Negotiations have been held with armed groups and government forces to treat schools as zones of peace, free of military activity. Education ministries and authorities can address grievances that may increase the risk of attack through conflict-sensitive policies and curricula.
However, while more information has been gathered on prevention and response since the last *Education under Attack* study was published in 2010, rigorous, empirical and comparative research into the effectiveness of different measures is still lacking, in part due to the major methodological challenges of conducting such research.\textsuperscript{124} The appropriateness of the response used depends heavily on the nature of the attacks and their perpetrators, as well as the overall conflict and community dynamics in a given situation. A clear understanding is still needed of exactly how these factors influence the success or failure of a particular intervention in different contexts; the relative advantages of one intervention over another given the nature of attacks, their perpetrators and motives; and the potential negative side effects, unintended consequences and trade-offs.\textsuperscript{125}

**Monitoring, assessment and reporting**

Monitoring, assessment and reporting involve documenting abuses, analysing their impacts, and using the data and analysis for advocacy as well as to inform policy development, service delivery, and other responses intended to prevent or remedy these problems and thereby shield education from attack. For instance, reporting of threats of attack can be used to trigger evacuation, temporary closure of schools or heightened security measures. Documenting military use of schools can facilitate advocacy with the relevant military authorities to end such use. Accurate reports of damage and destruction of schools inform rehabilitation and safety measures. Monitoring and reporting also play a vital role in accountability.

These objectives may require different types of monitoring, while channels for reporting will also vary, depending on the objective. Several mechanisms and processes provide regular channels for monitoring and reporting.

**UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict**

The UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict was established in 2005 through Security Council Resolution 1612 to end six grave violations:

- Recruitment or use of children by armed forces or armed groups;
- Killing or maiming of children;
- Rape and other grave sexual violence against children;
- Attacks against schools and hospitals;
- Denial of humanitarian access to children; and
- Abduction of children

Each year, the UN Secretary-General produces a report to the Security Council on children and armed conflict that includes in its annexes a list naming parties to conflict who have committed one or more of the four ‘trigger’ violations.\textsuperscript{126} In 2011, attacks on schools and hospitals were added as one of those trigger violations.\textsuperscript{127} In 2012 and 2013, the Taliban forces in Afghanistan (including the Tora Bora Front, the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and the Latif Mansur Network), Forces démocratiques de libératiion du Rwanda (FDLR) in DRC, Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qaida in Iraq and the Syrian Armed Forces, intelligence forces, and the Shabbiha militia in Syria were listed as parties that have attacked schools and hospitals.\textsuperscript{128}

A working group of the Security Council has a number of means to urge the listed party to change its behaviour to stop grave violations against children, including submissions to Security Council sanctions committees, referral to the International Criminal Court and field visits.\textsuperscript{129} To be delisted, the UN must verify that the party has ended the grave violation. This is most often achieved through the party implementing an action plan agreed with the UN to end, address and prevent the grave violation.

The first time that a party to the conflict is listed in a specific country, this should lead to the MRM being established to provide timely, reliable and objective information on the six grave violations.\textsuperscript{130} The MRM in any given country is managed by the country task force co-chaired by the UNICEF Representative and the UN Resident Coordinator in countries without a UN Mission, and by the UNICEF Representative and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in
peacekeeping or special political mission settings where there is a Department of Political Affairs or Department for Peacekeeping Operations Mission.

The findings of the Country Task Forces are reported to the UN Secretary-General and distributed via the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict, through the Secretary-General’s country-specific reports on children and armed conflict, and through a quarterly internal Global Horizontal Note (GHN) that provides regular updates on the situation in all MRM countries. Information collected by the Country Task Forces is also used to develop appropriate responses to the violations.

While the MRM covers an important niche for monitoring and reporting, it is specifically established to monitor the situation for schools and does not include attacks on higher education. Also, it is limited to situations of armed conflict, and is not tasked with reporting on the overall impact of attacks on children’s access to education or on the prevention and response measures taken to protect the education system, personnel and students. The MRM only reports on reported incidents that it has been able to verify and therefore may miss cases where monitors lack access or where they cannot otherwise secure accurate information. The information the MRM presents, therefore, will always be about patterns of attacks but will not always give the complete number of attacks.

In the majority of countries affected by attacks on education, there remains a need to further strengthen monitoring and reporting partnerships between UN agencies, international NGOs, human rights and development NGOs, and education ministries and district offices to improve data collection and verification of data, and better inform the range of responses.

There are a number of examples of strong collaboration to draw from.

The Education Cluster

Education clusters, which are present in all major humanitarian emergencies and many post-crisis settings, including in 19 of the countries profiled in this study, can play a positive role in assessing the impact of attacks on education, as well as in monitoring attacks and military use and sharing information to stop them from occurring. Education cluster coordinators and information officers have been instrumental in several countries in developing tools for data collection, and they have been collating, analysing and using information on attacks on schools and their impact, for example, to assess the financial costs and programming needs for appropriate response and to advocate with key partners. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Education Cluster, with the full cooperation of the Ministry of Education, was the catalyst for a nationwide survey on the impact of the post-election conflict on schools in 2010-2011, which involved head teachers in collecting data for the survey. In South Sudan, the Cluster has developed and disseminated briefing notes on military use of schools and collected data that have been useful in negotiations with armed forces to vacate schools. The success of these examples demonstrates that education clusters at country level could have an important role in encouraging wider involvement in monitoring, assessment and the use of collected data to inform a full range of responses. Education clusters can also work with child protection clusters to develop inter-cluster responses. In Israel/Palestine, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict has developed such an approach between the Child Protection and Education Clusters.

Government

Ministries and government bodies have monitored threats as well as the impact of attacks on education as part of their duty to provide education. In many contexts, they are well placed to do so because collecting data on student enrolment, attendance and learning achievements and on teacher attendance and teaching standards, as well as on school infrastructure and learning materials, is a core part of their work.

However, some governments either lack the political will or the capacity to monitor and respond to attacks on education. In some situations, they may themselves be complicit in, or responsible for, violations against students or education personnel or for the military use of education facilities. Governments
may also resist or block international monitoring, even of the activities of rebel groups, for political reasons.

Civil society
Monitoring, data collection, assessment and reporting by civil society, community-based organizations, and national and international NGOs have continued to grow. The development of local organizations’ capacity to do this requires further support. At the international level, Human Rights Watch, Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, CARE and others have published in-depth investigations in recent years.

The most glaring gap in data collection is the absence of global monitoring of attacks on higher education, although rescue networks and Education International do provide international alerts about the cases of individuals. In recent years, Scholars at Risk launched a monitoring project tracking violent and coercive attacks on higher education in a range of countries and regions. There is a good deal of media reporting of such attacks but this study may represent the first attempt to report on the full range of attacks on higher education globally and the methods for continuing to report globally will need to be strengthened over the coming years.

Accountability and ending impunity
The legal framework protecting education
Attacks on education may violate international human rights law, international humanitarian law (also known as the laws of war) or international criminal law, depending on the context. Although these are distinct legal regimes, they overlap and are increasingly interlinked. Each contains rules that protect education explicitly, or protect the conditions necessary for education provision, such as the protection of educational facilities and the lives of students and education staff. The right to education is guaranteed under international human rights law in both conflict and non-conflict situations where states have ratified the relevant treaties, with primary education to be compulsory and available free to all and other levels of education to be available and/or equally accessible to all. Its protection is most effective, however, where states have taken national measures to implement these treaty provisions. States may also be bound to human rights and other legal provisions through customary international law, which applies to all states regardless of whether they have ratified a relevant treaty.

In situations of armed conflict, both international human rights law and international humanitarian law apply. The latter offers protections to students and education staff under its general provision for protecting civilians, and to education facilities insofar as such property is civilian, is not a military objective and its seizure or destruction is not justified by imperative military necessity. Further, international humanitarian law seeks to protect the educational needs of particularly vulnerable groups, notably children, by ensuring that their education continues uninterrupted during armed conflict. The use of schools and universities in support of a military effort is restricted under international humanitarian law but not prohibited in all circumstances.

Under international criminal law, certain acts attract individual criminal responsibility – for example, wilful killing of civilians, torture, wanton destruction or seizure of enemy property, and attacks on civilian objects (including education facilities). Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, there is a specific reference to the prohibition of intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to education provided they are not military objectives. Insofar as inhumane acts such as torture, imprisonment and enforced disappearance are part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population (including students, scholars, and teachers) – even where there is no nexus with armed conflict – they may be considered crimes against humanity and therefore prosecutable under international criminal law.

National law may have even greater potential to deter attacks than international law. National legislation is a key piece of the legal framework, enabling domestic enforcement of protections and prosecutions of perpetrators. The incorporation into national law of, for example, Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court would promise greater deterrence and accountability as well as give more visibility to the protection of education in law.
Comparatively few countries, however, have included attacks on educational facilities as a crime within their national criminal or military laws. According to the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, only 65 countries have enacted domestic legislation implementing the crimes contained in the Rome Statute, while another 35 countries have some form of advanced draft implementing legislation.

Some countries have also introduced legislation, jurisprudence or military policies restricting, and in some cases completely prohibiting, the military use of schools or universities, although this injunction is not consistently enforced. Examples include Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, the Philippines, Poland, South Sudan and the UK.

In the Philippines, for example, the practice of military use of schools has been explicitly banned under both national legislation and military policy – although incidents continue to be reported. A draft law was also under consideration that would criminalize the occupation of schools. Further legal measures to address the problem of attacks have been proposed by a bill that would increase the penalty for election-related violence and another that would make election service voluntary for teachers and other citizens, since violence against teachers and schools is frequently connected with their use during elections. These are promising steps for increasing accountability, though their effectiveness will ultimately depend on the extent to which they are enforced.

In order to promote greater protection of schools and universities during armed conflict, GCPEA has worked with a range of stakeholders to develop and promote the Lucens Guidelines, international guidelines that urge all parties to armed conflict not to use schools and universities for any purpose in support of their military effort. These guidelines respect international law as it stands, are not legally binding in themselves and do not affect existing obligations under international law. They also reflect evidence of good practice already applied by some parties to armed conflict to avoid impinging on students’ safety and education. They are intended to lead to a shift in behaviour that will contribute to better protections for schools and universities in times of armed conflict and, in particular, to a reduction in their use by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in support of the military effort. These guidelines are discussed further in this report in the essay ‘Military use of schools and universities: changing behaviour’.

Strengthening accountability

It is clear that a strong legal framework for the right to education and the protection of education exists, even though there may be ways it can still be further enhanced. However, impunity for those responsible for attacking education is a persistent problem. Accountability means, in its most basic sense, ensuring there are consequences for perpetrating abuses. This is important for purposes of justice, both as an end in itself and because it can play a key role in peace-building by addressing the causes of conflict through legitimate and just ways. It can also have a deterrent effect, contributing to the prevention of future attacks – although it may also be the case that conflict continues because one or more parties does not want to face justice.

There are a range of effective mechanisms and means for holding perpetrators to account available at local, national and international levels, the appropriateness of which depend, for example, on the nature of the perpetrator, where the perpetrator is to be held accountable and whether or not an issue can be addressed domestically. This range covers, for example, civilian criminal trials, military trials, civil suits, travel bans and the freezing of financial assets for holding individual perpetrators to account in domestic fora, and truth commissions and traditional justice mechanisms for both individuals and states or non-state groups. Victims may also be awarded reparation.

At the international level, individual perpetrators may be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) or other international tribunals or have international travel bans and asset freezes imposed; meanwhile, accountability for states may be increased by mechanisms such as the UN Security Council (including through the UN MRM, mentioned above), the Human Rights Council, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and other treaty bodies, regional human rights courts and commissions, or by sanctions or
other embargoes. States – as opposed to individual leaders or military commanders – cannot be prosecuted criminally; therefore, holding them accountable includes increasing the costs to their international diplomacy through stigmatization or ‘naming and shaming’ and by imposing punitive sanctions, where appropriate.

While no one has yet been charged specifically for attacks on education facilities under the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute by the ICC, a handful of cases already on the Court’s docket – and one that has been successfully prosecuted – have mentioned the issue of attacks on schools or the effects that recruitment of children as soldiers can have on education. For example, both the closing arguments and sentencing submission by the Prosecution in the first case at the ICC, against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo from the DRC, as well as several submissions during the reparations phase, included references to the impact that the crime of child recruitment had on education. In the case investigated against Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, with respect to atrocities in Darfur, al-Bashir has been charged with multiple attacks on the civilian population of Darfur that took place from March 2003 to 14 July 2008 as part of the counter-insurgency campaign. These attacks included the bombing of schools where a large proportion of victims were children.

The deterrent effect of the Rome Statute against criminal violations during armed conflict that constitute attacks on education would be enhanced if ICC investigations were carried out with a view to bringing charges against high-profile leaders who are alleged to have issued orders to attack schools or kill teachers or students for going to school.

UN human rights treaty bodies and other international human rights mechanisms have also in several cases begun to include attacks on education in their observations, calling on states to address the impacts of attacks that violate the right to education and to hold perpetrators to account. The CRC – the treaty body established under the Convention on the Rights of the Child which requires signatories to submit reports every five years for review upon which recommendations for enhancing protections are then made – is one treaty body that has made recommendations regarding attacks on schools and military use to several countries. For example, in 2013 it issued concluding observations on the second to fourth periodic reports of Israel, which expressed concern over a range of attacks on schools and students as well as severe classroom shortages and restrictions on freedom of movement that impinge on access to education for some Palestinian children.

In addition, there are a handful of examples of domestic accountability mechanisms that have been used in response to attacks on school buildings or military use of schools. For example, in India, where security forces used more than 129 schools during 2010 alone, the Supreme Court issued a ruling ordering the forces out. In general, however, considerably less is known at present regarding local or national investigations and prosecutions for violations committed against students, education staff and education facilities. A study published by Conflict Dynamics International in 2011 suggests that national-level mechanisms have real potential to contribute to improved accountability, but that most do not prioritize children affected by armed conflict. Technical capacity and funding are also lacking. Therefore, there is a need to encourage and support countries to provide these requirements.

While encouraging steps have been taken to increase accountability for attacks, these are relatively few when compared with the number of violations documented by this study alone. Advocacy to strengthen accountability and reduce impunity for perpetrators who commit violations of law that constitute attacks on education remains a pressing need at both international and national levels. To be better able to draw lessons and address gaps, more information is also needed regarding the enforcement of national legislation and the use of domestic accountability mechanisms.

**Enhancing security on the ground**

Many different protection measures have been used in high-risk areas to shield potential targets, minimize damage from attacks or provide means of self-defence. These have included assigning armed or unarmed guards to education institutions, estab-
lishing checkpoints near schools, reinforcing school infrastructure such as building walls around school perimeters, making housing available for students or personnel near or on campus, providing a protective presence or escorts to accompany students or teachers en route to and from schools, offering safer modes of transportation and arming teachers.

For example, in Iraq, in response to child abductions and recruitment, the Ministry of Education instructed schools to take precautions and security patrols and checkpoints around schools were increased. In Thailand, the government – due in part to teacher trade union demands – has for a long time emphasized the use of hard protection measures such as providing military escorts for teachers travelling to and from school or lining the road to and from school with security forces, as well as issuing firearms licenses for teachers to carry weapons as a means of self-defence en route to and from school. In response to extortion-related kidnap threats issued to schools in Mexico, municipal authorities in 2009 dispatched hundreds of police cadets to patrol the targeted school surroundings, while a local government-created programme in Acapulco, called ‘Safe School’, increased security personnel in and around the schools in 2011 and installed alarm buttons in school buildings.

Although an elevated risk of attack or a general security situation may warrant the use of physical protection measures in some cases, these measures can have unintended negative consequences that need to be considered carefully. Reinforcing school infrastructure may make it more attractive for military use, for example. Furthermore, the presence of guards, police or other armed personnel, when they are themselves the intended targets of violence, can put students and teachers at increased risk of attack.

**Negotiated solutions**

A variety of negotiated responses to attacks have been attempted, in particular to military use of schools. In some cases, negotiations have been conducted by local communities or community leaders with armed groups or government forces; in others, they have been undertaken by government officials, depending on the context and nature of attacks. Negotiations have involved dialogue and consensus-building among parties to the conflict and education stakeholders around the types of behaviour that are permissible on school grounds, the negative impact of military use, the politicization of schools or the content of the curriculum. Agreements may declare a ban on weapons within a defined area, prohibit political propaganda on school grounds, restrict the military use of schools or order the vacating of schools by armed groups or security forces, establish codes of conduct for military and armed groups, or dictate other terms relevant locally.

Negotiations to cease or prevent military use of schools during the reporting period have also succeeded in some cases. For example, in Somalia, the UN has collected and used data on military use of education facilities to secure the agreement of force commanders to vacate schools. In some instances, negotiations have taken place successfully with armed forces and groups at local level to ban certain practices from school grounds, such as occupation and use of schools and looting and burning of learning materials and classroom furniture. In South Sudan, community leaders and Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) play a central role, acting as steering committees for county commissioners who negotiate with government security forces.

Dialogue initiated by ministries of education or UN partners with ministries of defence and leaders of the national armed forces has led the latter to issue a number of military directives to vacate school premises, for instance in South Sudan. In Mali, the education ministry and the UN engaged in dialogue with the defence ministry and a number of schools were subsequently vacated. In DRC, UN-led intervention with military leaders resulted in the national armed forces vacating schools.

Community-driven negotiations to develop and agree to codes of conduct have also been undertaken in countries such as Nepal and the Philippines, where a number of communities have established programmes whereby schools or ‘learning institutions’ become recognized as ‘Zones of Peace’ (SZOP and LIZOP, respectively). In Nepal, one of the key
components of the SZOP programme was the writing
and signing of codes of conduct defining what was
and was not allowed on school grounds in order
minimize violence, school closures and the politi-
cization of schooling. For instance, terms of the code
in some cases included: ‘No arrest or abduction of any
individual within the premises’, ‘no use of school to
camp’ or ‘no use of school as an armed base’. This was
achieved through collaboration among diverse
political and ethnic groups in widely publicized mass
meetings. The signatory parties kept their commit-
ments, in general, and these efforts helped
communities to keep schools open, improving
protection as well as school governance.

In the Philippines, codes of conduct developed collabor-
atively have been used to encourage armed groups
and government forces to protect and promote
children’s right to education and the human rights of
teachers and other education personnel. They are
asked to sign up to morally binding commitments to
abide by the codes. According to a case study of LIZOP
at a school in Maguindanao Province, this process
opened space for dialogue among the community and
other stakeholders on how to better protect and
ensure the continuity of schooling for their children,
and provided ‘an opportunity for actors in conflict to
become actors in building learning spaces that are
safe and secure’, with members of armed groups
involved in both agreeing and signing the LIZOP decla-
ration.

Concerns regarding negotiation include potential risks
to the mediator and representatives of the parties
involved in the dialogue in dealing with armed non-
state actors; whether to use local or international
mediators and how they will be perceived by the
parties in the negotiations; whether to hold talks in
private or publicly; and how far to compromise on
education policy and curriculum for short-term
security gains without undermining the quality of, or
access to, education in future.

Community responses
The limited amount of research that has been carried
out on the subject supports the view of some interna-
tional agencies and NGOs that responses initiated by
communities may have a key role to play in protecting
Communities can be involved in all of the types of response discussed in this study and contribute to protection in a range of ways. These may include the involvement of school management committees in protecting schools, students and teachers; the establishment of school defence committees; the involvement of communities in the construction, maintenance and protection of schools including as night-watchmen or security guards; the use of parents and other community members as student and teacher escorts or a protective presence; and the development of community alert systems, community-based schooling, and community-led protests, negotiations and monitoring.

These responses may be generated and implemented by communities with little or no external support in some cases. In other cases, they may be developed and managed by communities in consultation with, or with technical or financial support from, external organizations or government partners. Different forms of engagement may be more or less feasible depending on the context, the nature of attacks and community values with regard to education.

For example, in DRC in 2012, Education Cluster partners were working at school level with students, teachers and parents to analyse risks, including protection-related threats resulting from conflict and insecurity, and to develop risk reduction plans. In Myanmar, local organizations and communities developed systems for monitoring, negotiating with armed groups and providing physical protection. In Palestine, UNESCO helped to support the establishment of an alert system via text messages on mobile phones, building on the initiative of parents who call teachers in the morning to ensure that school routes are safe. The system helped warn students, teachers and parents when and where incidents are occurring.

Knowledge of the comparative effectiveness of different types of community response remains limited. It is generally accepted that community involvement is a critical component for improving the protection of education. However, more research is needed on what makes community-level interventions effective and their long-term impact. This issue is explored further in the essay: ‘The role of communities in protecting education’ later in this study.

**Education policy and planning**

In areas where there are persistent attacks, education ministries and departments can take steps to help prevent future incidents, reduce the impact of ongoing attacks and ensure affected schools recover in a timely way. When rebuilding, rehabilitation and resupply work is slow, it can lengthen the denial of access to good quality education by years. If curricula, teacher recruitment policies or resource allocation are a source of tension, failing to address them may mean that attacks continue or recur. Conflict-sensitive education policy and planning measures that take into account the need to both prevent attacks on education and respond to attacks where they do occur are therefore critical to improving protection.

Strengthening the elements of education for peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for human rights and responsible citizenship in the curriculum may also help reduce the recurrence of conflict and build peace.

One important aspect of educational planning in ensuring the recovery of the education system is making funds and other resources available to rebuild and repair schools. Every year that passes without a school being rehabilitated and reopened can mean a lost year of education for its students. But rehabilitating schools where large numbers have been destroyed, as in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, is a very heavy burden that may require sustained, large-scale collaboration with international donors and NGOs to fill gaps in funding. Investment on this scale is only possible where attacks have been halted, which requires intervention to avert or deter attacks and resolve conflict over education issues.

Where unequal access to quality education is a source of tension, as was the case in Sierra Leone, establishing fair and transparent criteria for allocating resources may be an important contributor to ending grievances that can lead to attacks. Transparency in education system governance and resource allocation is also vital for restoring trust. In Nepal, for instance, after years of unequal distribution of education resources, the government tried to ensure resources went to where they were really needed within conflict-
affected areas by introducing district-level micro-planning. It also sought to improve governance and transparency by encouraging parental involvement in school management via PTAs, making school governance bodies more inclusive and introducing fiscal audits.

Curriculum reform, changes to teacher recruitment and management, and increased community involvement that seeks to address the grievances of particular groups may also help to prevent attacks motivated by perceived bias or the imposition of alien cultural values, history, religion or language. In Nepal, the latest editions of social studies textbooks now include education for human rights, peace and civics. Moreover, the provincial education authorities in the southernmost provinces of Thailand have embraced the notion that attacks on schools and the assassination of teachers can be averted by changes to education curriculum and staffing policies and practices. The southern provincial education offices have instituted a number of policies to improve protection for teachers and schools, including:

- increasing by fivefold the hours of Islamic religious instruction in the four provinces where the ethnic Malay Muslim population is concentrated or predominates and switching from five to six days a week of schooling to accommodate the extra lessons;
- teaching English, the Malay language and the local Muslim population’s tribal language;
- funding projects that build relationships with the local community such as vegetable gardens for the school;
- transferring Thai Buddhist teachers to city areas which are safer, supported by subsidies to cover the extra cost of additional travel to school;
- recruiting more than 3,000 teachers from the local community to replace teachers transferred to other parts of the country;
- requiring students to study at home when access to school is limited, with community teachers visiting their homes.

The aim of these policies is to build relationships and trust with the local community and encourage them to protect teachers, students and schools, although it is difficult to say whether they have affected the number of attacks.

The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), UN agencies and a number of donors are also increasingly focusing on education policies and sector plans, as well as NGO and UN programming that are conflict-sensitive and anticipate and respond to some of the causes of armed conflict and associated attacks. The INEE Guiding Principles on Integrating Conflict Sensitivity in Education Policy and Programming in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Contexts were adopted at a high-level meeting convened by INEE and UNESCO in April 2013. INEE has developed a Guidance Note on Conflict-Sensitive Education, and USAID was commissioning work on conflict-sensitive sector planning in 2013. Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict (PEIC) and the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning are beginning a capacity-building project for crisis-sensitive education to reduce the risks of armed conflict and natural disasters.

Safety measures, including emergency drills, have become a part of school policy in some places in an effort to mitigate the impact of potential attacks. In Mexico, for example, in response to crossfire in shootouts near to schools, teachers in a number of states were given training on how to keep their students safe during gun battles and schools began to hold drills.

Aside from protection, a key problem affecting recovery from attacks is providing continuity of education for students affected by violence or whose schools have been destroyed. To ensure this happens, education authorities must develop and implement plans which respond to current emergencies and prepare for future ones; for example, they should ensure that education is protected and continuous for displaced populations – whether displaced internally or across borders – as well as for those who remain in their place of origin; and that regulations are in place to guarantee the safety of rebuilt or replaced facilities.
School children displaced by fighting in the southern Philippines watch though the windows of temporary classroom provided by UNICEF at an IDP camp in Talayan, Maguindanao Mindanao, Philippines.

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as well as the availability of temporary learning facilities in the meantime. UN agencies and NGOs frequently supplement government efforts in areas of conflict by providing temporary learning spaces for displaced school populations, often in the form of tented classrooms, as well as emergency education supplies. In Somalia, for example, the Somali Formal Education Network, an umbrella group for 55 schools in Mogadishu and three other regions, helps teachers follow communities when they are uprooted, sometimes teaching under trees or tents. When an area becomes dangerous, the school authorities look for another location and move to ensure that education continues.

**Protecting higher education**

Most responses to attacks on higher education appear to focus on either enhancing physical protection or promoting resilience and adaptability. This study found no examples of responses in the form of community protection or turning universities into ‘zones of peace’. Alongside the relative dearth of information about attacks on higher education compared with attacks on other levels of education, there is even less about the effectiveness of responses at the tertiary level.

The physical protection of higher education can take several forms, including on-campus security guards or escorts and the gates, fences and windows. In Colombia, for example, an elaborate protection scheme for individuals, originally set up for teachers and teacher trade unionists, was extended to protect academic and trade union representatives in higher education. Established by human rights groups, teacher trade unions, UNHCR and representatives of the Colombian government, it is providing threatened or targeted individuals with administrative and financial support for physical protection measures and, depending on the type and degree of risk of each individual case, armed escorts or guards, mobile phones, bullet-proof vehicles or temporary relocation.

A number of measures to promote the resilience of higher education in response to attacks have also
been taken. Distance learning programmes, such as those established for Iraq,\textsuperscript{213} Israel/Palestine\textsuperscript{214} and Zimbabwe,\textsuperscript{215} and scholarship schemes for studying, teaching or researching abroad have been used to enable continuity of education where normal teaching is no longer possible, for instance due to the security risk of travelling to university. Iraqi academics in exile, for example, have been able to contribute filmed lectures to Iraqi universities on specialist subjects through a Scholar Rescue Fund project.\textsuperscript{216} In recent years, scholar protection organizations have also put an increased focus on funding placements in countries neighbouring the conflict-affected country to increase the likelihood of scholars returning to their homeland when peace is restored.

Pressure for greater accountability in higher education has stemmed primarily from political and human rights campaigns at local and international levels, rather than the use of legal instruments, the prosecution of perpetrators or enhanced monitoring and reporting. Examples include student protests and demonstrations against repressive measures or the allegedly excessive use of force by state security forces; and national and international advocacy campaigns in support of individual academics or students. There is no clear evidence regarding the impact of many such actions.

GCPEA’s research examining the relationship between autonomy and security concluded that enhancing university autonomy \textit{vis-à-vis} the state may in some situations contribute to reducing or preventing attacks on higher education systems, particularly when coupled with university-controlled internal security provision.\textsuperscript{217} This includes developing and extending the notion of the university as a space outside of direct state control (even when funding is largely state-provided) – particularly concerning decisions about recruitment, financial and administrative management, curriculum and research. It also includes prohibiting state forces from entering university campuses (unless invited in by the institutional leadership or in extremely rare circumstances).\textsuperscript{218} While university autonomy alone is insufficient to prevent attacks, many of which occur outside of university campuses, the research found that it appears to be an important component of efforts to improve the protection of higher education. These issues are explored in greater detail in this study in the essay: ‘Protecting higher education’.

\textbf{Advocacy}

Advocacy has been undertaken at international, national and local levels over the past several years to increase awareness of the problem of attacks and catalyse improved response and prevention.

Concerted advocacy undertaken by a number of NGOs and UN agencies seems to have encouraged the decision to include attacks on schools and hospitals as a triggering offence for mandated UN monitoring and reporting of violations against children in armed conflict through UN Security Council Resolution 1998 (2011) and a corresponding increase in reporting in the UN Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict. Awareness-raising efforts have also contributed to improved coverage of attacks in these reports.

Advocacy efforts around the right to education in crisis-affected contexts have also called greater attention to the issue of attacks. In September 2012, the UN Secretary-General launched his ‘Global Education First Initiative’, a five-year strategy to improve education access and quality worldwide, which included as its second ‘Key action’: ‘Sustain education in humanitarian crises, especially in conflict’.\textsuperscript{219} To help implement this component of the agenda, the education in emergencies community met to develop ‘Education Cannot Wait’, which was launched at an event in September 2012 at the UN General Assembly bringing together global leaders from governments, international organizations and civil society. These leaders endorsed a ‘Call to Action’\textsuperscript{220} urging the protection of schools from attacks, as well as significant increases in humanitarian aid for education and integration of emergency prevention, preparedness, response and recovery in education sector plans and budgets.\textsuperscript{221} An INEE Education Cannot Wait Advocacy Working Group, focused on reaching the goals set out in the Call to Action, was formed and a high-level follow-up event was held in September 2013 to assess progress and
shortfalls and reaffirm commitments to: ‘plan, prioritize and protect education in crisis-affected contexts’. International human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and trade union organizations such as Education International have helped to focus public attention on the problem of attacks, producing country reports that cover the issue in-depth in a range of contexts, or alerts on the plight of students, teachers and academics who have been arbitrarily imprisoned, tortured or killed. Other international NGOs such as CARE, Save the Children and Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict have similarly developed thematic reports and advocacy documents highlighting the problem. Local human rights groups have also continued their coverage of attacks, producing publications and statements calling for an end to attacks and for appropriate redress. Collectively, these organizations have raised awareness and put pressure on perpetrators, including through the use of petitions, open letters and submissions to human rights bodies.

Education Clusters at country level have used data collected by education and child protection partners to advocate with government counterparts to vacate schools as well as to mobilize funds for the rehabilitation or construction of damaged schools and the provision of educational materials such as desks and textbooks. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, monitoring information was used for advocacy with the ministries of education and defence on the issue of attacks on education; it was also published in the Education Cluster’s reports. Education and child protection partners undertook awareness-raising activities to sensitize armed groups to the effects of military use of schools and to improve their understanding of international humanitarian law, including through training and visits to military checkpoints and occupied schools. As a result of these efforts, military commanders dismantled checkpoints near schools and armed groups vacated the majority of occupied schools.

Advocacy has also been undertaken by organizations or communities directly with governments, armed forces or armed groups. According to a UN respondent, advocacy and awareness-raising with the armed forces in South Sudan increased their understanding of the negative impacts of military use of schools on education and children’s well-being. Subsequently, the number of schools occupied has decreased significantly, as has the length of time from when a school is reported to be occupied until it is vacated. In 2013, the SPLA ordered its troops to stop using schools.

In Libya, the UN in September 2011 prepared a confidential briefing note on protecting schools and other civilian infrastructure, which documented the use of schools by parties to the conflict, the ongoing presence of combatants and explosive remnants of war in schools, and widespread damage to schools, and called on parties to the conflict to take all necessary measures to protect them, reminding the parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law. It was disseminated among the donor community, embassies present in the country, international and local partners and representatives of the National Transitional Council.
Recommendations

The evidence is incontrovertible: attacking schools, universities, students, teachers and academics is a common tactic in situations of conflict and insecurity around the world. While some progress has been made, much more can and should to be done to protect education from attack:

Monitoring, assessment and reporting

Monitoring, assessment and reporting of attacks on education are essential for many purposes, including holding those responsible to account, devising effective ways to respond to and prevent attacks, and addressing the impact for victims.

- Ministries of education, interior and other relevant parts of government should rigorously monitor and investigate attacks against students, schools and universities, teachers, academics, and other education personnel and the impact of such attacks, and should use that information to devise effective, coordinated responses. International agencies such as the Education and Child Protection clusters, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNICEF, UNESCO, and donor governments should support or continue to support these efforts, involving local NGOs in the monitoring process where possible.

- UN human rights monitoring mechanisms, including the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Human Rights Committee; the Committee on the Rights of the Child; and the Human Rights Council and its mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, should give greater attention to monitoring and reporting attacks on education at all levels of schooling, where relevant to their mandates. Governments and civil society organizations, in turn, should submit or continue to submit to these bodies information about violations of international law that constitute attacks on education.

- Country task forces of the UN-led MRM on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict should enhance monitoring and reporting of attacks on schools, teachers and other persons related to the school (protected persons); threats of attacks against protected persons; and actions by parties to the conflict which impede children’s access to education, including the military use of schools, as requested by the Security Council in Resolution 1998 of July 2011. Although more information is being gathered, gaps still remain, particularly in certain countries.

- Steps should include:
  - Establishing or strengthening monitoring and reporting partnerships involving NGOs.
  - Reporting in more detail about education. For example, country task forces that combine attacks on schools and hospitals should disaggregate the information. In addition, reporting on killing and maiming, sexual violence, and recruitment should specify if these violations took place in or around schools.
  - Linking data collection to action on the ground to prevent or respond to military use of schools and attacks on schools and protected personnel, including, where appropriate, collaborating with education ministries and authorities to better inform and trigger responses to attacks and monitor the effectiveness of response measures.
International and national legal protections

Notwithstanding the existence of a strong framework of international law in favour of the right to education and the protection of education, the number of attacks on education and the impunity of most perpetrators indicate that much remains to be done to further strengthen legal protections and accountability mechanisms at international and national levels.

- All parties to armed conflicts should abide by the laws of war and never intentionally direct attacks against civilians – such as students, teachers or other education personnel – who are not taking direct part in hostilities. Nor should they intentionally direct attacks against buildings dedicated to education – such as schools and universities – provided they are not military objectives.
- Government officials and leaders of armed non-state groups should make clear public statements that attacks on education are prohibited, issue clear orders to this effect and refrain from using education institutions for military purposes.
- States should ensure that their domestic law criminalizes all elements of attacks on education in line with international humanitarian and human rights law.
- Where they have not done so, states should ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which protects the right to education at all levels.
- Relevant UN treaty-based human rights bodies and other international and regional monitoring and supervisory bodies should offer coherent and coordinated guidance to states (and, where relevant, non-state actors) on the measures required to implement their obligations under international law with respect to attacks on education. States and armed non-state groups should, in turn, implement these bodies’ recommendations.
- All parties to peace agreements and mediators should ensure that issues concerning attacks on education be included in any post-conflict agreement and that international legal protections for education are explicitly articulated.

Military use of schools and universities

The use of schools and universities for military purposes during armed conflict can displace students and deprive them of an education, create a wholly inappropriate learning environment, or even place students, teachers and academics at risk of attack.

- All parties to armed conflict should refrain from using schools and universities for any purpose in support of the military effort. While certain uses may not be contrary to the laws of war, all parties should endeavour to avoid impinging on students’ safety and education.
- To this end, states, as well as UN and regional peacekeepers, should support and endorse the Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict and incorporate them into military doctrine, military manuals, rules of engagement, operational orders and other means of dissemination, as far as possible, to encourage appropriate practice throughout the chain of command.
Accountability

Perpetrators of attacks must be held responsible, where appropriate, in domestic, regional and international fora through judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. Others who are responsible for putting education at risk of attack or for failing to fulfil their responsibility to prevent or respond to attacks should also be held to account.

- States should, in accordance with international standards, systematically investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute those individuals responsible for ordering, taking part in, or bearing command responsibility for, the range of violations of international law that constitute attacks against education. Tribunals at regional and international levels should similarly give specific consideration to the range of violations that constitute attacks against education during relevant investigations and pursue and prosecute cases of sufficient gravity over which they have jurisdiction. When considering awards of reparation, tribunals should consider the full effect of such attacks.
- Informal and transitional justice mechanisms, such as commissions of inquiry and truth and reconciliation commissions, should, where relevant, recognize and concretely address attacks against education at all stages in their processes, including in fact-finding and any reparations.

Protective programmes, policies and planning

In areas where attacks occur, implementing effective measures to prevent, respond to and mitigate the impacts of attacks is critical. All interventions should be tailored to context and conflict dynamics and, where possible, should be based on assessment and evaluation of what works and why.

- Governments, NGOs and UN agencies should involve communities, including marginalized and vulnerable groups, in analysing the nature of attacks, as well as programme design and delivery. Community engagement should not come at the expense of community members’ safety.
- Donors should ensure flexibility in both programme design and funding to allow for interventions to be tailored to context and to change course as needed.
- UN agencies, NGOs and relevant ministries should undertake conflict analysis to avoid unintentionally increasing or transferring risk.
- UN agencies, NGOs and education ministries should pay particular attention to the impact of violent attacks on girls’ and women’s education and devise appropriate programmes of prevention, response and recovery.
- UN agencies, NGOs, peacekeeping forces and governments, where appropriate and where security concerns allow, should undertake negotiations with parties to a conflict, or support such negotiations, to reach agreement on respect for schools as safe sanctuaries and the re-opening of closed schools.
- States should take steps towards de-linking education facilities, staff and students from electoral tasks and partisan political events in contexts where it can be reasonably expected that such linkages would heighten the risk of attacks.
- Education ministries should adopt conflict-sensitive curricula and resourcing policies to ensure that education does not trigger tensions and become a target for attack.
• Education ministries and international agencies should support in policy and practice the development of contingency plans to ensure that schools and universities are equipped to respond to attacks and resume educational activities as soon as possible.

• Academics, practitioners and education providers, including international and local organizations, should conduct rigorously designed in-country and comparative research to illuminate what programmes successfully protect education and why, taking into account the fact that attacks are often highly context-specific. All actors should make use of available relevant research to inform their responses.

Higher education

Greater efforts are needed to strengthen the protection, and promote the resilience, of higher education institutions. Stronger guarantees of university autonomy, academic freedom and security are essential in the face of a wide variety of attacks and threats.

• States should publicly affirm their responsibilities to protect higher education from attack, including abstaining from direct or complicit involvement in attacks and preventing and deterring attacks. This should include conducting thorough investigations of any incidents which occur, reporting findings in an open and transparent way, and holding perpetrators accountable under law.

• All states should promote the security and autonomy of higher education institutions at all times and prevent violence and intimidation against academics. To this end, states should encourage, within higher education communities and society generally, a culture of respect for institutional autonomy, including rejection of external ideological or political interference. Suitable measures may include new policies, regulations and laws that promote both institutional autonomy and the security of higher education communities.

— States and other relevant organizations should do everything in their power to protect higher education personnel from threats and danger, including by providing support to those who seek refuge from such threats or danger in another country.

— More information about the nature, scale and impact of attacks on higher education is needed. States, higher education institutions and professionals, UN and international agencies, and NGOs should support and expand research on and monitoring of attacks on higher education communities.

11 “Six law enforcement agents arrested over student death,” University World News, 29 April 2012; and David Smith, “Student activist was murdered, Malawian inquiry rules,” The Guardian, 10 October 2012.


15 All countries listed in this sentence were listed in a summary of reported cases/incidents, by country, January 2010-December 2012, supplied to the researchers by Scholars At Risk.

16 “Bomb Attack on School Convoy Kills 10 in Algeria,” AFP, 3 June 2009.


24 Yves Pierre-Louis, “UN Troops Assault Haiti’s University, Again,” Global Research, 27 June 2012.


29 Vasasmin Kaviratne, “Govt. set to use military to suppress students: IUSF,” 7 November 2010.


36 For detailed list of citations, please refer to the Pakistan profile in Part III of the present volume.


45. Information provided by a UN respondent, 1 February 2013.  

46. Initial figures are drawn from the Reports of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013. The figure 542 derives from 509 attacks in 2011 and 2012 reported by a UN respondent plus 17 schools reported destroyed in 2009 and 16 reported used for military purposes in the UNSG CAC report; and the “many more” refers to an additional figure of 311 schools hit by mortar shells and crossfire (43% of Sa’ada schools in 2010 – of which there were 725), without specifying how many of those were targeted and how many were caught in crossfire. The SG’s report did not specify a number of attacks on schools in 2010.  

47. Information supplied by a UN respondent, 23 April 2013.  


PART I — GLOBAL OVERVIEW


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Ibid., 55-57; Alex Spillius, “Al-Shabaab militia abducting teenage girls to marry fighters,” The Telegraph, 21 February 2012.

Wafa Organization for Martyrs’ Families and Wounded Care, officials interviews by Fuad Rajeh on March 12, 2013; updated information from provided by Wafa, December 2013. In collecting data, Wafa visited field hospitals registering details of the wounded and conducted follow-up visits to the homes of all of the victims to check on details.

For citations see Sudan profile, in this Part III of this volume

For detailed examples and citations, please refer to the Sudan profile in Part III of this volume.

For details see the relevant Country profiles in Part III of this study.


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HRW, No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia (New York: HRW, February 2012), 63, 64, 71.


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115 HRW, Sabotaged Schooling: Naxalite Attacks and Police Occupation of Schools in India’s Bihar and Jharkhand States (New York: HRW, 9 December 2009), 28.

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120 HRW, Sabotaged Schooling: Naxalite Attacks and Police Occupation of Schools in India’s Bihar and Jharkhand States (New York: HRW, 9 December 2009).

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123 Mike Young, Asia and Caucasus Regional Director, IRC, interviewed by Brendan O’Malley, 16 June 2010.

124 Dana Burde and Amy Kapit-Spitalny, Prioritizing the agenda for research for GCPEA: Why evidence is important, what we know and how to learn more (GCPEA, 2011). See also studies prepared on programmatic responses, which primarily remain at the level of case study/examples and description of components – though suggest lessons for programme design and implementation, for example: GCPEA, Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack (New York: December 2011); and Christine Groneman, “Desk study on field-based mechanisms for protecting education from targeted Attack,” in Protecting Education from Attack: A State-of-the-Art Review (Paris: UNESCO, 2012).

125 Dana Burde and Amy Kapit-Spitalny, Prioritizing the agenda for research for GCPEA: Why evidence is important, what we know and how to learn more (GCPEA, 2011).

126 The first violation for which a party could be listed was recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups. Subsequent Security Council resolutions added other violations: killing and maiming of children and rape and other grave sexual violence against children (SC Resolution 1882) and attacks on schools and hospitals (SC Resolution 1998). Abduction and denial of humanitarian access do not lead to listing, but are monitored in all situations.


129 The possible tools are described in “Options for possible actions by the CAAC Working Group of the Security Council (“toolkit”).”


131 MRM Field Manual, April 2010, 32.

132 Information supplied by a UN respondent, 16 September 2013.

133 Humanitarian clusters are sectoral and thematic coordinating bodies established through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Where they are activated, they allow UN agencies, NGOs, government and civil society to work together on responses to emergencies.

134 Education Cluster monitoring in Cote D’Ivoire, Case Study, Protecting Education in Countries Affected by Conflict, Booklet 7: Monitoring and Reporting (Global Education Cluster, October 2012), 8.

135 UN staff members in Israel/Palestine, interviewed by Brendan O’Malley, May 2012.

136 Email from Rob Quinn, Executive Director, Scholars at Risk Network, 16 December 2013.

137 For a more in-depth discussion of the legal frameworks protecting education, please see British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Protecting Education in Insecurity and Armed Conflict: An International Law Handbook (Doha: Education Above All, 2012). See also: Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms and the Right to Education in Insecurity and Armed Conflict (Doha: Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict, 2013); and British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Education and the Law of Reparations in Insecurity and Armed Conflict (Doha: Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict, 2013).

138 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Protecting Education in Insecurity and Armed Conflict: An International Law Handbook (Doha: Education Above All, 2012), 258.

139 See Art. 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which provides that: “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.”

2. (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.”


141 Arts 48 and 51(2) Additional Protocol I; Art.15(2) Additional Protocol II; Rule 1 Customary IHL Database (ICRC); and Rule 7 Customary IHL Database (ICRC).

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143 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, art. 52.

144 For full text of the Rome Statute, see http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm

145 Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and Art. 8(2)(e)(ix).

146 Rome Statute, Art. 7.


149 General Commander of the Military Forces, order of July 6, 2010, official document number 2010124005981/CGFM-CGING-25.11; Yenys Osuna Montes v. the Mayor of Zambrano Municipality, SU-256/99, Constitutional Court of Colombia, April 21, 1999; and Wilson Finch and others v. the Mayor of La Calera, T-1206/01, Constitutional Court of Colombia, November 16, 2001.

150 Ley Orgánica de Educación (2010).


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161 The content and process of developing these guidelines are discussed in detail in Part II of this study in the essay titled, “Military use of schools and universities: changing behaviour”.

162 GCPEA, Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict, 8 July 2013.
and Education Integration No 12 Yala, by Brendan O’Malley, September 2010.

ESCO, 2010), 30.


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Chris Hawley, “Mexico schools teach lessons in survival,” USA Today, 8 July 2010.

Protecting Education in Countries Affected by Conflict, Booklet 5: Education policy and planning for protection, recovery and fair access (Global Education Cluster, October 2012), 4-5. See also: the INEE Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery.

For detailed information on the provision of safe temporary learning spaces and ensuring the continuity of education during and after conflict and other humanitarian emergencies, please see the INEE Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery.


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Mario Novelli, Colombia’s Classroom Wars: Political Violence Against Education Sector Trade Unionists (Brussels: Education International, 2009), 26.


Virtual Majlis is a programme by NGO Al Fakhoora that aims at overcoming the physical blockade of Gaza’s higher education institutions by arranging regular online meetups between international student groups and students in Gaza (http://fakhoora.org/virtual-majlis-new, accessed on 22 July 2013). See: GCPEA, Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack (New York: December 2011), 20.


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General Order No. 0001, Chief of General Staff (South Sudan), 14 August 2013, 4, 5. after GCPEA advocated for greater monitoring of military use by the Security Council (re sec res 1998), the SPLA has ordered its troops to stop using schools, citing its desire to not appear in these reports. after GCPEA advocated for greater monitoring of military use by the Security Council (re sec res 1998), the SPLA has ordered its troops to stop using schools, citing its desire to not appear in these reports. after GCPEA advocated for greater monitoring of military use by the Security Council (re sec res 1998), the SPLA has ordered its troops to stop using schools, citing its desire to not appear in these reports.

Information provided by a UN respondent, 1 February 2013.
The following section consists of three essays commissioned for this study and written by independent experts. The essays focus on themes critical for improving response to, and prevention of, attacks on education: the role of communities in protecting education, the protection of higher education and the changing of military behaviour regarding the use of schools and universities. These pieces are intended to provide greater depth of analysis on several dimensions of protecting education and to highlight ways forward for strengthening the effectiveness of protective and preventive measures.
The role of communities in protecting education

The limited amount of research that has been undertaken on programmes to protect education suggests that communities have a crucial role to play in preventing and responding to attacks. However, less is known about the outcomes of community engagement or the conditions for its success. This chapter summarizes key findings across a range of protection measures (e.g. physical protection, monitoring, advocacy, negotiation) in which communities have played an active part. Different approaches to engaging with communities are analysed and lessons are drawn with the aim of improving support for the protection of education at the local level.

Communities have an important role to play in protecting education from attack. In many conflict-affected countries in particular, governments may lack the capacity or will to fully protect education. For example, in northern Liberia, where attacks on students and schools continued to occur after the conflict, some communities organized student escorts and provided unarmed guards at schools to improve their physical security. Communities in Afghanistan have protected schools in instances where they know and are able to negotiate with the perpetrators of attack. Often, national and international actors can support community action. In Nepal, for example, NGO investments in capacity-building ensured that school management committees were more representative of the community and reportedly reduced threats to education. However, a community-based approach can present certain risks to the individuals involved. In eastern DRC and Nepal, community members monitoring attacks have reported being threatened.

Despite the worldwide engagement of communities in protecting education, very little research, either quantitative or qualitative, has taken place on the outcomes of these actions. This essay summarizes available documentation on this topic, based on a review of existing literature and selected programme documents as well as practitioner experience. The analysis draws on the Interagency Learning Initiative’s (ILI) typology of ways of engaging communities in activities to achieve children’s well-being. The four-category typology of community participation in protection interventions proposed by the ILI has been adapted and used for this review: community-initiated, community-implemented, community-inspired and community-involved. The analysis of community action presented draws, in particular, upon two in-depth case studies of the Philippines and Afghanistan prepared for this chapter. Based on the review, suggestions are offered on ways that national or international actors can support community action.

Community action to prevent and respond to attack

Communities are engaged in preventive, damage-mitigating and responsive actions designed to ensure continued safe access to education. These actions can be undertaken independently or with varying degrees of support from government, civil society or international organizations. Work at the community level is facilitated through national-level education policies that are conflict-sensitive and through curriculum reform to remove bias and build students’ capacity for conflict resolution. The present chapter, however, examines only modalities of action specifically at community level.
Forms of education protection in which communities are engaged

**Preventive actions, such as:**
- strengthening management of education
- negotiation to prevent attacks
- establishing ‘Codes of Conduct’/’Schools as Zones of Peace’ with the objective of long-term prevention of attacks
- awareness-raising on the value of education
- roll-out of, and awareness-raising on, national legislation
- advocacy
- adaptation of education delivery
- physical strengthening of schools, construction and reconstruction
- night guards/day guards/security
- protests

**Damage mitigation, such as:**
- contingency planning
- safety and first aid training
- extinguishing fires in case of arson attacks
- early warning systems: Short Message Service (SMS) warning teachers and students of attack

**Response actions, such as:**
- facilitating speedy resumption of education when safety permits
- support for temporary learning spaces and psychosocial support
- monitoring and reporting
- capturing lessons learned in order to be able to carry out further preventive action
- negotiation – e.g. for the clearing of school buildings used by armed groups and forces, or the release of teachers or students
- reconstruction and repairs
Preventive actions

Strengthening management

In many countries, school management often includes not only senior education staff but also a school management committee composed of community representatives. However, particularly in unstable settings, school management may be politicized or biased, discriminating against members of certain cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious minorities, thereby potentially making schools more vulnerable to attack. Ensuring the full participation of excluded groups in school management committees may reduce threats to schools, teachers and students. In Nepal, there seemed to be a correlation between democratic elections to select committee members and reduced threat of attack. In Afghanistan, community involvement in the management of schools encouraged greater vigilance against attack. In addition, representative management structures may more effectively implement other protective actions outlined below. However, the voluntary nature of these committees can lead to slow progress, high turnover or lack of willingness to participate.

Negotiation

Many instances have shown that local actors, including school management committees, community and religious leaders, and village elders, may be effective at negotiating with potential perpetrators of attacks, particularly when the attackers are trying to gain the community’s support or are community members themselves. Religious leaders and religious groups may also have greater success in negotiating with parties to conflict when they draw from similar belief systems.

In one case in Nepal, a Village Development Council successfully lobbied to locate election booths in community buildings instead of schools to ensure that education facilities retained a politically neutral profile.

The approach taken to negotiations depends upon the perpetrators and motives of attack. At times, transparent and public negotiations may be most effective since they ensure awareness of agreements, for example, through public ceremonies. Alternatively, back-door negotiations may be more appropriate where discussion with certain parties to the conflict would present a risk for negotiators. For example, in Nepal, secret negotiations took place with Maoist rebels so that individuals – mostly women – involved in discussions on the subject of Schools as Zones of Peace would not be put in jeopardy.

Codes of Conduct/Zones of Peace

Codes of Conduct are a particular type of negotiation that can be long-term and prevent school attacks. ‘Schools as Zones of Peace’ (SZoP) have been established in many areas and international organizations can play a major role in encouraging communities to engage in such a process. A mid-term evaluation by Save the Children noted 12 of 16 of their project schools in Nepal had Codes of Conduct regarding SZoP.

UN agencies and NGOs promoting SZoPs have often found it beneficial to work through local partners, whose staff speak local languages and understand the context, enabling long-term relationship-building, meaningful participation from all stakeholders, including schools and their communities, and contextual relevance. The negotiation process may be lengthy and requires patience, flexibility and trust. In Baglung, Nepal, for example, Maoists initially rejected a declaration of the school as a SZoP, but allowed it as they became more integrated into the community.

Additionally, including clauses that target all participants’ behaviour – not just armed groups and forces – has been effective in places like Nepal. There, clauses covered concerns such as armed activities and weapons in school; use of children in political activities; abduction; use of inappropriate language; and use of alcohol and tobacco.

Adaptation of education delivery

Schools may be targets for attack because they are large physical structures, are a source for human resources or have symbolic meaning. Consequently, changes in physical set-up or content may be protective; for example, reducing visibility by means of boundary walls, relocating schools or holding classes...
in homes or community premises, or changing curriculum, staffing or teaching. However, these changes must be made with an awareness of how they might adversely affect education quality.249

Guards/security
Armed or unarmed guards may provide security, reduce the risk of attack or enable rapid response to attack. Because government provision of security can attract attacks in some cases, community guards may be a logical alternative. In Liberia, the community viewed unarmed guards as a relatively cost-effective and sustainable protection mechanism that helped teachers and students feel safe.250 However, depending on the context, having community guards may simply transfer the risk.

Protest
Community protests against attacks on education have occurred in several countries including Pakistan, Yemen and India. For example, in India, students and teachers in Jharkhand organized a protest after Maoists blew up a school in 2011.251 While protests draw attention to threats to education, they can present considerable risks for communities, subjecting them to further violence. External actors, therefore, should not initiate community protest though they can support wider awareness of the issues being raised.

Response actions
Promoting continuity of education provision
Because of their immediate proximity, communities can be first responders for restoring access to education and mitigating the impact of attacks; for example, by repairing damaged buildings. NGOs may also engage community members in the process of fund-raising, and provision of materials and labour to rebuild. Save the Children’s global programme for education in conflict-affected states included the mobilization of communities in locations such as Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Iraq and Nepal to repair damaged school buildings or build new structures, leading to increased access to education.252 Doing so may instil a sense of community ownership of the school, further protecting education. However, standards need to be in place to ensure that buildings constructed are safe.

In situations where schools are attacked, communities may also establish temporary learning spaces. In the Central African Republic (CAR), amid ongoing violence and insecurity, communities set up ‘bush schools’253 in makeshift shelters or under trees to continue education when fighting forced them to flee. Teachers received training and then worked for in-kind payment from the community.254

With temporary learning spaces or non-formal education sites, it is vital to ensure that children’s learning and qualifications are recognized in order to facilitate integration into formal education or vocational training.255 This requires that the stakeholders, including international organizations that are often involved, advocate with the Ministry of Education and other key decision-making bodies to recognize adapted forms of schooling. Although CAR’s bush schools were initially intended to be temporary, the Ministry of Education eventually recognized them, which allowed for students' and teachers' future success in formal education.256

Monitoring and reporting mechanisms
School management committees, parent teacher associations, community groups and children’s clubs can monitor and report cases of attack, facilitating analysis that informs prevention and response actions, supports advocacy and increases accountability.

Communities, schools and governments can set up independent monitoring systems. They can also contribute alerts to the UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on children and armed conflict (MRM), which records grave violations of children’s rights in certain conflict-affected countries. Ideally, local organizations should be involved in monitoring from the outset to ensure that data collection is sensitive to protection issues. In parts of eastern DRC, focal points from school management committees and parent teacher associations report violations of children’s rights and children’s clubs are encouraged to participate.257 In the Philippines, it was found that the creation and ongoing presence of a volunteer-run community monitoring group (not initially linked with
the MRM) reduced attacks because armed non-state actors were aware of permanent observation. Reports from DRC and Nepal indicate that community-based NGOs involved in the MRM have been threatened and intimidated. Close communication with community groups and regular evaluation and adaptation of monitoring mechanisms according to community feedback are important for improving data collection and reducing the risks to locally-appointed MRM Monitors.

Overview of community action to prevent and respond to attack

To ensure suitable response strategies, stakeholders should conduct an in-depth analysis of the nature of attacks on education, community awareness and attitudes to education, and existing community action. Context is very important. For example, in places like Nepal, where Maoists used schools to gain support, community negotiation and pressure from civil society and international actors on government, political leaders or armed groups may protect education. In other circumstances, such as in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, physical strengthening of premises or use of guards may be more appropriate.

Levels of community engagement

As noted above, community actions to protect education from attack can be mapped using a framework of four interconnected - and in some instances overlapping - levels of community engagement: community-initiated, community-implemented, community-inspired and community-involved. Which level is most effective may depend on the resourcing and design of the protection activities and on-the-ground realities. Additionally, interventions may start off being ‘community-initiated’, and then be emulated by external actors who introduce them into other communities where they become ‘community-involved’ actions. Furthermore, within one community or programme it is possible that several different actions are carried out with differing levels of engagement. The typology may help programme planners when considering various options for community engagement prior to implementing programmes.

1. Community-initiated: Community members conceive, define, manage, implement and resource these initiatives. Continuing community motivation is essential to maintain action.

CASE EXAMPLE: In the eastern part of Myanmar, conflict between armed non-state actors and state armed forces resulted in burning of schools, forced relocation, and abduction and recruitment of children on their way to school. Because strict government controls blocked international access to conflict-affected areas, communities responded entirely alone. They frequently rebuilt schools or provided education in temporary facilities during displacement. Local organizations monitored the incidence of attacks and conduct advocacy. These efforts were initiated and maintained without external support.

2. Community-implemented: Groups external to the community design these interventions but rely on community members to manage, support or resource activities. The assumption is that community volunteerism will maintain actions beyond the life of the project when external funding ends.

CASE EXAMPLES: School management committees in DRC variously initiated by UN agencies, INGOs and the Ministry of Education fall into this category. In Afghanistan, community guards, initially supported by the government, became the responsibility of communities themselves in many locations.

3. Community-inspired: Community groups conceive or develop these actions but rely upon some form of external support (human resources, skills, knowledge, advocacy or funding).

CASE EXAMPLES: Protests by Malala Yousafzai may be seen as ‘community-inspired’ action. She and the community in which she lived may not have been able to raise the same level of funding or awareness without collaboration with international media and UN agencies.

4. Community-involved: In these activities, external organizations, donors or governments use participatory processes to solicit community perspectives to shape the design, monitoring and evaluation of the
programme, but implementation is not in the community’s hands. Actions continue as long as the external funding stream is available. This often occurs in rapid onset emergencies, when international agencies have access to the affected population and support education as a short-term gap-filling measure.

CASE EXAMPLES: During the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, armed groups attacked large numbers of villages, causing forced displacement, and used schools. In response, NGOs set up temporary learning spaces in camp settings. The speed at which TLS programmes are established may limit the level of community participation in programme design, but NGOs do solicit community perspectives in the monitoring process. When camps close down, the programme may move with the population or close if formal education has been reinstated. The role of the community would become critical at this stage.

Overview of community engagement

Many of the forms of education protection cited earlier can be implemented at any of the four different levels within this typology – with some exceptions. Different forms of support may be more or less realistic or effective depending on the context, the nature of attacks and community views of education. Programme initiatives within a country may span the full range of levels of engagement, depending on site-specific realities. While community-initiated activities may be better adapted to context and considered more cost-effective than community-involved ones, they are not feasible in all contexts. Furthermore, some initially community-organized actions, such as protests, may only achieve large-scale outcomes once they gain support from NGOs, UN agencies or the media.

Case studies of community prevention and response action

Two country case studies, on the Philippines and Afghanistan, are presented here to demonstrate the range of activities in which communities can engage within a given context. They also show how national and international actors may support communities to achieve protection for education.

The Philippines: Zones of Peace, and monitoring and reporting

For the past thirty years, Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, has experienced conflict between government forces and a range of non-state actors. Fighting between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government alone has cost 60,000 lives and driven a million people from their homes. These conflicts have been accompanied by recurrent attacks on education throughout Mindanao, including burning and occupation of school buildings, kidnapping of teachers, planting of explosive devices, forced evacuations and physical attacks on school buildings during fighting. In some cases, teachers were targeted while performing election duties. The MRM taskforce identified both state forces and armed non-state groups as perpetrators.

Initiatives engaging community groups in protection of education

Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace

The Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace (LIZOP) programme started in 2011, influenced by previous national and international initiatives in zones of peace, and established spaces that care for the welfare of all children, prioritizing their rights to protection and education. UNICEF is supporting the expansion of this programme in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao in collaboration with several NGOs, the Department of Education and community groups. The objective is to engage stakeholders – community leaders, parents, teachers, state agencies and parties to the conflict – to enable children in conflict-affected areas to access safe education. Stakeholders in four pilot communities participated in a process of developing a ‘declaration’ to recognize schools as ‘Zones of Peace’. The project is now being rolled out in eight additional communities.

Monitoring and reporting mechanisms

The Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC), formed in January 2003, has trained 3,500 local volunteers, called the Bantay Ceasefire group, to monitor and
report violations of the ceasefire agreement between the MILF and the government, including attacks on schools. The Bantay Ceasefire group has shared information and reports of child rights violations with the UN MRM in place in the Philippines since 2007.

Awareness-raising

In addition, the MPC runs the Youth Volunteers for Peace Action Network. They seek to generate support for the peace process among youth through advocacy campaigns. UN agencies and NGOs also engage communities in a process of awareness-raising on existing legislation.

National and international support for community action

These community actions and the LIZOP process build upon, and are underpinned by, government legislation to protect education. Key legislation supports education for all, prohibits the military use of schools and promotes protection of children in conflict.

Reported outcomes

The village of Tina, in the province of Maguindanao in Mindanao, has shown positive results of community and agency efforts. As of 2008, conflict forced the entire population to evacuate the village, resulting in its occupation by the MILF. In late 2010, when the community started to return, UNICEF began working with the community and key stakeholders to implement the LIZOP model enabling Tina Primary School to reopen with 104 pupils in 2011. Members of the armed forces and the MILF all decided that they would not carry firearms in the vicinity of the school and other learning spaces and agreed not to allow their own children to carry firearms at school.

The Bantay Ceasefire group is also perceived to have made parties to conflict more cautious because they know a civilian-led monitoring team is reporting on their actions.

Key lessons learned

Whilst external actors are initiating and rolling out LIZOP, the model borrows heavily from the two decades old Philippine practice of establishing community-wide zones of peace. Research on zones of peace initiatives has found that the process of establishing community-wide peace agreements was most successful and sustainable when engaging a range of stakeholders – including government, local and international organizations, church groups and the community. Community engagement in monitoring compliance with peace agreements enabled permanent surveillance with low resource investment. Further, it proved helpful to engage with parties to the conflict as parents, rather than as armed individuals. Overall, it may be seen that, out of the four approaches outlined in the typology of community engagement, only ‘community-involvement’ appears absent or insignificant in the Philippines context.

Afghanistan: Negotiation and adaptation

Education was a point of contention in Afghanistan’s conflicts long before the Taliban. Since the change of government in 2001, schools have experienced violent attacks, including arson, explosions and grenades, as well as threats to teachers and the killing and injury of students, teachers and other education personnel. While the common depiction in the media was that a majority of incidents emanated from Taliban opposition to girls’ education, the reasons were more complex. These additionally included schools’ symbolic value as government entities, their association with international military forces, ideological opposition to any education offered outside of madrassas (Islamic schools), local disputes or ethnic rivalries, and opposition to the central government and the rule of law by criminal groups.

Initiatives engaging community groups in protection of education

Communities in Afghanistan help manage and protect schools through negotiation, physical strengthening, guards and adaptation of education delivery. Some examples of community action are outlined below.

School management committees, school protection committees, school security shuras and community protection shuras – defence groups focused either on schools or the community as a whole – and parent teacher associations were established, covering over 8,000 schools by 2009 with support from NGOs, UN agencies and the MoE. While the arrangements are
different, a common thread is participation of community members to support education. To protect education, these groups may: involve religious leaders in reviewing or modifying school curricula; improve governance; or establish lines of communication with potential attackers for purposes of negotiation.

Government, NGOs and UN-agencies have supported and rolled out schools located inside communities. This may reduce the likelihood of attacks on children, teachers or physical spaces by reducing distance to school, attracting less attention and making it harder for intruders to approach unnoticed. The schools also tend to have stronger ties with their respective communities which, in turn, work harder to protect them.

Communities also provide night guards for their schools to prevent attack. School guards or whole communities have put out fires caused by arson attacks, reducing damage and enabling education activities to resume more quickly.

National and international support for community action

Local-level community successes in negotiation must be assessed against a backdrop of national-level action. Attacks on students, teachers and school buildings are criminal offences under Afghan law. The Ministry of Education has sought to prevent attacks and reopen schools closed due to conflict, including through negotiation with local-level Taliban leaders on ways to adapt education to make it more acceptable to all parties. In March 2009, following these government initiatives, 161 schools re-opened compared to 35 in 2007-2008. Between late 2010 and early 2011, negotiations between the Ministry of Education and top-level Taliban leaders started, while local-level negotiations also accelerated. The number of schools re-opening grew while the number of attacks dropped substantially in the second half of 2010 and even more so in 2011 However, the following year, the discussions stalled and the trend of re-opening schools was partially reversed, even though the Ministry of Education continued to report overall progress in terms of decreasing violence and increased re-opening of schools.

Similarly, the success of adapting education delivery at a local level must in part be attributed to central ministry-level support and the resourcing and promotion of this approach by international NGOs such as Save the Children, CARE and Catholic Relief Services.

Reported outcomes

A number of successful site-specific processes of negotiation between the Taliban and education committees or village elders have led to the release of teachers and the re-opening of schools. In some cases, local communities agreed to adaptation, such as curriculum changes or the hiring of Taliban-approved religious teachers. A randomized controlled trial study of community schools in Ghor province found that these schools have increased access, completion rates and learning outcomes and addressed gender constraints.

However, according to field research by CARE in 2009, only 4 per cent of respondents indicated that attacks had been prevented in the past. Although this figure is very low, communities believe their involvement in prevention and response is important. The lack of statistical proof of impact of community efforts may reflect the difficulty of measuring prevention (compared with response actions) and the challenges in monitoring and reporting attacks in general, rather than indicate that community engagement has limited outcomes.

Key lessons learned

The majority of communities that CARE was able to survey in its 2009 study felt that responsibility for decision-making and implementation of mechanisms to protect education from attack must remain local. Respondents believed that communities may play numerous roles based on the type of attack and perpetrators responsible. For example, respondents reported that, when attacks were linked to armed conflict as opposed to criminal activity, the community was more likely to know the attackers or be better able to open a line of communication with them. Popular opinion also appeared to play a role. An Afghanistan Analysts Network report suggests that the Taliban were aware of the need to interact positively with local
communities and therefore may have been more responsive to their efforts to re-open or protect schools. 294

As a result of these factors some communities were able to more effectively engage in actions like negotiating curriculum, undertaking dialogue with armed groups or hiring local staff. 295 Engaging communities to negotiate for girls’ education may prove more difficult in some situations, however, if perpetrators of attacks on girls’ schools come from within the community or have support there, which the CARE study found sometimes to be the case. 296 This suggests it may be important to take into account potential opposition to girls’ education within the community when considering negotiation as a protection measure.

Community members reported to CARE that they were less likely to know or be able to negotiate with criminal or outsider perpetrators. In these cases, activities like investing in physical security, hiring guards and increasing school patrols may be more appropriate. 297 The CARE study also found that schools may be less targeted where the community itself requested the school or was deeply involved before establishing the school. 298 The association of schools with certain international donors or military forces may place schools at increased risk in the specific context of Afghanistan. 299

Evidence from Afghanistan shows that community engagement must be tailored to each locale in order to protect education most effectively. Therefore, the flexibility of programme strategies, objectives and implementation plans is critical. Overall, the ‘community-involved’ type of approach appears to hold little, if any, sway in the Afghan context, while complex and site-specific permutations of the other three approaches are evident.

Challenges of working with community groups

The advantages of working with communities may include: lower costs, ensuring actions taken are tailored to context, achieving sustainability and gaining credibility with parties to the conflict. However, there are also a number of challenges, including the following:

- Donor funding in conflict settings tends to be short-term, seeking quick impact. This is often incompatible with the long-term relationship-building that working with communities often requires.
- Variation in the composition of communities means that one model of response might not fit all contexts.
- Communities are not internally homogeneous. Wider buy-in depends on working with a full range of community members. However, there may be language barriers between group members or power dynamics that may slow down activity implementation. Conversely, more homogeneous communities may be less likely to recognize the value of improved relations since they interact less frequently with members of the ‘other’ group. Therefore, they may be less willing to collaborate with other communities or minority groups. 300
- Ethnic or religious divisions between agency or government staff and community-level groups may reflect the divisions that are at the heart of the conflict.
- Language barriers may exist between international and national staff and the community groups they are working with, especially in more isolated communities. Furthermore, literacy rates in many countries affected by conflict tend to be low, particularly in remote and hard-to-reach locations. This may limit both physical and written outreach. 301
- Relying on community volunteerism may mean that initial programme costs are low. However, this is not always sustainable. Over time, it may lead to reduced community support, increased costs or a halt in activities. 302
- Community engagement may also transfer both the responsibility for, and risk of, protecting schools and providing security from state actors to communities themselves. This may be necessary in a conflict situation where the state
has been weakened and is unable to provide security for its citizens in vast geographical areas within its territory or because the state may be a perpetrator of violence affecting communities. However, care should be taken to ensure that the community having sole responsibility for protecting education is viewed only as a short-term, gap-filling strategy. Ideally, the state should be responsible for providing security and protection to its citizens.

- Community engagement may be difficult where certain communities or groups oppose specific aspects of education.

Only by recognizing and addressing these challenges can programme collaborations with communities be successful. Programming must be adaptable and solutions must be found jointly with community members.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

Evidence exists that communities participate in a broad variety of protective actions ranging from prevention to response. Most protective action can be implemented with communities at any of the four levels of engagement – community-initiated, community-implemented, community-inspired and community-involved. Each has value depending on the setting-specific needs. For example, external actors often support and advise the establishment of Zones of Peace or school management committees. In other situations, communities themselves have appointed unarmed guards or altered education delivery mechanisms. And it may be inappropriate and risky for external actors to initiate some activities, such as protest and one-to-one negotiation with armed non-state actors.

Before developing policies or programmes, external actors, in collaboration with the communities they seek to assist, should carry out in-depth analyses of the nature of attacks on education, an assessment of community attitudes to education and a mapping of existing community action. These may inform their decisions on how best to engage different communities.

Governments, donors, NGOs and UN agencies typically assume that it is beneficial to engage communities in protecting education. However, there is very limited quantitative or qualitative data on the impact of these actions. Further research should explore the advantages and disadvantages of community action and assess what forms of action achieve the greatest impact while minimizing physical risks or negative impacts on education quality.

While there are significant advantages to working with communities, there are also challenges. These include a possible lack of awareness of the value of education, low literacy levels and intra-community tensions that may hamper actions to protect education from attack. Strong participatory monitoring systems need to be in place to identify these issues early and mitigate any negative effects on programming.

Finally, whilst community engagement has value, it is also important not to forget that the state is the ultimate duty-bearer with regards to education and the protection of citizens. All programmes should seek to support governments to implement durable protective mechanisms once the context enables them to do so.
Recommendations

For governments
- Encourage and invest in the development of community-based mechanisms to protect education. Incorporate these into Education Sector Plans and ensure that they are in line with national policies and standards. These may include: school management committees, contingency plans, education awareness campaigns, etc.
- Coordinate external actions and provide recognition for agreed alternative forms of education that are common and reportedly effective measures for protecting education in certain settings such as community-based schools and temporary learning spaces.
- Where appropriate, conduct a conflict risk assessment to ensure that activities do not heighten risk to education.

For institutional donors
- Increase the flexibility of funding streams (including the time horizon for implementation) in order to be able to better tailor programmes to the context of specific communities and types of attacks on education, and to facilitate community engagement and ownership.
- Apply more nuanced conditionality to funding streams. Conditions that restrict contact between grant recipients and particular actors that may perpetrate attacks on education can inhibit certain protective measures, such as undertaking or facilitating negotiations with armed groups or military forces.

For UN agencies and NGOs
- With engagement from communities, conduct a context and conflict analysis to inform response design, including:
  - assessment of the nature of attacks on education in relation to the history of the conflict;
  - consideration of whether external assistance can increase the risk that education may be attacked;
  - analysis of community power structures, knowledge, attitudes and practices that may exacerbate threats to education or affect programme implementation; and
  - mapping community actions to protect education.
- Carefully consider the role of the national government in community protection projects with attention to conflict dynamics, since, in some situations, government involvement can heighten the risk of attack or governments themselves may be perpetrators. Where appropriate, elicit government participation in project development, planning and implementation.
- Based on the initial mapping, determine the appropriate level of community engagement in all phases of project development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Use varied methods to engage all community members, including those from marginalized groups, so as not to exacerbate any existing tensions.
- Ensure that staff have the relevant cultural knowledge and background and are accepted as neutral parties.
- Consider long-term sustainability to ensure that risk to education does not return once the programme ends. Long-term programming, with due consideration for sustainability, is vital when seeking community engagement in activities. For interventions like community schools, this may include lobbying the relevant line ministries to support the training of para-professionals, integrate them into the formal system, endorse the curricula and strengthen facilities.
Protecting higher education from attack

While there is a growing body of work investigating the scale, nature and impact of attacks on children and schools, far less attention has been placed on attacks on higher education, and still less on the protection and prevention measures that are being or could be taken. The lack of research and the limited attention given to developing and implementing such measures represent a serious omission on the part of the international community, as the higher education sector has a vital role to play not only in scientific progress but in political, economic, social and cultural progress too, including in the development and provision of primary and secondary education. This chapter explores why attacks on higher education occur and how they might be prevented or their impact reduced. A starting point would be to invest in evidence-gathering and advocacy aimed at increasing accountability, as well as in strengthening emergency protection and prevention measures.

Higher education is a public good. The university sector throughout the world has a complex and multifaceted role in developing human capital vital for scientific, political, economic, social and cultural progress. This includes developing pedagogy and providing future teachers for schools; acting as a point of critical reflection on national development; preparing young adults to become active citizens and future leaders; and offering a potentially autonomous space, independent of state, capital, religion and society, where key issues can be debated and solutions developed through evidence-based discourse. Attacks on this sector amount to attacks on all levels of education, as well as on intellectual, cultural and economic heritage, political stability and social cohesion. Consequently, such attacks must be challenged with greater rigour and resources.

For the purpose of this essay, an attack on higher education, as with attacks on other levels of education, is defined as any threat or deliberate use of force, carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic or religious reasons, against higher education institutions, administrators, academic and other staff, or students. These include acts of intentional violence resulting in damage or destruction of institutions or facilities, or physical harm or death to individuals. They also include deliberate acts of coercion, intimidation or threats of physical force that create a climate of fear and repression that undermines academic freedom and educational functions. The definition, however, does not include non-violent infringement of academic freedom or discrimination in hiring, promotion or admission.303

Attacks on higher education communities have been documented in armed conflicts, but many also occur under repressive regimes where armed conflict may not be present.304 Indeed, some of the most damaging attacks on higher education happen in situations where universities and their academics and students are perceived by repressive authorities as a ‘threat’ in a way that schools, teachers and pupils typically are not. As a result, they may be at heightened risk of individual attacks or campaigns comprising multiple attacks over an extended period, whether aimed at the isolation and persecution of a single target or the intimidation of the higher education community as a whole.

In this essay, we look at why attacks on higher education occur and the impact of such attacks before considering how they might be deterred or prevented and how, once they occur, they might be addressed. The chapter concludes with a brief synopsis of the core arguments and their implications, highlighting knowledge gaps and pointing towards areas for future research and policy development.

Motives for attacks on higher education

The motives for attacks on higher education are multiple and they vary within and across contexts. Academics and higher education students can be
both supporters of, and threats to, the power and legitimacy of state and non-state actors. Thus they can be targeted for a number of reasons, falling under three main categories, each of which is broadly ‘political’ in character:

- The subject and nature of teaching, research, writing and publication
- Identity, religious, sectarian and gender issues
- Factors relating to armed conflict or high levels of violence or coercion in society (including, in the context of an armed conflict, strategic and tactical considerations related to destroying state symbols and defeating the enemy; proximity of university campuses to government buildings; a desire to convert university facilities to military use; terrorism, insurgency or counter-insurgency strategies; weakening of the state and the rule of law; and the militarization of opposition groups).

Any particular attack may involve more than one motive within one or more of these categories, especially where multiple perpetrators or targets may be involved.

**Impact of attacks on higher education**

Attacks on universities, students and academics may constitute violations of the right to education and other human rights, including freedom of expression. The most serious attacks on higher education are those that violate the right to life and the personal liberties of members of the higher education community, including abduction, disappearance, torture, extra-judicial killing, indirectly induced or forced exile, arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, trial and arbitrary imprisonment, threats and harassment. Apart from their grave consequences for the individuals directly targeted and their families, these attacks can undermine local research and teaching by triggering self-censorship, retreat, fear and flight or ‘brain drain’ that can silence a whole academic community. They may also have a serious impact on wider issues of access to, and quality of, education at all levels, in both the short and long term, given the interdependence of the different levels of an education system, wherein higher education institutions and personnel develop instructional methods and content, and train teachers, administrators and other education professionals. Furthermore, they may adversely impact the wider society, curtailing the contributions of higher education to the development of human capital and knowledge that foster economic and social progress.

**How can attacks on higher education be prevented?**

UN agencies, national and international civil society organizations and national governments have developed measures to protect education in situations of fragility, violence, repression, humanitarian emergency and armed conflict. These range from local initiatives to governmental and transnational projects and reforms, and aim variously at protecting civilian lives and education infrastructures, promoting the right to education and academic freedom, and preventing attacks from taking place. A 2011 GCPEA study categorizes such measures as falling under four groups: 1) protection; 2) prevention; 3) advocacy; and 4) monitoring. The focus of the study, and of the majority of measures developed to date, has been on situations affecting primary and secondary education, but it may be possible to apply these to the protection of higher education, while keeping in mind that many attacks on higher education occur outside of conflict situations and may therefore warrant specific responses tailored to the sector.

Measures to protect higher education should focus on increasing protection, prevention and accountability through greater application of existing domestic and international laws, and enhanced monitoring, reporting, and domestic and international advocacy.

**Protection and prevention measures**

Restricting military use of university facilities

In countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Yemen, state forces or armed non-state groups have used universities for military purposes such as weapons caches, strategic bases or training camps. This increases the risk that attacks aimed at such forces or groups might result in intentional or
collateral damage to facilities; and, if the university continues to function despite being used for military purposes, it increases the risk of harm to members of higher education communities. This also undermines the autonomy of higher education institutions and risks creating a perception that the institution and its personnel are aligned with combatants, increasing their vulnerability (discussed below). Protection against such military use of universities and other educational buildings is extensively covered later in this report in the essay: ‘Military use of schools and universities: changing behaviour’. 314

Strengthening university autonomy
While there is extensive literature on the topic of university autonomy, it is not often linked explicitly to the issue of security from violent or coercive attacks. However, recent work commissioned by GCPEA examines the relationship between autonomy and security, and reflects on the security-enhancing potential of university autonomy around the world. The work lays out some of the ways in which enhancing university autonomy vis-à-vis the state can provide a possible model for reducing attacks on higher education systems, particularly when coupled with university-controlled internal security provision. These ideas include developing and extending the notion of the university as a space outside direct state control (even when funding is largely state-provided), including control of recruitment, financial and administrative management, curriculum and freedom of research. It also extends to the prohibition of state forces entering university campuses (unless invited in by the institutional leadership or in extremely rare circumstances). The authors argue that: ‘The ultimate goal of all of these efforts should be to establish a culture of autonomy and security, recognized not only within the higher education sector but in the wider society, in which higher education spaces are “off limits” to attacks, freeing them to develop their research and educational functions to their fullest and to the maximum benefit of all.” 316

The case of Colombia provides an illustrative example. In response to campus demonstrations against higher education reforms, successive Colombian governments have challenged the autonomy of university space, arguing that the state has the right to intervene in all national territory to protect its citizens. Similarly, they have argued that armed non-state actors, particularly the guerrilla movements, are using the university as a space for recruitment and incitement. Many infringements of higher education space have occurred over the past two decades, resulting in violent clashes between students and state forces and the deaths of several students. 318

The authors of the GCPEA study note that to have full protective effect, a culture of respect for institutional autonomy must include not only the state but also non-state actors and the academic community itself. In Colombia, this broad culture has been undermined by decades of violence, leaving the Colombian academic community vulnerable to threats and attacks by illegal paramilitary forces and their successor groups, such as the Black Eagles. 319 Meanwhile, the state, which has failed to provide universities with full security from such attacks, responds to them by limiting the universities’ autonomy. As the study notes, full respect for autonomy requires more than the state refraining from committing attacks. States also have a responsibility to protect higher education communities from attack – especially from para-state forces, insurgencies or criminal gangs which are less likely to be subject to the same pressures as states to comply with legal norms and policies – but in ways that respect and promote autonomy.

Physical protection of higher education
Increasing protection through defensive, physical measures has been one of the traditional responses to attacks on primary and secondary education, as cases across a number of contexts show. 320 Physical protection strategies for higher education could similarly include defensive reinforcement of infrastructure, such as installing bullet-proof windows and blast-proof walls; installing security ramps and other anti-suicide bombing measures (e.g. metal detectors, security cameras and checkpoints); 321 changing lecture times to fit with arrival and departure in daylight hours; escorting higher education professionals, students, and education trade unionists en route to and from university; and providing
bodyguards and blast-proof vehicles for high-profile staff and trade unionists. These strategies could also include providing armed or unarmed security forces around or within universities, although these should be provided in ways that recognize and enhance the autonomy concerns unique to higher education, whenever practical (see above).

There are a number of country-specific examples of physical protection strategies involving university campuses and communities. In Colombia, a Working Group on the Human Rights of Teachers composed of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and representatives from the Colombian government and the trade union movement provided threatened or targeted teachers, university academics and trade union representatives with administrative and financial support for protection measures. Special committees were set up that studied on a case-by-case basis the type and degree of risk and the type of ensuing protection, including armed escorts/guards, mobile phones, bulletproof vehicles and temporary relocation.

It is not clear to what extent the securitization and militarization of educational staff and buildings may mitigate or exacerbate attacks, and if, and in which ways, such measures may affect learning. While a high risk of attacks may necessitate increasing security at and around universities, physical protection strategies present a number of dilemmas: first, escorting large groups of students and university professors collectively may render these groups and the respective guards more exposed to attacks; second, concentrating security forces around universities may turn students or scholars into individual targets outside the university campus; third, enhancing infrastructure security may protect university buildings but equally it may turn them into ‘attractive’ locations for military use by armed forces; fourth, there is a risk that the use of self-defensive force by education staff could be seen or interpreted as taking an active part in the hostilities, thus turning them into potential targets.

Moreover, effective implementation of such strategies in the higher education context may be difficult for several reasons: first, attacks on students and academics often occur off-campus; second, attacks that take place inside higher education buildings have in some cases been carried out through suicide attacks or using remotely detonated bombs, which may make external security measures ineffective; and third, security measures and armed responses risk limiting or restraining the autonomy of universities, especially when the perpetrator of aggression and violence is the state through its security forces. Increasing use of university-controlled private security guards might be a partial solution to these challenges, at least as far as respecting autonomy concerns, but not in all cases. Furthermore, even the best trained private security forces will be of little use in situations where the state itself is the source of the threat to universities and to the perceived ‘enemies’ within their walls.

Promoting resilience: alternative sites and modes of higher education provision

Flexible education provision has been tested in places such as Belarus, Iraq, Israel/Palestine and Zimbabwe. It implies reducing the risk of students and staff as visible targets by removing them from the context of traditional learning places, reducing the time they spend in class by rescheduling lectures and providing them with alternative learning modalities (e.g. homeschooling, community-based learning, or distance learning).

In 2007, a year rife with attacks on Iraqi academics and scholars, the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education allowed academics and researchers to work from home for part of the week in order to minimize movement around university buildings. While similar measures may prove efficient in reducing the number of fatalities, they do little to reduce death threats or to prevent the ensuing exodus. In this regard, more can be done with exiled academics either to find ways through which they can still contribute to the national education system, or to better integrate them in the new host country, giving them the chance to continue their work throughout the period abroad.

For example, distance learning programmes have been developed by a number of organizations, enabling exiled Iraqi scholars to record lectures that
are screened at universities within Iraq and to connect in ‘real time’ with students and faculty at Iraqi universities,\(^{339}\) and fostering exchange between Iraqi universities and universities abroad to improve access and quality of higher education within Iraq.\(^{339}\) In Israel/Palestine, distance learning has been used to mitigate problems associated with university closures and travel risks for students and academics at Palestinian universities.\(^{334}\) In Zimbabwe, virtual classrooms have enabled academics in the diaspora as well as non-Zimbabwean lecturers to deliver lectures in areas such as health science and veterinary science to students at the University of Zimbabwe.\(^{332}\) These are fields of study in which there are staffing and teaching capacity gaps at the university,\(^{333}\) as many higher education staff have felt compelled to leave the country.\(^{334}\)

Other alternative sites or modes of education provision include home schooling or community-based learning. Following the removal of autonomy and the repression by the Serbian state throughout the 1990s and until the 1999 war, the education of Kosovo Albanian children and youth was based on a parallel schooling system that operated from the primary to the tertiary level.\(^{335}\) As a political response to increasing pressure placed by Belgrade on Kosovo Albanian scholars and activists, the parallel ‘Albanian University of Prishtina’ was reorganized into a diaspora-funded system whose classes were offered in the basements of private apartment buildings;\(^{336}\) such a political choice had protective implications. There exists little comparative research on the topic of flexible education, however, and there is little substantive evidence on whether such a system could work for urban-based higher education in larger settings and in conflict areas.

Alternative learning programmes, when and where implemented, also raise questions about the quality, feasibility and sustainability of the education provided as well as about relations with the formal education system. With regard to higher education, the lack of empirical research renders it unclear to what extent and for how long such alternative learning programmes can prove to be useful, how they can be certified, and what their overall impact is on the quality of education.

Recovery measures for academics in exile: fellowships and multiple relocations

Many of the international networks and organizations that engage in advocacy on behalf of threatened academics provide support for relocation to other countries, including offering, finding or funding temporary academic positions, as well as professional capacity development programmes and research fellowships.\(^{337}\) Clearly, much of this work provides a vital lifeline for vulnerable and threatened academics. But it also raises important issues related to brain drain and the well-being of those academic communities left behind.

For any academic or scholar, the decision whether to stay or leave is a very personal one. It reflects calculations about physical safety of the individual and her or his family; about work prospects; and about the future of the country in which she or he is working. The decision to leave is rarely taken lightly, and it is often not intended to be a ‘forever’ decision. However, exiled academics may be more effective when safely outside of their home countries, living in conditions that allow them to produce academic works – and often send them home – in a way that would otherwise not have been possible under conditions of attack and life-threatening insecurity.

Reversing brain drain is not impossible and a multi-faceted response towards ending impunity and increasing resources and protection for higher education personnel would, in many cases, further promote returns. More specifically, the risk of brain drain could be reduced by: increasing support and protection measures for scholars and academics before they feel compelled to flee the country; developing particular programmes that would ease and support their eventual reintegration while still in exile and after they return to their home country; facilitating increased security provision; and increasing support from colleagues in the region and beyond to prevent feelings of isolation.

Underground and in-exile universities

One of the few cases of entire universities relocated in exile is the European Humanities University (EHU) in Belarus\(^{338}\) which, following government efforts to assert control over the university, relocated to
Lithuania with support from over a dozen governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, foundations, corporations and individuals. Many of the staff and students still live in Belarus and endure regular harassment from the Belarus authorities when travelling between university and home. A similar example was the establishment in Syria of the private International University for Science and Technology in 2005. The institution was founded by a group of Iraqi professors who, having fled Iraq following targeted assassinations of academics, pooled their savings, opened the first English-language university (with both Iraqi and Syrian students enrolled) and recruited other Iraqi professors from Iraq. The university was still operational in 2013, although it had had to adapt to conditions of insecurity resulting from the Syrian conflict.

A further example of alternative, though widely known, higher education provision is the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE) in Iran. It was founded in 1987 as a result of systematic discrimination and exclusion from universities of the religious minority group Baha’i. Characterized by an innovative teaching-learning environment, courses that were initially delivered by correspondence are now provided through on-line communication technologies. In addition to the on-line platform, an affiliated global faculty (AGF) that involves hundreds of accredited professors from universities outside Iran assists BIHE as researchers, teachers and consultants. However, in 2012 the Special Rapporteur on Iran reported that in June 2011 the Ministry of Science and Technology had declared the activities of the institute illegal and that all diplomas and degrees issued by it had no legal validity; and noted that some individuals affiliated to the university had since been arrested.

Community protection
Mechanisms of protecting education from attack based on community engagement have been tested in rural settings and for primary and secondary education, while to date there have been no examples of their effectiveness for higher education. For higher education institutions and academic communities, mainly located in urban areas, the potential of using local community leaders and links to offer protection is much weaker. Local people may not identify with a university, which likely draws its student population from a wide area, in the same way that they do with the schools their own children attend.

Furthermore, community-based protection often implies negotiation and bargaining with religious leaders or ideology-driven armed groups. But such people may not see higher education students and academics – who are often viewed as sources of power or threats to power – as ‘neutral’ in the way that younger schoolchildren and their teachers are generally perceived. Negotiating security would therefore probably require a much greater degree of trade-off and compromise, which might in turn be detrimental to academic freedom or the rights of specific groups within the university, such as female students. Moreover, community-based measures are likely to offer little protection against violence or coercion by the institutions of the state itself.

Negotiated codes of conduct as protective/preventive measures
Initiatives of negotiation to turn schools into safe sanctuaries, such as the *Schools as Zones of Peace* programme carried out in Nepal, have not yet been applied to protecting higher education communities from attack. It is thus not clear whether, to what extent and how they would work at this level. The university, unlike the school, is often a setting for intense political debate. Higher education communities often seek greater autonomy and academic freedom to engage in teaching, research and debates on pressing societal issues; consequently, they might be resistant to strategies that could be perceived as requiring a trade-off between unfettered academic activity and security. At the same time, the rapid expansion of international higher education partnerships and exchanges, ranging from higher education ministries to institutions and administrators, academics and students, may create opportunities for negotiating standards of behaviour, including increased protection. Large, influential higher education networks and associations in particular, with increasingly global memberships where participation and good standing are prerequisites for international...
recognition and prestige, may provide platforms for norm-setting. Pilot studies, research and consultation with stakeholders are needed to better understand under what conditions such participatory processes might lead to agreements, codes of conduct and the standards which strengthen the status of universities as zones of peace.

**Accountability measures**

Reducing impunity for perpetrators of attacks on higher education communities is essential to providing justice to victims, deterring future attacks and combating some of the most harmful negative impacts of attacks on higher education, including self-censorship, isolation, involuntary exile and brain drain.

While non-state actors are often implicated in attacks, states and state-entities bear primary responsibility for protecting higher education communities. Yet too often states and state-entities are themselves implicated in attacks on higher education communities, directly or indirectly, or they fail to investigate incidents and hold perpetrators accountable. UN agencies, governments and international civil society organizations, including both human rights organizations and international higher education networks and associations, must do more to pressure states to recognize and adhere to their responsibilities.

Campaigns aimed at raising awareness of attacks on higher education should emphasize state action and responsibilities and might include positive, negotiated approaches to encouraging more effective protection and prevention measures by states, as well as more adversarial efforts to improve protection, including highlighting state involvement, complicity or failures to protect in reporting and inter-state mechanisms and bringing formal legal complaints under existing legal standards.

As to the latter, international humanitarian, human rights and criminal law provides general rights and protections which higher education and members of higher education communities enjoy to the same extent as other institutions and citizens, such as the protection regarding the physical integrity of civilians and infrastructure not used for military purposes, the right to freedom of expression, and so forth. In addition, certain international instruments offer specific protections to higher education, including the International Labour Organization (ILO) core Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel defining autonomy and academic freedom. Efforts should be made to encourage and reinforce local and international legal practitioners in using the laws at their disposal to advocate for the protection of higher education communities and their members.

**Reporting and advocacy measures**

**Monitoring and reporting**

Monitoring means the systematic collection and analysis of information. Accurate information about individual attacks or national patterns is crucial for enhancing prevention and providing protection. However, information is often lacking as to ‘who’ and ‘what’ is targeted, the reasons behind attacks, and the effects and trends over time.

Several actors have an explicit or implicit mandate to monitor and respond to attacks on education. Theoretically, governments are in the best position to monitor attacks on higher education but this monitoring is often inadequate and where state security or armed forces are the perpetrator of attacks, they may not be trusted or appropriate. Efforts at collecting data should be complemented by the work of police, prosecutors and criminal courts for investigating and prosecuting attacks that constitute criminal violations under domestic and international law. UN bodies can also play a monitoring role, while international and local NGOs may help to fill the gaps of UN monitoring systems or to compensate for the lack of will or capacity of government authorities. The UN and NGOs may have to take the lead where the government is itself the source of the abuse.

In Colombia, the Ombudsman’s office monitors human rights situations in many areas, working as an early warning system for preventing abuses. It has played a pivotal role in reporting threats to, and attacks on, communities, trade unionists and
teachers. However, government authorities have not always taken into consideration or reacted through protection measures to risk reports from the Ombudsman’s office reporting human rights violations in the country.350 Elsewhere, government actions can actually endanger higher education. In India, government troops and paramilitary police have been based in schools and on at least one college campus as part of their counter-insurgency strategy against the Naxalites, a practice that has increased the risk that these facilities may be attacked or that students and staff may be caught in the crossfire.351

More generally, governments may lack the capacity or the will to monitor attacks on education. In particular, this is often the case in conflict-affected areas. Governments may not be operative in, exert control over, or be in communication with many areas within the country’s territory. In other cases, governments may be implicated in the attacks, so they have an interest in obstructing or diverting the whole process of data monitoring and collection.

UN human rights mechanisms, such as the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and its Special Procedures, treaty bodies, and fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry are well positioned to monitor, report and hold states accountable for their human rights violations related to the higher education community. Through the UPR, the human rights records of all UN member states are reviewed, allowing for an opportunity to inject attention to higher education through that process. The Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights are treaty bodies that monitor a number of human rights obligations relevant to the protection of higher education; more information relating to any violations of these obligations should be presented to the treaty bodies.

Similarly, the joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts is charged with monitoring and promoting adherence to the 1997 Recommendation on the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel; the committee may provide another avenue for presenting evidence of state failure to protect higher education from attack. UN fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry should also be encouraged to specifically investigate violations of humanitarian law and human rights committed against the higher education community. For example, the first Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 352 which investigated alleged violations of human rights between March 2011 and November 2011, did not report on the raid by security forces on the dormitories of students at Damascus University in June 2011, when three students were killed, 21 injured and 130 arrested after students refused to participate in pro-government rallies. 353 Similarly, in its later report of 16 August 2012, 354 the commission did not report on a raid by security forces at Aleppo University in May 2012, when four students were killed, 28 injured and 200 arrested.355 Other UN bodies that have mandates related to human rights, education and conflict are in a good position to monitor and report attacks on education. Several of them are better positioned to monitor attacks on primary and secondary levels of education, and thus attacks on higher education are monitored less. To be explored is whether such agencies as OHCHR, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Protection and Education Clusters, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) might contribute to efforts to promote and improve assessment and monitoring of attacks on higher education. The monitoring work of some of these agencies is activated only to the extent that attacks on higher education affect humanitarian access, thus leaving large gaps in reporting. The UN MRM has the most explicit mandate to monitor attacks on education at the levels of schools, students and teachers, but higher education is not within its purview.

Local and international NGOs may play an important role in monitoring and reporting attacks on higher education, especially in those cases where government or state-backed forces have been implicated in attacks. Scholars at Risk has recently launched such an initiative to track and report on five defined types of attacks on higher education communities and their members: improper travel restrictions; retaliatory discharge or dismissal; wrongful detention; wrongful prosecution; and killings, violence or disappearances. An ‘other’ category is used to track incidents outside the defined categories which may
significantly impair academic freedom or the human rights of members of higher education communities, such as violent student unrest, systemic discrimination or intimidation, university closures, military use of higher education facilities and direct attacks on university facilities or materials. Dissemination of monitoring data by email, a website and in periodic reports will help raise awareness and support future advocacy for greater protection.

Documenting and reporting attacks are important for holding perpetrators accountable, prosecuting them at different levels and deterring future attacks. However, collecting data that seek to map and document responsibility for attacks is far more difficult than reporting attacks. Current monitoring efforts reflect some progress but also significant gaps.

**National and transnational advocacy campaigns**

Linked to the need for monitoring and reporting mechanisms is the crucial role that national and international civil society advocacy – as a mechanism of reporting, accountability, protection and prevention – can play in addressing the issue of attacks on higher education and academic freedom, particularly if the perpetrator is a national government in a ‘non-conflict’ situation, which is often the case in the higher education sector. Transnational networks, linked through a myriad of organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Education International and activated by national civil society and human rights organizations, can be – when successfully mobilized and coordinated – a powerful force for protection of higher education communities.

Letters of protest and ‘urgent actions’ sent to international organizations, solidarity networks and pressure on government embassies can raise the international profile of violations, making them visible and increasing the costs of politically-motivated violence or coercion. All of this pressure relies on national civil society and human rights organizations providing regular and well-documented evidence upon which campaigns can be based.

The effectiveness of this type of protection measure relies on the perpetrator’s sensitivity and need to maintain international respectability. This appears intimately related to the need of nation states to be legitimated both domestically and internationally and to be seen as accepted members of the international community. This is reflected in the increase in state signatories to human rights agreements over the past four decades, which appear important not just on the international stage but also for national public consumption. Similar reputational pressures may be an avenue for increasing protection for higher education communities, insofar as the higher education sector is highly reputation-sensitive: academic personnel, students, institutions and national systems are themselves increasingly integrated, and eager to partner with international counterparts who could be mobilized to demand greater security, autonomy and accountability.

In research on transnational advocacy movements, Keck and Sikkink talk about the ‘boomerang effect’ whereby channels for change are blocked at the national level and processes of transnational advocacy assist in mobilizing external actors to pressure the state and therefore change its behaviour. Such transnational civil society pressure appears to be an important variable in encouraging human rights compliance and this is where global civil society activism has the potential to make a real difference. This can provide a solid rationale for an international advocacy strategy on higher education attacks. The recent campaign to free Miguel Ángel Beltrán, the Colombian sociologist, is an illustrative example. From the time of his detention in May 2009 to his release in June 2011, a powerful global campaign gathered petitions signed by thousands of teachers and academics and activists and lobbied the Colombian government and their own respective national governments to raise Dr Beltrán’s case.

One caveat concerning this mechanism of protection is that its power rests on the need of the perpetrators for legitimacy. Similar to respect for university autonomy, such pressure is less likely to work on armed non-state actors, unless they are at a stage where they are seeking legitimacy, and even less so on criminal gangs.
Conclusions and ways forward

As the above analysis demonstrates, possible measures for the protection of higher education and prevention of future attacks are wide-ranging and each has strengths and limitations. Success is likely to be highly context-sensitive and case-specific. More research is clearly needed to improve knowledge and awareness and further develop strategies on this issue. This review suggests the need for caution in generalizing findings and positing global solutions, particularly when so little rigorous research is available that maps the dynamics of attacks on higher education in relation to mechanisms of protection, prevention and accountability.

Nevertheless, immediate short-term steps can be taken to increase protection and help prevent future attacks. These could include increased support for the monitoring of attacks on higher education. Analysis of the problem of attacks on higher education points to the lack of systematic documentation, and an absence of a mechanism that specifically and exclusively monitors and reports on attacks (nature, scope, motives, patterns, frequency) and of international and national protection responses. One important aspect of this would be to gather data on attacks on university students more systematically. Such data are worryingly absent from what little documentation exists. Students unions and their collective organizations, unlike academic staff organizations, often lack the institutional infrastructure and resources to gather data on attacks on members of their community. These efforts could also be linked to awareness and advocacy campaigns on attacks against students, and lend support for the setting up of protection measures for targeted or at-risk students similar to those available to at-risk academics (temporary exile strategies, etc.).

Mechanisms could also be developed to improve emergency protection measures available to higher education institutions and communities. In countries with a high prevalence of attacks on higher education institutions, efforts could be undertaken to raise security awareness among students, academics and administrators and other staff, for example, through training workshops, and to develop a tailored security strategy. These could be developed as part of a broader strategy of reducing overall violence that would turn higher education communities into less vulnerable or soft targets, whilst simultaneously recognizing the dilemmas of securitization/militarization, especially when the state is the only or main perpetrator of attacks.

Lobbying and advocacy could also be fruitfully targeted at national governments to emphasise their responsibilities for protecting higher education from attack and the potential legal sanctions if they fail to do so. Linked to this, there is a great need to increase awareness and understanding of attacks on higher education as part of the problem of attacks on education more generally. While there have been great strides made over recent years in raising awareness of attacks on education around the world, evidence and advocacy on the higher education sector have been noticeably lagging.
Military use of schools and universities: changing behaviour

Research shows it is common for military forces and armed groups to use schools and universities as bases, barracks, night shelters, fighting positions and detention centres during conflict, often with serious consequences. It makes them a target for the enemy, it causes damage and destruction of facilities, it can put students, teachers and academics at risk from incoming fire or soldiers’ misconduct and it can deprive students of classes for long periods or lead to their dropping out of education. How can a change in military behaviour be achieved? This chapter explores why an effective approach to better protecting schools and universities from military use is through the adoption and implementation of international guidelines.

In March 2010, Human Rights Watch researchers visited a government elementary school for Muslim children in the southern Thai village of Ban Klong Chang. The Royal Thai Army Ranger force had been using the grounds of the school for the previous two years, occupying about half of the school playing field. The paramilitary soldiers were armed with pistols and military assault rifles. One of the children at the school told the researchers that they were allowed to touch the weapons but were not allowed to carry them. Despite the apparently friendly atmosphere, with soldiers playing with students, some of the students expressed fears. They said they worried that the guns might hurt them. They also said that they were frightened because the presence of the soldiers meant that they and their friends might be hurt if fighting broke out between the Rangers and the opposing forces.

Both the students and their parents were concerned that the teachers were unable to do their jobs as successfully as they would if the school was just being used as a school. There was a strong awareness in the small village community of the extent to which the soldiers’ presence was adversely affecting the children’s schooling. Some of the girls were worried about the soldiers touching them and one of them said she was not happy that the soldiers asked her if she had an older sister. The possibility of sexual harassment of the girls was a general fear for both parents and students, and one mother expressed concern that her daughter might become pregnant by the soldiers. The Rangers brewed and drank an herbal narcotic drink in the school and some of the students had apparently tried it themselves. The games that students played also became increasingly militarized. Inevitably, given their concerns, some parents removed their children from the school but attendance at an alternative school required the children to travel an extra hour each day. There was no general opposition to the soldiers’ presence in the locality – just a widely held feeling that they should not be using the school and that their presence was having a bad effect on education.

As this single example illustrates, during armed conflict there is the potential for considerable interaction between those delivering and receiving education and those doing the fighting, be they members of states’ armed forces or those belonging to armed non-state groups. This chapter discusses the various forms military use of schools and universities can take and considers ways in which the behaviour of military forces might be changed to reduce that use, including through the development of international guidelines. It describes the content of Draft Guidelines developed last year under the auspices of GCPEA and how these are being taken forward for adoption. It concludes with a brief discussion of how different states and armed non-state actors might choose to implement them.

Military commanders or the leaders of armed non-state groups may regard school buildings as ideal for use as headquarters, barracks or stores for military equipment. Schools often have fenced or walled perimeters making security relatively straightforward. During active hostilities, their buildings can be used as defensive positions, as good locations from which
to launch attacks or as observation posts. Their use for such purposes may have a profound impact on educational provision, even to the extent that it may result in the destruction of essential educational infrastructure.

Some acts that might seem positive to a military commander, such as deploying a fighting force to provide much needed security for a school, may actually have negative consequences; the presence of fighters in or around a school may render it a legitimate target for opposing forces. The close proximity of military forces guarding a school may actually attract the very assault they are attempting to prevent.

Armed conflict is an enduring feature of the international system. It should be possible, however, to mitigate its worst effects by modifying the behaviour of the fighting forces of parties to conflict. Their actions can have profoundly damaging effects and there is a responsibility on all concerned to take measures to mitigate these negative impacts. Action of any sort to reduce the effects of armed conflict on education should be accorded a high priority. It is necessary, however, to be realistic and pragmatic about what is possible in that regard.

The military use of schools and universities today

The GCPEA report Lessons in War: Military Use of Schools and Other Education Institutions during Conflict (2012) reveals clear evidence of the use of educational institutions by the forces of parties to conflict in armed conflicts in at least 24 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South America from 2005 to 2012. In all 24 of these countries, state armed forces were among those using schools and universities, non-state actors used schools and universities in 17 of these countries, and other international actors used schools and universities in at least five of these countries.

The evidence, however, almost certainly under-represents the extent of military use of schools and universities. For instance, not all ‘conflicts’ were included in Lessons in War. ‘Criminal insurgency’ has frequently been excluded from legal definitions of armed conflict because it is motivated by greed rather than a political objective. Importantly, however, International Humanitarian Law says nothing about the motives driving rival forces – something acknowledged by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – so criminal gangs may be engaged in a form of armed conflict if the intensity of armed violence reaches a threshold level, as it has done in Mexico, for example.

There is also a degree of under-reporting of military use of schools and universities. This is not always deliberate and can be related to the difficulties of data capture in conflict zones. Nevertheless, governments have suppressed information. Community leaders may also fail to report such use for fear of retribution. In any case, it is clear that military use of education institutions has disrupted education provision in many regions affected by conflict.

This is a serious problem. Military use of educational institutions occurs in most regions affected by armed conflict and assumes several forms. For these reasons, GCPEA initiated a project to mitigate the worst effects of military use of schools and universities by setting new standards to guide parties to armed conflict.

Lessons in War analysed the military use of schools and universities, categorizing the use to which they are routinely put. The following seven different categories of military use were identified:

Bases and barracks

Bases or barracks are set up in school or university buildings and grounds to accommodate fighters for the medium- to long-term, providing them with access to such amenities as cooking spaces, washing facilities and lavatories. Examples include:

- Across India, government paramilitary police occupied schools. In 2010, before forces began complying with court orders to vacate schools, approximately 130 schools were being used, particularly in states most affected by the Maoist insurgency – Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand – but also in the country’s northeast, in Tripura, Manipur, Nagaland and Assam.
In Syria, schools have been used as barracks for government forces with tanks at the school gates and snipers posted on rooftops. Anti-government forces have also used schools as bases.\textsuperscript{369}

Defensive and offensive positions or staging areas
Troops use school or university buildings as defensive positions providing protection from enemy fire, observation posts, firing positions or locations from which to direct attacks on opposing forces.

- During Ramadan in 2010, Al-Shabaab fighters entered a school in Mogadishu and told the students to stay in their classrooms. The fighters set up a surface-to-air rocket launcher and fired from inside the school compound at territory held by the Somali government. Government forces responded and one rocket hit the school just as the students were finally released, killing eight on their way home.\textsuperscript{370}

- For six months in 2011, Yemeni government forces occupied the Superior Institute for Health Science, a school for pharmacists and physicians' assistants on high ground in the city of Ta'izz. Dozens of troops occupied the medical laboratory and the pharmacology department, as well as the roof. A machine gun was mounted on an armoured vehicle in the yard and machine gun and mortar rounds were fired from the school while classes were in session.\textsuperscript{371}

Weapons and ammunition storage
In order to hide or simply store weapons and ammunition, armed forces and armed groups have stockpiled weapons and ammunition in schools and school grounds.

- In 2010, the Armed Forces of The Philippines and their irregular auxiliary force (the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units) used functioning public schools to store weapons and ammunition.\textsuperscript{372}

- During an international assessment in 2011 in Côte d'Ivoire following the arrest of former President Laurent Gbagbo and the cessation of hostilities, three schools were found to contain firearms and ammunition.\textsuperscript{373}

- In 2012, the UN verified 36 incidents of schools in Yemen being used for weapons storage, sometimes resulting in their closure.\textsuperscript{374}

Detention and interrogation centres
Armed forces and armed groups have converted schools into sites of detention and interrogation. Sometimes, classrooms are used temporarily to hold or interrogate individuals, possibly in connection with other military activities in or around the school.

- In Syria in 2011, government authorities established numerous temporary holding centres in schools during massive detention campaigns while anti-government demonstrations were underway. While in the schools, some detainees were subjected to torture during interrogation.\textsuperscript{375}

- The Israeli Defence Forces have used schools in the West Bank for detention and interrogation while arresting anyone in the community aged between 17 and 50.\textsuperscript{376}

- During the armed conflict in Libya in 2011, schools were converted into improvised detention centres. Tajura Primary School, for example, became a prison for several hundred combatants who fought in support of the Gaddafi regime.\textsuperscript{377}

Military training
Schools and universities make ideal locations for military training, fitness programmes and weapons training for new recruits.

- In 2011, anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya conducted training in schools. Journalists documented at least one instance of rebel leaders using a secondary school to instruct soldiers in the use of anti-aircraft guns.\textsuperscript{378}

- During 2012, Islamist armed groups controlling northern Mali trained new recruits, including children, in both private and public schools as well as in Koranic schools.\textsuperscript{379}
Children have reported receiving military training in madrassas (Islamic schools) in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan from armed groups active in these areas.\textsuperscript{380}

**Illegal recruitment of child soldiers**

Many non-state armed groups have taken advantage of schools as locations where children gather, to recruit them into their forces.

- In April 2012, mutineers under General Bosco Ntaganda rounded up over 30 male students at Mapendano secondary school, in Masisi territory, DRC. The boys and young men were tied up, taken to a military camp and inducted into Ntaganda’s forces.\textsuperscript{381}

- The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) engaged in child recruitment campaigns in schools. In September 2008, they entered a school in the department of Cauca where 800 students were studying and invited the children to join the group.\textsuperscript{382}

- In Somalia, al-Shabaab militants have systematically used schools as recruiting grounds. They have regularly visited schools and forcibly removed children from classrooms, often at gunpoint. They have lined up students, selected those they deem fit to serve as fighters and suicide bombers, and taken them back to their training camps.\textsuperscript{383}

**Temporary shelter**

Armed forces and armed groups sometimes use schools and university buildings as temporary shelter, either from incoming attacks or simply for protection from the elements.

- In Colombia, army helicopters occasionally use school playing fields and playgrounds as landing sites for the unloading of personnel and weapons.\textsuperscript{384}

- In July 2010, the Burmese government’s armed forces temporarily sheltered from the rain in a school in the village of Tha Dah Der, in the north-eastern Karen state. Local residents had already fled the area and the soldiers had burned most of the buildings in the village. They also tried to burn down the school buildings.\textsuperscript{385}

- In South Ossetia, Georgia in 2008, a kindergarten teacher reported to Human Rights Watch that volunteer militias had been hiding in her kindergarten and that Georgian government forces had attacked the building with rockets.\textsuperscript{386}

As the preceding analysis shows, educational facilities are used regularly by armed forces in various ways. While temporary physical occupation is the most widely reported form of military use, other overt and indirect forms of use are common. There are instances where schools and universities are being used militarily and educationally at the same time; in other circumstances, military use spells the end of all educational activities. In either case, the effects of military use on education functions are typically adverse.

The negative consequences of military use are many and various. Students and teachers come under fire and are often exposed to physical injury and sexual violence. Students drop out of school or are removed by worried parents who are frightened about the risks to which their children are exposed. School and university buildings are damaged and destroyed – both by attacks precipitated by their use and by the actions of armed forces and groups using them – with many being altered in some way to make them even more suitable for military use. Course notes, textbooks, classroom furniture and a great deal of other educational material are damaged or lost. Students, teachers and support staff may suffer trauma when schools are attacked; merely the fear of attack can undermine the feeling of security that is necessary for a good teaching and learning environment. Schools and universities that are used by the military while carrying on their educational function become overcrowded; there are consequential lower rates of enrolment; the quality of education that is still delivered declines; and the presence of soldiers can seriously undermine general personal security, with girls and women being especially vulnerable.
Provision of security for educational institutions

Not all forms of military interaction with education are motivated purely by military imperatives, nor are they necessarily negative in their impact. Schools and universities in conflict zones are in need of security and protection. Their administrators and military commanders may judge it necessary for military personnel to guard them. Military commanders with a specific mandate to protect civilians as part of a humanitarian mission, for example, may well regard school security as an essential mission objective. Education institutions damaged in war may need rebuilding and essential services may need to be restored. Military units could be physically capable of providing the sort of support necessary to maintain the infrastructure vital for schools to operate effectively. Indeed, military personnel may be the only source of such support during conflict and its immediate aftermath.

There is, however, a fundamental dilemma to be faced. Military personnel providing the support and security necessary for a school to function could compromise that school’s status and lead to it becoming a target for opposing military forces. This may be the case even when a military force is acting in a conflict zone under a humanitarian mandate. The provision of support by the military could have exactly the opposite effect of that intended.

Whether military interaction with education is essentially for military purposes or for the apparent benefit of education itself, it is important that military commanders are aware of the serious dilemmas that result. Their decisions should be consistent with the need to mitigate the impact of conflict on education. Clearly, those decisions need to be informed by an understanding of the relevant legal rights and obligations; military action must remain within legal limits. It is also desirable, however, to do more to protect education than the minimum required by the law. Any military interaction with education should be reduced as much as possible to maximize the benefit to education and to minimise the damage to it.

Options for changing behaviour

Changing military behaviour, especially in order to impose additional constraints on military activity, is a major challenge. The use of educational establishments is a sorry feature of modern warfare. What the law demands is known and it is vitally important that all fighting forces, both those belonging to states and those making up armed non-state groups, are sufficiently well-disciplined and trained to comply. Even if the law as it stands were to be fully complied with, however, it would not result in education obtaining the degree of protection it deserves and requires. Even lawful behaviour by fighting forces can result in serious damage to education. Better behaviour than the current law demands is therefore needed.

A change in the law might be one way forward. Would an education-specific treaty or convention be a sensible step and could the process of achieving this be initiated by a coalition of international organizations and NGOs rooted in civil society? There is evidence that the contemporary normative climate is becoming increasingly conducive to civil society-inspired changes to the law governing the conduct of hostilities and the development of means and methods of warfare. Both the Ottawa and Oslo processes, on anti-personnel land-mines and cluster munitions respectively, were initiated by civil society groups, as was the process resulting in the UN negotiations for an Arms Trade Treaty, successfully concluded in early 2013. A convention restricting military use of schools and universities is, therefore, a serious option to consider.

The need to persuade states formally to engage in negotiations and then agree to be bound by resultant treaty provisions may, however, be a challenge too far. Such an approach is likely to result in many powerful or influential states either distancing themselves from the process of negotiation or engaging with the intention of preventing progressive rules that would impose more constraints on military forces. Many states would simply argue that the protection of education is already adequately provided for in existing treaty law. The risk is that states would not be willing to commit in law to a more restrictive set of rules even if they might be prepared generally to adopt
practices that would have the same result while preserving their legal rights.

There has been evidence recently of the advantages of taking a softer and more pragmatic approach that might have a greater chance of succeeding than trying to change the law. An obvious example is the production of both the Montreux Document regulating the activities of Private Military and Security Companies\(^3\)\(^8\) and the subsequent Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.\(^3\)\(^8\) Another is the establishment of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.\(^3\)\(^9\) Such documents are not treaties; they are not, therefore, a source of international law and are consequently not legally binding on states – although they do have the potential to change or improve behaviour.\(^3\)\(^9\) Treaty negotiations would be difficult to initiate; by comparison, developing and seeking the adoption of voluntary guidelines would be more achievable, could change the law over time and ultimately might be more effective.

**Developing international guidelines**

Following wide consultations with states representatives and other experts, GCPEA decided to develop guidelines rather than attempt to initiate international negotiations for a convention that would change the applicable law. A workshop attended by a number of experts was convened at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in early 2012. The workshop recommended the development of a set of guidelines for protecting schools and universities from military use during armed conflict. The draft that eventually emerged was shaped around several considerations, namely:

- While any guidelines should aim to effect a change of behaviour, they should respect international law as it stands and not propose changes to it. They should not be legally binding in themselves or affect existing obligations under international law.
- The guidelines should reflect what is practically achievable and acknowledge that parties to armed conflict are invariably faced with difficult dilemmas requiring pragmatic solutions.
- The guidelines should reflect good practice already applied by some parties to armed conflict.
- The guidelines should be produced for the use of all parties to armed conflict, both states and armed non-state actors.
- While the guidelines should be produced specifically for application during armed conflict, they should also be useful and instructive for post-conflict and other comparable situations, including those with the potential to turn into armed conflict.

An initial draft set of guidelines was discussed by representatives of a number of states from regions around the world, as well as UN organizations and NGOs, at a workshop in Lucens, Switzerland, in late 2012. All those who attended were invited on the understanding that their identities would not be disclosed and their input would not be directly attributed to the states and organizations they represented. The states included a cross-section of the international community, ranging from NATO members to developing states that had experienced, or were still experiencing, armed conflicts within their borders.

**Content of the Draft Guidelines**

Further drafts and discussions resulted in Draft Guidelines published in July 2013.\(^3\)\(^9\) They remain in draft form and may be amended slightly before being finalised (at some point in 2014). There are six guidelines, as follows:

**Preamble:** Parties to armed conflict are urged not to use schools and universities for any purpose in support of the military effort. While it is acknowledged that certain uses would not be contrary to the law of armed conflict, all parties should endeavour to avoid impinging on students’ safety and education, using the following as a guide to responsible practice:

**Guideline 1:** Functioning schools and universities should not be used by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in any way in support of the military effort, either for immediate tactical advantage or for longer term purposes.
a This principle extends to schools and universities that are temporarily closed outside normal class hours, during weekends and holidays, and during vacation periods.

b Parties to armed conflict should neither use force nor offer incentives to education administrators to evacuate schools and universities in order that they can be made available for use in support of the military effort.

Guideline 2: Abandoned schools and universities should not be used by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict for any purpose in support of the military effort except when, and only for as long as, no choice is possible between such use of the school or university and another feasible method for obtaining a similar military advantage. Appropriate alternative premises should be presumed to be a better option, even if they are not as convenient or as well positioned for the desired military purpose, although all feasible precautions should be taken to protect all civilian objects from attack. The fighting forces of parties to armed conflict should be mindful that they may not have full knowledge of the potential negative consequences of their use of a school, including its effect on a civilian population’s willingness to return to an area.

a Any such use should be for the minimum time necessary.

b Abandoned schools and universities that are used by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in support of the military effort should always remain available to allow educational authorities to re-open them as soon as practicable, provided this would not risk endangering the security of students and staff.

c Any evidence or indication of militarization or fortification should be completely removed following the withdrawal of fighting forces, and any damage caused to the infrastructure of the institution should be promptly and fully repaired. All munitions and unexploded ordnance or remnants of war must be cleared from the site.

Guideline 3: Schools and universities – be they in session, closed for the day or for holidays, evacuated, or abandoned – are ordinarily civilian objects. They must never be destroyed as a measure intended to deprive the opposing parties to the armed conflict of the ability to use them in the future.

Guideline 4: Use of a school or university by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in support of the military effort may have the effect of turning it into a military objective subject to attack. Parties to armed conflict should consider all feasible alternative measures before attacking a school or university that has become a military objective, including warning the enemy in advance that an attack will be forthcoming unless it does not cease its use.

a Prior to any attack on a school that has become a military objective, the parties to armed conflict should take into consideration the duty of special care for children, and the potential long-term negative effect on a community’s access to education posed by the damage or destruction of the school.

b The use of a school or university by the fighting forces of one party to a conflict in support of the military effort should not serve as justification for an opposing party that captures it to continue to use it in support of the military effort. As soon as feasible, any evidence or indication of militarization or fortification should be removed and the facility returned to civilian authorities for the purpose of its educational function.

Guideline 5: The fighting forces of parties to armed conflict should generally not be employed on security tasks related to schools and universities except when the risk to those institutions is assessed as high; if alternative means of reducing the likelihood of attack are not feasible; if evacuation from the high risk area is not feasible; and if there are no alternative appropriately trained civilian personnel available to provide security.

a If such fighting forces are engaged in security tasks related to schools and universities, their presence within the grounds or buildings of the school should be avoided if at all possible, to avoid compromising its civilian status and disrupting the learning environment.
**Guideline 6:** All parties to armed conflict should, as far as possible and as appropriate, incorporate these Guidelines into their doctrine, military manuals, rules of engagement, operational orders and other means of dissemination, to encourage appropriate practice throughout the chain of command.

**Raising awareness of the Guidelines**

Securing implementation of the Guidelines requires a powerful campaign to raise awareness. This needs to reach out to both states and armed non-state actors. Increased awareness of the practice and consequences of the military use of schools and universities is vital - to prompt recognition of the need for guidance and to increase the political will to secure buy-in from government decision-makers and key stakeholders from the wider domains of both government and civil society.

How will the Guidelines be dealt with by military forces and by relevant government departments in states? Different states will approach the process of implementation, promulgation and achievement of an appropriate degree of compliance in different ways. There will be no hard and fast or universally acceptable means of achieving these things. Civil society organizations will be key partners in this endeavour, alongside those states willing to champion both the reasoning behind the Draft Guidelines and their content. Supportive states will be important but so too will armed non-state actors who will be made aware of the benefits of compliance through support from NGOs.

**Implementing the guidelines**

Each state will have its own ways of applying the Guidelines. This is the case even for NATO members. While NATO is the most sophisticated multinational military organization in the world, with military doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures promulgated in Allied Publications, individual member states retain publications for exclusively national use. Each will decide how best to ensure compliance and, although there will be similarities, one cannot assume that all will do this in the same way. Some may choose to incorporate the Guidelines into doctrine, some to include them in relevant manuals (including those dealing with the law of armed conflict) and some might favour reflecting them in command and control arrangements (such as rules of engagement).

Doctrine is essentially ‘that which is taught’. It is a guide for military commanders about ways of achieving tactical and operational success. It establishes ways of thinking about operations and also acts as a way of promulgating procedures necessary to make a military force work as a coherent whole. It is important at all levels, from military-strategic to tactical, but for the Guidelines the tactical level will be especially significant. Since doctrine provides the framework and content of tactical training, it would be a good way of ensuring compliance with the Guidelines.

Another way to promulgate Guidelines would be in legal manuals. The Guidelines are not law, however; indeed, they are an attempt to provide more protection for education than the law currently demands. For this reason, some states may include them in legal manuals; others may not. Importantly, many states do not have legal manuals of their own. The more sophisticated military powers do, but most states do not and often rely on commercially published versions – including versions produced by the more established military powers, such as the United Kingdom and German armed forces, for example, which reflect the views of those governments. It would be useful if states with their own legal manuals can be persuaded to adopt the Guidelines and reflect them in their manuals, but it may take some time – the UK’s manual was first published in 2004 and is only now undergoing its first review.

A further suggestion is to reflect them in rules of engagement (ROE). There is value in this approach because ROE are a command and control mechanism giving precise instructions to those operating at the tactical level about what they can and cannot do. For example, if a state had adopted the Guidelines and, in so doing, had agreed not to use school buildings for military purpose except in extreme circumstances, high-level commanders could use ROE to either
restrict a tactical commander’s choices or allow him to use a school exceptionally if the situation demanded it.

Another issue to consider is enforcement. No international agreement is automatically enforceable, even if it is agreed in a treaty. The Guidelines will not be binding internationally – but this does not mean they cannot be legally binding domestically. Breaches of the Guidelines would be unlawful if they contravene orders issued through the military chain of command. Non-compliance would then represent an offence under the military justice arrangements in the states that adopt them.

Armed non-state groups are most unlikely to use the range of publications and command and control mechanisms common within the armed forces of states. Such groups often emerge or coalesce during crises within states and their command arrangements will often be informal. Although some groups exist for extended periods, many are short-lived coalitions of disparate elements. The most effective and organized will have a command and control process of some sort, however. The Guidelines will require implementation through that. A number of organizations work with armed non-state groups to promote their compliance with international law; these organizations could be encouraged to include the Guidelines in this work.

Conclusions

It is evident that a great deal needs to be done to protect education – students, teachers, academics, administrators and the schools, universities and other establishments in which education is delivered – from the effects of armed conflict. This is particularly the case when it comes to military use of schools and universities. The Draft Guidelines are consistent with the law but are intended to lead to behaviour on the ground that should provide a greater degree of protection than even the law demands. The Draft Guidelines have been produced through a process that has involved substantial input from the military and defence and foreign ministries of a range of interested states. The process has also taken into account the special demands of the armed non-state actor community. The Draft Guidelines are pragmatic, realistic and capable of implementation through a range of mechanisms that are already employed to achieve compliance with the law.

Once the final version of the Guidelines has been produced, they will require endorsement or adoption, implementation and some measure of compliance and enforcement. As GCPEA and other bodies take the Guidelines forward, additional thought needs to be devoted to how the least capable states and armed non-state actors might be advised to proceed and what mechanisms they will need to put in place to ensure compliance.
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245 Save the Children reports that attendance levels of children in project schools were higher than in schools not included in the Save the Children programme, this might in part be attributed to reduced disruptions as a result of SzOP.


248 Ibid., 10.

249 When classes take place outside or in makeshift structures, increased distractions for students, limited supplies, poor facilities and environmental factors may contribute to truancy and higher dropout rates. See Bebe Sheppard and Kyle Knight, Disarming Schools: Strategies for Ending The Military Use of Schools during Armed Conflict (New York: HRW, 31 October 2011).


252 Save the Children ran and implemented a programme entitled Rewrite the Future, with the aim of improving education in conflict-affected states. The objectives included increasing access, with one of the possible activities to achieve increased access being school rehabilitation or construction. See for example: Frances Ellery and Katy Webley, The Future is Now: Education for Children in Countries Affected by Conflict (London: Save the Children, 2010); Save the Children, Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Midterm Country Report (London: Save the Children, March 2009); and Lynn Davies, Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children’s Delivery of Education in Conflict-affected Fragile States (London: Save the Children, 2012).


Christine Groneman, “Desk Study on Field-Based Mechanisms for Protecting Education from Targeted Attack,” in Protecting Education from Attack: A State-of-the-Art Review (Paris: UNESCO, 2010), 23. Alternative schooling can also prevent or reduce future cycles of violence. Save the Children has addressed issues of discrimination against minorities (such as Hindu and Sikh communities) in mainstream education in Afghanistan. One school was set up in a Sikh temple, with a Sikh director and Muslim teachers. This initiative came from a Muslim child media group, who discovered that children from Hindu and Sikh communities were not attending school. This initiative has implications for widening religious tolerance. See Lynn Davies, Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learning from Save the Children’s Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States (London: Save the Children, 2012), 9-10.

GCPEA, Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack (New York: GCPEA, December 2011), 43.

“What is Bantay Ceasefire?” Mindanao People’s Caucus, 16 November 2012.


For a detailed analysis of the nature, scope and motives of attacks, please see the Philippines profile in Part III of the present volume; and UNSC, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/782-S/2012/261, 26 April 2012.


Primary steps in the process include: establishing coordination mechanisms; carrying out community assessments; establishing mechanisms for ongoing dialogue between various stakeholders; establishing a Code of Conduct for the Declaration of LIZOP; community skills assessment and capacity strengthening; awareness-raising; community-level days of celebration and declaration of peace; and monitoring and advocating for government monitoring and enforcement of legislation – including establishing stronger links with RMN monitoring mechanisms.


Mindanao People’s Caucus (MPC), “Youth Volunteers for Peace Action Network.”


“What is Bantay Ceasefire?” Mindanao People’s Caucus, 18 November 2012.

In September 1986, the first Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the Philippines was declared in Naga City in southern Luzon. This was a community-based and people-initiated peace effort, involving the council of elders and the church. Since then, this model has gained ground around the country. For more details, see: Pushpa Iyer, Peace Zones of Mindanao, Philippines: Civil Society Efforts to End Violence (Massachusetts: Collaborative Learning Projects, October 2004); Mario Cabrera, “Schools as ‘Zones of Peace’,” UNICEF Philippines; Tilman Wörtz Zeitenispiegel, The Philippines: Peace Zones in a War Region (Tuebingen, Germany: Institute for Peace Education); and Debbie Uy, “Philippines: Local Communities Push for Peace Zones,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3 October 2008.

Church groups involved were of various denominations depending on the community. In communities where more than one religious or church group is present, the full range of religious groups would ideally be involved in the process.


Results from CARE’s research showed that 8% of key informants felt protection of schools is the community’s responsibility. See Marit Glad, Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan - Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation (Afghanistan: CARE International, September 2009), 44.

The concept of community schools has been taken to scale by national and international agencies. Community schools are now estimated to reach 156,000 students, according data given in Morten Sigsgaard, Education and Fragility in Afghanistan: A Situational Analysis (Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning, 2009), 19. This data illustrates the scope for variation in the level at which communities engage in one specific form of programmatic action. Some villages have initiated community schools themselves, others have been involved primarily in their implementation.


Ibid., 10-13.


Some examples include: In Herat in western Afghanistan, police collaborated with the community after an attack to arrange meetings to negotiate an end to attacks and the reopening of schools. Global Education Cluster, Protecting Education in Countries Affected by Conflict Booklet 3: Community-based Protection and Prevention (Global Education Cluster, October 2012), 8. In 2010, it was reported that a school in Jawzjan reopened after local communities put pressure on the Taleban. Elsewhere, the Taleban closed schools for two months as the government wanted to use them as election stations. The local elders convinced the government not to conduct the election in schools and the Taleban to permit the schools to function. Antonio Giustozzi and Claudio Franco, The Battle for the Schools: The Taleban and State Education (Afghanistan Analysts Network, 13 December 2011), 6.


Boys’ enrolment rates in community schools versus traditional government schools were 34.4% higher, and girls’ enrolment was 51.1% higher. The performance gap between girls and boys was reduced by a third. Dana Burde and Leigh Linden, The Effect of Village-Based Schools: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Afghanistan, IZA DP No. 6531 (Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, April 2012).


Ibid., 55.

While there is reluctance amongst communities to negotiate with armed insurgents, fear of criminal groups may be greater. Marit Glad, Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan - Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation (Afghanistan: CARE International, September 2009), 47-49.


Key informant interview with INGO staff member based in Kabul, May 2013.


Key informant interview with INGO staff member based in Kabul, May 2013.

Pushpa Iyet, Peace Zones of Mindanao, Philippines: Civil Society Efforts to End Violence (Massachusetts: Collaborative Learning Projects, October 2004).


Current debates are characterized by a lack of consensus over what constitutes an ‘attack’ on higher education communities, versus an infringement of academic freedom [or of the right to education] that falls short of the meaning of the term ‘attack’. This has methodological repercussions evident in the difficulty of establishing an agreed-upon set of indicators for monitoring attacks.

For example, according to Jarecki and Kaisth, in three-quarters of cases of scholars granted assistance by the Scholar Rescue Fund, the sole or a contributing source of persecution was the state. Henry Jarecki and Daniela Kaisth, Scholar Rescue in the Modern World (New York: Institute of International Education, 2009), 8.

For an outline of the kinds of attacks taking place in the higher education sector, see the Global overview in Part II of this study. Also see the ‘Attacks on higher education’ section in each country profile in Part III of this study.

Brain drain is the process of migration of highly-skilled and educated people that implies a loss of human capital for the country of origin. Attacks on higher education may trigger involuntary migration by victims of attacks and those similarly intimidated who seek physical security elsewhere, as well as voluntary migration by those seeking more favorable, secure and open environments in which to pursue their academic interests.


314 HRW site visit to Sanaa University Old Campus, 22 March 2012; HRW, Classrooms in the Crosshairs - Military Use of Schools in Yemen’s Capital (New York: HRW, 11 September 2012), 16; and HRW, “No Safe Places”: Yemen’s Crackdown on Protest in Taiz (New York: HRW, 6 February 2012), 59.

315 See, for example, the case of Yemen, where rebels remained on campus for three months after students began returning: HRW site visit to Sanaa University Old Campus, 22 March 2012; HRW, Classrooms in the Crosshairs - Military Use of Schools in Yemen’s Capital (New York: HRW, 11 September 2012), 16.

316 See the third essay in Part II of the present volume.


320 Colombia: Students in The Firing Line – A Report on Human Rights Abuses Suffered by Colombian University Students (National Union of Students, University and College Union and Justice for Colombia, July 2009), 4-5; and “Caso Jhony Silva, a la CIDH,” El Espectador.com, 17 June 2009.


323 Such measures have been used recently in some Mexican universities. See, for example: “Universidades duplican sus gastos en seguridad,” Universidad, 19 May 2010; Manual de Seguridad para instituciones de Educación Superior: Estrategias para la prevención y atención, Ausies, 2011, 29-39.

324 United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights

325 Mario Novelli, Colombia’s Classroom Wars: Political Violence Against Education Sector Trade Unionists (Brussels: Education International, 2009), 41.


327 The Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict have tried to address the third challenge in Guideline 5 by stating that: “[T]he fighting forces of parties to armed conflict should generally not be employed on security tasks related to schools and universities except when the risk to those institutions is assessed as high; if alternative means of reducing the likelihood of attack are not feasible; if evacuation from the high risk area is not feasible; and if there are no alternative appropriately trained civilian personnel available to provide security. (a) If such fighting forces are engaged in security tasks related to schools and universities, their presence within the grounds or buildings of the school should be avoided if at all possible, to avoid compromising its civilian status and disrupting the learning environment.” GCPEA, Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use During Armed Conflict (New York: GCPEA, 8 July 2013).

328 For example, a 2009 report on human rights violations against Colombian students, issued jointly by the UK’s National Union of Students, University College London and the UK-based NGO Justice for Colombia, concluded that the Colombian state not only did little to prevent attacks and systematically failed to capture or punish perpetrators, but also, security forces were found to have been directly involved in many of the attacks. The report suggests that in such a situation only international pressure and human rights campaigns addressed to the government can make a real difference. See Colombia: Students in The Firing Line – A Report on Human Rights Abuses Suffered by Colombian University Students (National Union of Students, University and College Union and Justice for Colombia, 2009), 5-7, 9.


331 For instance, the Scholar Rescue Fund’s “Iraq Scholar Rescue Project” has developed an “Iraq Scholar Lecture Series,” a distance learning programme that screens recorded lectures from SRF Iraqi scholar-grantees living abroad to 16 universities in Iraq. In addition, a ‘Live Lecture Series’ provides ‘real time’ lectures by SRF scholar-grantees living abroad to students and faculty at Iraqi universities in order to foster links between Iraqi scholars in the diaspora and those within the country.

332 In 2009, UNESCO in partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research launched the Avicenna Virtual Campus for universities in Iraq, which built on a previous EC-funded and UNESCO co-ordinated project for enhancing the adoption and use of Open and Distance Learning (ODL) in nine Mediterranean non-EU member states. The aim of the project was to expand access to education and improve the quality of teacher training by promoting partnerships and exchanges between Iraqi universities and a network of universities abroad.

333 GCPEA, Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack (New York: GCPEA, 2011), 20. Virtual Majlis is a programme by NGO Al Fakhoora that aims at ameliorating the physical blockade of Gaza’s higher education institutions by arranging regular online meet-ups between international student groups and students in Gaza. See “Virtual Majlis,” Fakhoora.org, 2013.


336 CARA, Zimbabwe programme webpage: http://www.carazg33.org/zimbabwe-programme.asp


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346 One example is a joint initiative of the International Association of Universities (IAU) and the Magna Charta Observatory (MOCO), together involving over 1,000 HE institutions worldwide, to establish a code of ethics in higher education. See IAU and MCO, IAU-MCO Guidelines for an Institutional Code of Ethics in Higher Education (Paris: IAU and MCO, December 2012). Although the initiative does not focus on security issues, per se, it suggests a model for exploring participatory processes for increasing protection of higher education from attack.

347 For a discussion of the legal frameworks protecting education, please refer to Part I of the present volume. A detailed analysis of these protections can be found in: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Protecting Education in Insecurity and Armed Conflict: An International Law Handbook (Doha: Education Above All, 2012).


351 HRW, Sabotaged Schooling: Naxalite Attacks and Police Occupation of Schools in India’s Bihar and Jharkhand States (New York: HRW, 2009), 6, 55, 70-2, 84-5.


356 Scholars at Risk’s monitoring project website is at http://monitoring.academicafreedom.info/.

357 Finnemore and Sikkink note that: “[I]nternational legitimation is important inssofar as it reacts back on a government’s domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in power.” This dynamic was part of the explanation for regime transitions in South Africa, Latin America and Southern Europe. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization, 52 (4) (1998), 903.


359 The campaign was led by the Colombian trade union ASPU, the UK-based Justice for Colombia, Education International and the British University and College Union (UCU).


361 This account draws upon a case study included in HRW, Targets of Both Sides: Violence Against Students, Teachers and Schools in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces (New York: HRW, September 2010), 56-60.

362 GCPEA, Lessons in War: Military Use of Schools and Other Education Institutions during Conflict (New York: GCPEA, November 2012).

363 GCPEA, Lessons in War: Military Use of Schools and Other Education Institutions during Conflict (New York: GCPEA, November 2012).


366 For example, India’s Supreme Court ordered security forces to clear out of all schools in Chhattisgarh state but almost half a year later the court noted that “[T]he State of Chhattisgarh had categorically denied that any schools ... were continuing to be occupied by security forces, and in fact all such facilities had been vacated. However, during the course of the hearings before this bench it has turned out that the facts asserted in the earlier affidavit were erroneous, and that in fact a large number of schools had continued to be occupied by security forces.” Indian Supreme Court, “Mandini Sundar and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh,” Writ Petition (Civil) No. 250 (2007), order of January 18, 2012.

367 GCPEA, Lessons in War: Military Use of Schools and Other Education Institutions during Conflict (New York: GCPEA, November 2012). This section relies heavily on the data reported in that document, which was produced as a part of the GCPEA Guidelines project.

368 GCPEA, Lessons in War: Military Use of Schools and Other Education Institutions during Conflict (New York: GCPEA, November 2012), 67, note 8.


375 Save the Children, Untold Atrocities: The Story of Syria’s Children (London: Save the Children, 4 February 2012), 8.
384 Coalition contra La Vinculación de Niños, Niñas y Jóvenes al Conflicto Armado en Colombia (COALICO), Un Camino por La Escuela Colombiana desde Los Derechos de La Infancia y La Adolescencia: 2006-2007 (Bogotá: COALICO, 2007), 51.
390 The sources of international law are listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
391 GCPEA, Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict, (New York: GCPEA, 8 July 2013).
392 See, however, the evidence produced by the ICRC in its Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vols 2 and 3.
393 The fact that a state has its manual published commercially is a very positive feature, since it makes the manual widely available.
PART III — COUNTRY PROFILES

There were attacks on education in dozens of countries during the reporting period, 2009-2012. This section of the study profiles the 30 countries where there was a pattern of such attacks during those four years and also includes information on key incidents in 2013.

The data presented here are based on reports from different sources and generally not on primary research, and therefore cannot be considered fully verified. The authors have cross-checked these reports as far as possible. The country profiles should be seen as an informed collation and distillation of published reports, which the reader may investigate further according to his or her specific needs.
AFGHANISTAN

The UN reported more than one thousand attacks on education in 2009-2012, including schools being set on fire, suicide bombings and remotely detonated bombs, killings of staff, threats to staff and abductions. Given the challenges in collecting and verifying reports in Afghanistan, the true number may well be significantly higher.

Context
During 2009-2012, armed opposition groups, including the Taliban, continued to fight to regain control of the country, which they lost in 2001 to US-backed forces.

NATO assumed responsibility for security in Afghanistan from the US-led coalition in 2006. Following military setbacks, in March 2009, US President Barack Obama announced a new policy of increasing US forces there in the short term, taking the total number of foreign troops to 130,000, while agreeing to hand control of security to Afghan forces by the end of 2014.

By the end of 2012, the Taliban had a strong influence over areas of the south and east but also maintained pockets of control and the ability to carry out attacks in every region of the country. In 2011, the Afghan government and its international partners began efforts to hold peace negotiations with the Taliban but there was little concrete progress by mid-2013. In addition to the Taliban, numerous other armed anti-government groups were active, some affiliated to the Taliban and some pursuing separate agendas. The situation was further complicated by the unpredictable activities of village militias (arbakai) – some allied with or supported by the government of Afghan President Karzai and some operating independently – and the Afghan Local Police, a village-level defence force established by the Afghan government at the urging of the US to defend communities from attack.

The Taliban and other groups have for many years attacked schools, teachers and students. Along with other forms of insecurity, this violence has impeded access to education and in some areas...
A teacher holds an outdoor class under military guard on the outskirts of Mihtarlam, Afghanistan, where decades of war and conflict have destroyed hundreds of schools and colleges, 19 December 2012.

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actually rolled back progress made after schools reopened in 2002. In 2009, for example, more than 70 per cent of schools in Helmand province and more than 80 per cent in Zabul province were closed. In May 2012, the Ministry of Education reported that more than 590 schools were closed in areas at risk, mostly in Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar provinces.

As of 2011, gross primary enrolment was 97 per cent, gross secondary enrolment was 52 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment was 4 per cent. Net attendance was only 66 per cent for boys and 40 per cent for girls at primary school level, and 18 per cent for boys and 6 per cent for girls at secondary level (2007-2011).

**Attacks on schools**

Types of attacks on schools included the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines and suicide bombs in or around school buildings, rocket attacks, grenades thrown into school playgrounds or facilities, the burning down of buildings, looting and forced closure of schools.

In 2009, the number of school-related attacks reported by the UN increased to 613 in January to November 2009, compared with 348 in 2008, with attacks on schools increasing in areas around Kabul and in the east, including in the provinces of Wardak, Logar, Khost, Laghman, Kunar and Nangarhar, but dropped to 197 in 2010. For instance, unknown armed men used dynamite to blast a high school in Nadir Shahkot district of Khost province in May 2009, destroying 18 classrooms. There were spikes in the number of attacks in September 2010, at the time of the parliamentary elections, just as there were during the 2009 presidential elections, when schools were used as polling stations. But the number fell to 167 in 2012. (There were at least 133 attacks on schools or school-related victims in 2011, but the UN report did not clarify how many other of the 185 incidents of attacks on schools and hospitals were attacks on schools.)

Anti-government groups were responsible for the ‘vast majority’ of attacks in 2012, the UN Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, verified. However, these groups operated both covertly and publicly, sometimes claiming responsibility for attacks and sometimes denying activities attributed to them by others, making the overall conflict — and efforts to determine the source of attacks — complex. The UN Mission also verified four attacks by armed groups that were not anti-government in 2012 and at least nine by Afghan Local Police, as well as one incident in which American forces ‘bombarded’ a school in Nangarhar province, injuring 12 children and a school employee and damaging the school building. The UN Secretary General’s Report on Children and Armed Conflict said that among documented — as opposed to verified — incidents, attacks by anti-government elements outnumbered attacks by pro-government forces by two to one and approximately one in four attacks attacks were by unidentified perpetrators.

An earlier study reported that criminal gangs have also threatened or attacked schools in Afghanistan. Motives for attacks by armed non-state groups included opposition to the perceived ‘western’ or ‘un-Islamic’ curriculum, external affiliations of the school or the perceived role of Western forces in rebuilding some schools, the education of girls generally, or any operation of the central government. Other attacks were motivated by the wider political objectives of the insurgency in particular areas or the use of schools by opposing forces (see the Military use of schools section of this profile).

In 2012, the Taliban made public statements saying it did not oppose education but only curricula that tried to supplant Islamic and national values with western culture. It also denied responsibility for attacks on schools. Nevertheless, the UN reported that attacks and threats of attack continued in areas controlled by anti-government forces, including the Taliban. In some places, the Taliban allowed schools to reopen, sometimes due to public opposition to their continuing closure. In these areas, there is evidence that Taliban officials sought to control the curriculum and the appointment of teachers, and place additional restrictions on girls. They also appointed ‘controllers’ or shadow directors who distributed Taliban directives on schools and pressed local officials to change the curriculum in line with Taliban thinking. In some cases, they checked if teachers and students were turning up to school.
Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

In addition to schools being damaged, destroyed or shut down, students, teachers and other education personnel have been killed, injured, abducted and driven away from their schools. School students, teachers and other education personnel have been killed or injured by the use of IEDs and suicide bombing attacks. Grenades were lobbed into schoolyards. Bombs were hidden in pushcarts and rickshaws, or carried on motorbikes. For instance, on 20 October 2010, at least eight children were killed when a powerful roadside bomb blasted a school bus carrying girls in the Khash Rod district of Nimrod province. On 3 July 2011, a suspected militant on a motorbike threw a grenade at the main gate of a school in Faryab province, wounding 17 children, two critically. On 3 May 2012, three students and two teachers were injured when an attacker threw a grenade into the playground of Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar High School in Kabul.

According to UN figures, at least 24 teachers and other education personnel and 23 students were killed and 342 students and 41 teachers and education personnel were injured in attacks on education in 2009. In 2010, at least 21 students, teachers or education officials were killed. In 2011, 25 education staff members were killed and seven abducted; in one incident, six teachers were killed and one abducted, allegedly by anti-government elements. UNAMA recorded six instances of targeted killings of teachers, school guards and department of education officials by anti-government elements during the first six months of 2012. This was an increase compared with the first six months of 2011. In 2012, one of the most serious incidents involved an ambush in May of a convoy of education officials travelling to visit schools in Paktika province. According to the police and a provincial government spokesperson, the convoy was hit by a remotely detonated roadside bomb and then came under gunfire. Five officials were killed and three others wounded.

Threats to girl students and their teachers

Attackers frequently targeted girls’ education. ‘Night letters’ – threatening letters placed at night outside schools, en route to the school or outside teachers’ homes – were distributed in the southern, south-eastern, central and northern regions, warning entire communities not to send their daughters to school and calling on teachers and government employees to close schools, especially girls’ schools. Some letters warned that failure to comply with the demand would lead to retribution, such as acid or gas attacks. In another example, in 2009, a teacher at a girls’ school received a letter with Taliban insignia that forced her to quit her post: ‘We warn you to leave your job as a teacher as soon as possible otherwise we will cut the heads off your children and we shall set fire to your daughter...This is your first and last warning.’ In some cases, the threats were carried out. In May 2011, for instance, the head teacher of Porak girls’ school, Logar province, was shot and killed near his home after receiving repeated death threats telling him not to teach girls.

Alleged poison attacks

There were numerous allegations of mass school poisonings, either through intentional contamination of drinking water or by the release of gas into the air, including 17 such alleged incidents in the first half of 2012. Although no scientific evidence has been found to support these attacks, they have escalated fear and disrupted children’s access to education. For example, on 12 May 2009, at Qazaaq school, north of Kabul, five girls reportedly went into comas and almost 100 others were hospitalised, allegedly due to the release of toxic gas. Similar attacks were reported at other girls’ schools. An alleged poison attack in Kunduz city in 2010 caused 1,500 girls to miss classes at Khadeja-tul Kubra high school. By mid-2012, hundreds of students and education staff affected by such incidents had been treated by medical officials for symptoms such as nausea and unconsciousness.

In June 2012, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security announced that it had arrested 15 people, including two schoolgirls, who confessed to involvement in poison attacks in Takhar province.
However, UNAMA expressed concern that the people arrested had been tortured and that the publicizing of the confessions compromised the right to a fair trial.\(^{439}\)

In July 2012, UNAMA reported 17 alleged poisonings, particularly targeting girls’ schools. In all cases it reviewed, however, it found no evidence of ‘deliberate acts to harm’. Testing of contaminated water by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and government departments found no evidence of toxic substances, and forensic testing of other potential sources of poison proved inconclusive.\(^{440}\) Human Rights Watch and media reported that preliminary WHO investigations of some cases pointed to mass hysteria as the likely cause.\(^{441}\)

**Military use of schools**

Schools were also used for military purposes. The UN Secretary-General reported that international military forces used schools on five occasions in 2010,\(^{442}\) and that in 2011 schools were taken over 20 times by armed groups and 11 times by pro-government forces, totalling 31 incidents of military use of schools.\(^{443}\) In 2012, 10 schools were used for military purposes, three of them by anti-government elements and seven by pro-government forces.\(^{444}\)

Although most occupations were temporary, local elders in Kapisa province told UNAMA in 2012 that the Afghan National Army (ANA) had used a school building for the previous four years, forcing staff to teach pupils outside.

There was also evidence that occupation of schools by security forces made the buildings a target for attack. For instance, in May 2012, after police occupied two schools in Badakhshan province, displacing the students and teachers, anti-government elements fired a rocket-propelled grenade into the school compound, damaging the building, and warned local officials that they would continue to target schools used for military purposes. In June, the forces vacated both schools.\(^{445}\)

**Attacks on higher education**

Several universities were also targeted. For example, a new Islamic university, Jamiyat’al-Uloom’al-Islamiya, in Jalalabad, was badly damaged in a bomb attack on 8 February 2011, following threatening letters accusing the university and three local seminaries of ‘spreading western propaganda and poisoning the minds of the young generation in Afghanistan’.\(^{446}\)

According to news reports, the threats and bombing caused 120 students to drop out.\(^{447}\)

The use of suicide bombers extended to at least one university as well as to schools. On 7 February 2012, government officials reported that a blast from a suicide bomb car attack close to the entrance to Kandahar University killed at least seven people and also wounded 23.\(^{448}\)

In another case, Sunni students attacked Shiite students at Kabul University in late November 2012 to prevent them from observing Ashura – the festival of the martyrdom of Hussein, a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad – inside a dormitory mosque. Around 100 students were involved in the fighting, university buildings were damaged, one student was killed after being thrown out of a window and up to 30 were wounded.\(^{449}\)

**Attacks on education in 2013**

According to the Ministry of Education, approximately 100 teachers and education officials were killed between January and August, some of them by assassination, others in roadside bombings and crossfire.\(^{450}\) In June, in one incident with heavy casualties, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle detonated his explosives close to a boys’ high school in Chamkani district, at going home time when ISAF and Afghan Local Police forces were passing, killing 10 students and injuring 15 others.\(^{451}\) The UN said tactics such as suicide bombings close to schools could be war crimes.\(^{452}\) In other incidents, UNAMA reported that a student was abducted and killed in May in Bak district, Khost province, after chanting an anti-Taliban song, and an education officer was shot and injured while visiting schools to monitor them in Kunar province in June;\(^{453}\) and in August a teacher’s home was targeted – an explosive device was set off outside the house of a teacher who had previously received threats to leave his job, killing two children in Sangin district of Helmand province in August.\(^{454}\) Three education administrators were also shot dead in Parwan, Uruzgan and Herat provinces by unknown...
gunmen in August.\textsuperscript{455} Schools and universities were threatened,\textsuperscript{456} set on fire\textsuperscript{457} or used as bases for combat,\textsuperscript{458} and there were continuing reports of alleged mass poisonings of schoolgirls,\textsuperscript{459} although there was no verification of whether poisoning took place.

In May, the Taliban forced schools in Zabul province to close after the local government banned motorbikes as a security measure because they were being used in assassinations.\textsuperscript{460}

**BAHRAIN**

*Following the outbreak of anti-government protests in 2011, students, teachers and academics were arrested from schools and universities and teacher association leaders were imprisoned. There were many incidents of sectarian threats and intimidation in schools and universities that year.*\textsuperscript{461}

**Context**

The majority of attacks on education in Bahrain occurred amid the unrest that erupted in February and March 2011 during a wave of protests inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. But repercussions continued into 2012.

In February 2011, authorities forcibly suppressed peaceful anti-government and pro-democracy protests. Seven people were killed and many more were wounded.\textsuperscript{462} Members of both the majority Shia community, which has called for a greater voice in the government, and the Sunni community joined the demonstrations for political reforms.\textsuperscript{463} After weeks of protests, the government declared a three-month state of emergency and called in Saudi military forces to help keep order.\textsuperscript{464} Sporadic protests against the government continued into 2013, and the country’s human rights situation reportedly deteriorated.\textsuperscript{465}

Political tensions were reflected in schools and universities. In early 2011, thousands of teachers went on strike, first demanding respect for human rights and later calling for better security;\textsuperscript{466} thousands of students participated in protests, including in and around their schools; police entered school facilities to arrest students; and political and sectarian clashes involving students and parents occurred on school grounds.\textsuperscript{467}

Political activities were prohibited at universities and schools, as well as at other government buildings and public institutions.\textsuperscript{468} Teacher trade unions, along with other government sector trade unions, were banned in 2003 by the Civil Service Bureau Act 1.\textsuperscript{469} The Ministry of Social Development dissolved the Bahrain Teachers Association, formed as a response to the ban on unions, in April 2011, alleging that it had incited teachers and students to strike.\textsuperscript{470}

Net primary enrolment was 98 per cent (2006),\textsuperscript{471} net secondary enrolment was 93 per cent (2011) and gross tertiary enrolment was 37 per cent (2011).\textsuperscript{472} The adult literacy rate was 92 per cent (2010).\textsuperscript{473}

**Attacks on schools**

The Ministry of Education reported a pattern of attacks on government schools, typically involving damage to facilities by setting them on fire or throwing Molotov cocktails. Approximately 200 schools were reportedly attacked between September 2011 and October 2013.\textsuperscript{474} However, it was not clear whether these were acts of political protest or, rather, of vandalism.

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

During 2011, police arrested students and teachers for their political activities from school facilities, including from at least 15 girls’ schools, according to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR).\textsuperscript{475} In July 2011, BCHR said it had received reports of arrests of 66 teachers, predominantly women, although it said the actual number may have been higher.\textsuperscript{476} In December 2012, BCHR reported that police stopped a school bus carrying boys from an elementary and an intermediate school and held them at a police station until their parents came to sign a pledge before releasing them.\textsuperscript{477} According to BCHR, some students and teachers arrested from schools reported that police interrogated and beat them, and threatened them with sexual assault.\textsuperscript{478}

There were also reports of numerous suspensions and sackings, as well as salary deductions, of teachers and Bahrain Teacher Association members who were accused of having taken part in the February 2011 anti-
government protests. On 15 June 2011, for example, the independent newspaper Al Wasat reported that the Al Ahd Al Zaher School had sacked eight teachers and, on 27 June, the Unions Federation in Bahrain reported that the Ministry of Education had sacked 60 employees, mostly teachers.\(^{479}\)

On 25 September 2011, a military court sentenced the president of the Bahrain Teachers Association, Mahdi Abu Deeb, to 10 years in prison on charges of using his position within the BTA to call for a strike by teachers, halting the educational process, inciting hatred of the regime and attempting to overthrow the ruling system by force, possessing pamphlets and disseminating fabricated stories and information. Abu Deeb alleged that he endured torture in pre-trial detention.\(^{480}\) His deputy, Jailila al-Salmaan, received a three-year sentence. In October 2012, a court of appeal reduced their sentences to five years and six months respectively.\(^{481}\)

Clashes between rival groups of students and their parents led to violence on school grounds. For example, according to the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), on 10 March 2011, at the Saar High School for Girls, an argument between anti-government and pro-government pupils led to parents converging on the school. Some students and parents threatened the headmistress and staff and threw rocks at a school building in which they had taken refuge. Riot control forces were sent to disperse the crowds. Eight students were injured and received medical care. Other schools reported similar incidents on a much smaller scale.\(^{482}\)

The BICI report also documented complaints of abuse against members of the Sunni community at schools because of their religious affiliation or refusal to join protests.\(^{483}\) In total, the BICI report identified around 83 incidents of sectarian threats in universities and schools, including verbal abuse and harassment of students as well as physical assaults.\(^{484}\)

**Attacks on higher education**

Most incidents affecting higher education occurred during, or as a result of, the protests of February and March 2011 in which university students and professors participated. According to the president of the University of Bahrain, on 13 March 2011, 55 individuals were treated in intensive care after clashes at the campus between government supporters and 5,000 anti-government protesters.\(^{485}\) The University of Bahrain and Bahrain Polytechnic subsequently suspended classes until mid-May and late April respectively.\(^{486}\)

According to the BICI report, 73 students were arrested or detained after February 2011 and some were imprisoned for more than three months.\(^{487}\) Security forces also questioned at least 15 professors from three universities for several hours before releasing them without charge, and detained one for over four months, Human Rights Watch reported.\(^{488}\) One professor said he was detained with 10 other colleagues on suspicion of having participated in protests – and that Interior Ministry officials went to the university and ordered them to report to a police station, where they were blindfolded, interrogated and beaten before being released.\(^{489}\)

During 2011, the government also dismissed professors and suspended or expelled hundreds of university students for participation in demonstrations and political activities. At the University of Bahrain, students not charged with violent crimes were reinstated but were required to sign loyalty pledges and received warnings not to engage in political activity on campus.\(^{490}\) Of those charged with crimes, at least six were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.\(^{491}\) The University of Bahrain also dismissed 19 academics on charges that included participation in protests; by the end of 2012, they had all been reinstated.\(^{492}\)

Prior to the 2011 events, there was one reported incident concerning an academic. Dr Abduljalil al-Sinage, a professor of engineering at the University of Bahrain, who was detained in 2010 after speaking about the country’s human rights practices during a seminar at the UK House of Lords.\(^{493}\) His lawyer reported that during detention, al-Sinage was deprived of sleep and the crutches and wheelchair he relied upon, subjected to physical violence that resulted in a partial loss of hearing and denied medical treatment.\(^{494}\) In June 2011, a military court
sentenced him to life in prison, a decision the Supreme Court upheld in January 2013.\textsuperscript{496}

**Attacks on education in 2013**

On 16 April, police raided the Jabreya Secondary School for Boys in Manama, firing tear gas and clashing with students who were peacefully demanding the release of one of their classmates, arrested from the school the previous day.\textsuperscript{497} Injuries among students were reported and one was allegedly arrested at the scene.\textsuperscript{498}

**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

**During 2009-2013, more than 100 schools were damaged, destroyed or looted, two dozen were used for military purposes and there were reports of students and teachers being killed, mostly in incidents after the Séléka rebellion in late 2012. One in two schools had closed by early 2013**

**Context**

The Central African Republic (CAR) has experienced decades of political unrest, including two conflicts in the past ten years and ongoing violence, particularly in the north.\textsuperscript{499} Various armed rebel groups, including the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and of Democracy (APRD), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), fought government forces between 2004 and 2011.\textsuperscript{500} The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group originally from Uganda, has spread its operations into south-east CAR since 2008.\textsuperscript{501}

In late 2012, renewed conflict broke out when a group of rebel forces known as Séléka (meaning ‘coalition’ in Sango), comprised primarily of UFDR and CPJP dissidents and members of the Patriotic Convention for the Salvation of Kodro (CPSK), accused President François Bozizé’s government of failing to abide by previous peace agreements.\textsuperscript{502} Séléka’s military campaign from the north to the capital Bangui in the south-west culminated in a coup d’état on 24 March 2013 and the formation of a new transitional government.\textsuperscript{503} However, for months after the coup, law and order broke down and Séléka forces committed serious human rights abuses against civilians.\textsuperscript{504} In October 2013, a UN Security Council Resolution was unanimously approved to deploy an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force and to support a possible UN peacekeeping mission.\textsuperscript{505} By early December 2013, amid escalating violence, French troops were additionally deployed to CAR after the Security Council authorized their temporary intervention and the use of ‘all necessary measures’ to support the AU-led peacekeeping force in protecting civilians and restoring order.\textsuperscript{506}

The education system suffered as teachers and students were displaced and schools were shut, damaged or destroyed.\textsuperscript{507} By April 2013, nearly half of CAR’s schools had closed\textsuperscript{508} and more than 650,000 children were out of school.\textsuperscript{509}

Net enrolment at primary level was estimated at 69 per cent in 2011, and 14 per cent at secondary level, while gross tertiary enrolment was only 3 per cent. The estimated adult literacy rate was 57 per cent.\textsuperscript{510} In the northern conflict-affected regions, net primary enrolment was only 48 per cent in 2012.\textsuperscript{511}

**Attacks on schools**

No attacks on or looting of infrastructure were reported in 2009 or 2010 but due to fear of fighting in the eastern part of the country, including LRA raids, parents kept many students out of school.\textsuperscript{512} In 2011, according to the UN, 12 schools were used, attacked or destroyed in fighting between CPJP, UFDR and FPR.\textsuperscript{513} In 2012, fewer attacks were reported on schools and hospitals than in 2011.\textsuperscript{514}

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

Teachers were abducted and killed in 2010, but it was not clear whether this was related to their work.\textsuperscript{515} In 2011, the UN reported teachers in Bria, the capital of Haute-Kotto prefecture, being assaulted by armed groups because their schools were in areas under the control of rival groups.\textsuperscript{516}

**Military use of schools**

CPJP elements used schools in villages in Haute-Kotto between May and July 2010.\textsuperscript{517} While in 2011, a number more were used during confrontations between CPJP and UFDR, as well as during attacks by the Chadian
rebel group the Popular Front for Recovery (FPR). In January 2012, a Chadian army helicopter landed on a school in Ouadango (Nana Grébizi prefecture), destroying the building; also, two schools were used as outposts by CPJP in Yangoudrounja (Haute-Kotto prefecture) and Miamani (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture).

Attacks on education in 2013
Attacks spiked at the time of the Séléka rebellion in late 2012 and heightened insecurity in 2013. An assessment conducted by the Education Cluster in CAR, which surveyed some 176 schools in conflict-affected areas, reported that at least 108 of the schools had been looted or vandalized by rebels, soldiers and local populations; 14 were hit by bullets (in four cases intentionally, two of which occurred while school was in session) and two were specifically targeted by shells; and three were intentionally set on fire.

There were numerous alleged attacks on students and teachers during the fighting in late 2012 and in 2013 that occurred at or near schools. According to the Education Cluster, at least two teachers were reportedly killed intentionally; the wife of a school director was killed at school; a school student was shot dead. It also reported allegations of ‘many atrocities’ committed at schools in Haute-Kotto, including the rape of girls and the killing of one teacher. Séléka members reportedly robbed or assaulted two teachers; and entered at least one school and told students if they returned to class they would be taken hostage. In another case, a child soldier entered his former school and threatened to detonate a grenade if schooling continued.

Between December 2012 and August 2013, at least 24 schools were occupied or used by combatants in Bamingui-Bangoran, Kémo, Ombella-M’Poko, Bangui, Haute-Kotto, Nana-Grébizi and Ouaka prefectures, four of which by the military. Many of these schools reported looting and damage.
A deserted school in Bangui, Central African Republic, 11 January 2013, where many schools remained closed after a group of rebel forces known as Séléka launched an offensive against President François Bozizé’s government in late 2012.

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**COLOMBIA**

*Some 140 schoolteachers were murdered and more than 1,000 schoolteachers received death threats in 2009-2012, with threats increasing in 2013. Children were recruited from school by armed groups and schools and there continued to be reports of public security forces using schools for military purposes despite legal curbs*

**Context**

Violence and abuses associated with Colombia’s internal armed conflict, which has continued for nearly half a century, have displaced more than 5 million people. Approximately 220,000 people have died, according to the government-created National Center for Historical Memory.

The main actors involved in the fighting have included government armed forces and the police; left-wing armed groups, notably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN); and right-wing paramilitaries, especially the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which underwent a deeply flawed official demobilization process during the administration of President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010). New paramilitary successor groups, led largely by former paramilitaries, emerged after the demobilization process.

Juan Manuel Santos replaced Álvaro Uribe as president in 2010 and initiated peace talks with the FARC in November 2012.

Human rights defenders, community leaders, trade unionists, journalists, indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, and displaced persons’ leaders all face death threats and other abuses.

According to the teachers’ trade union the Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE), 360 teachers were murdered and 342 threatened in the decade up to 2009. The president of the National University of Colombia is reported to have stated that the university registered 312 reports of threats in 2007 and 2008. At least twelve Colombian university students were killed between 2006 and 2008, most of whom were well-known student leaders, according to a report by the National Union of Students, University and College Union and UK-based NGO Justice for Colombia.

In 2011, net enrolment in primary school was 87 per cent, net secondary enrolment 76 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment 43 per cent. Adult literacy was 93 per cent (2009).

** Attacks on schools**

The Ministry of Education reported that 19 schools were damaged in attacks by armed groups or in fighting during 2009-2012, affecting some 12,000 students.

During the reporting period, the International Committee of the Red Cross registered five incidents of education facilities destroyed in hostilities and 10 more affected by nearby explosives and ordnance.

At least two schools were directly targeted. In one case, a school was attacked both by armed groups and armed forces. In February 2010, for instance, FARC combatants forced their way into a rural school in Nariño department during a meeting of the indigenous community, according to the UN. The Colombian armed forces attacked the FARC members inside the school. Suspected of collusion with the enemy by both sides, 300 members of the indigenous community reportedly fled. In the other case, in June 2010, a bomb blew up in a school in rural Cauca, allegedly targeting Colombian military forces while they were inside it.

The UN reported three incidents of mines left near schools during the reporting period. For example, in Valle del Cauca, the FARC left behind mines after using a school as a shield, causing lessons to be suspended for six months. A 2012 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict report also warned that guerrillas were increasingly planting landmines without a record of their location, preventing children from walking to school.

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

Figures for the number of teachers murdered vary. According to teachers’ union FECODE, the number of its members killed remained steady for the first three years of the reporting period (27 in 2009, 27 in 2010, ...
21 in 2011), then dropped to 13 in 2012. The Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), a prominent Colombian NGO monitoring labour rights, reported 21 murders of unionized teachers in 2009, 28 in 2010, 16 in 2011 and just four in 2012. The Ministry of Education’s numbers, which include both unionized and non-unionized teachers, were higher overall but with lower totals for unionized teachers: 34 (of whom 15 were unionized) were killed in 2009, 40 (21) in 2010, 36 (17) in 2011, and 30 (9) in 2012.

Compared with the number of teachers killed, five to 10 times as many death threats were reported. Ministry of Education figures (for all teachers) and ENS figures (for unionized teachers only) differ, but both...
exceed 1,000 death threats in the reporting period. The breakdown by year is set out below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>MoE</th>
<th>ENS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,086</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,007</strong></td>
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By comparison, FECODE's figures were much higher: more than 3,000 teachers reported threats against them in 2011 and 2,000 reported threats between January and September 2012. Teachers may be targeted for a number of reasons. Some teachers in remote areas, where armed non-state groups are strong and schools are the only visible presence of the state, are accused by illegal armed groups of collaborating with the enemy. Teachers have also been targeted for playing an important social and leadership role in the community. Armed groups have threatened teachers for trying to lead community efforts to protect children from sexual violence and child recruitment and other efforts that challenge the groups' activities.

Teacher murders can prompt wider community instability. According to the UN, in June 2009, an entire indigenous community was forced to flee their homes in Arauca province after suspected members of the FARC shot a teacher from their village in front of his pupils. In Cauca in 2010, the FARC allegedly killed two teachers and then threatened all the teachers in one rural area of that department, forcing all teachers to flee the area and leaving 320 children without schooling.

According to ENS, 305 unionized teachers suffered forced displacement in 2009-2012. In 2010, the government strengthened protections for teachers at risk of violence by a decree offering such teachers ‘provisional status’ so that they could relocate rapidly while they waited for police to carry out a risk assessment. A year later, another decree added another teacher trade union representative to the ‘Threatened Teachers’ Committee’ in territories that had more than 5,000 teachers, and the period of provisional status was increased from three to six months in cases where the police could not complete their investigation in time.

According to a report by the National Ministry of Education, of the 600 teaching staff who reported receiving death threats in 2011, 38 left the country, 282 were given temporary transfers and 38 were transferred permanently. The International Trade Union Confederation reported that on 9 September 2010, Segundo Salvador Forero, a member of the teachers’ trade union EDUCAL, was killed in Anserma, Caldas, after the local education ministry rejected a request made to them by his union to grant him ‘threatened person’ status, which would have given him the right to transfer to a safe location.

Paramilitary successor groups and affiliated criminal gangs also attacked students on their way to and from school. In Medellín, the Ombudsman registered the murder of 11 students while they were going to or returning from school in 2009 and four more in 2010. These killings occurred almost exclusively in the violence-wracked poor neighbourhoods known as ‘comunas’ where criminal gangs, which often acted as local franchises of paramilitary successor groups, fought for territorial control. In 2011, the Ombudsman’s Office declared that 23 schools in Medellín were at risk from armed groups because they were situated on the invisible boundaries between gang territories, according to UNHCR. That same year in Medellín, 965 students transferred from, or simply dropped out of, six educational institutions after being threatened or because one of their classmates was killed, according to the Ombudsman.

### Military use of schools

Colombia is one of the few nations that explicitly limits or prohibits the use of schools and other education facilities by their armed forces. Nonetheless, there continued to be reports of security forces using...
schools during the reporting period. The UN reported serious concerns over the occupation of schools by national security forces in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Córdoba and Norte de Santander in 2010, and by the Colombian National Army in those same departments plus Huila, Nariño and Valle de Cauca in 2011.

The ICRC recorded 75 cases of occupation of school facilities by all armed actors from 2009 to 2012. On 2 June 2012, the FARC attacked a police outpost located on the grounds of the Chilví Education Institution, Nariño department, according to CINEP, a Colombian human rights organization. The police reportedly left their outpost, which was constructed out of wood, and fled to the neighbouring school, which was made of brick. In the firefight, about 70 per cent of the school was damaged, according to CINEP. Public concerns had previously been raised about the risks involved in locating a police station close to the civilian population. CINEP reported that the police had stayed years longer than the originally agreed three months and the Tumaco Secretary of Education had specifically asked for the station to be relocated. After the attack students had to be moved to schools in neighbouring areas and teachers did not want to teach in Chilví due to the lack of security. A day after the school rector asked the police to relocate during a public meeting, he received death threats and was forced to flee, according to CINEP.

The 2012 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict report described police in Putumayo using schools as a base for operations against guerrillas or failing to comply with a requirement to stay at least 200 metres away from schools. Police presence led to schools being attacked by guerrillas; and police reportedly sexually harassed female pupils and stole school food supplies, according to Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict.

**Child recruitment from schools**

The Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office identified the FARC, ELN, El Ejército Popular Revolucionario Antiterrorista de Colombia (ERPAC), Los Paisas, Los Urabeños, Águilas Negras and Los Rastrojos as groups recruiting children during the reporting period. According to the UN, some of this recruitment took place in schools. The 2012 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict report confirmed guerrilla and paramilitary successor groups used schools for recruitment.

According to the UN, a teacher in Chocó intervened in the attempted recruitment of two teenage boys on school grounds by the ELN guerrilla group in April 2010. Both the teacher and the students then fled, fearing retaliation. In 2012, the Ombudsman reported that in Vichada Department FARC members approached two students of the Escuela Santa Teresita del Tuparro on their way to school to obtain information about the school for recruiting purposes.

The national Ombudsman reported that both the FARC and paramilitary successor groups were using schools to indoctrinate students as a first step towards recruitment. Rural boarding schools were particularly targeted for recruitment purposes by armed groups because of their isolation. For instance, recruitment was carried out by suspected guerrillas in education centres and boarding schools in rural Vista Hermosa and Puerto Rico municipalities. Other boarding schools were targeted by paramilitary successor groups. In 2012, a teacher in Putumayo was arrested for teaching FARC ideology to children at school, including making them sing the FARC anthem. In Vista Hermosa, Meta, during the week of 12–18 March 2012, guerrillas believed to be part of FARC’s 27th Front called meetings with students at several rural schools in the area, offering them snacks for their attendance, and appeared to attempt to indoctrinate them. According to the Coalition Against Involvement of Children and Youth in Armed Conflict (COALICO), other cases of recruitment activities by armed groups in schools were reported in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Caldas, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Sucre and Valle del Cauca. According to the national Ombudsman, also in 2012, in Tierradentro, Cauca, young children and teenagers were used in surveillance and intelligence work for Águilas Negras, as well as to recruit other children by offering bribes in educational institutions.
COALICO reported that paramilitary successor groups waited outside schools to talk to children, find out information, and recruit and control them.\textsuperscript{573} COALICO also reported that armed groups used school students to run their drug business inside schools which in many cases led to children being recruited by the group. Boys and girls were also used as spies or to transport arms or pass on messages to other students in schools.\textsuperscript{576}

**Attacks on higher education**

Paramilitary successor groups and guerrillas threatened students and student and university leaders as they sought to exert influence over university campuses.

**Attacks on higher education facilities**

According to media reports, in May 2010, 50-60 armed persons in ELN uniforms entered the central square of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Bogotá, and made a political speech.\textsuperscript{577}

**Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel**

Four university students were murdered between March and May 2009, according to a report by the UK’s National Union of Students (NUS), University and College Union (UCU), and Justice for Colombia.\textsuperscript{578} The victims included Enrique Sierra, a student of ethnic education of the University of La Guajira who was active in the Association of Colombian University Students. He was shot in the head by motorcyclists while he made his way to university on 9 March 2009.\textsuperscript{579} NUS, UCU and Justice for Colombia reported three additional cases between March and May 2009.\textsuperscript{580}

Also in March 2009, 30 student leaders from the University of Antioquia were threatened in an email signed by the ‘Bloque Antioqueño de las Autodefensas’. The students were told to leave the university and the region or face assassination.\textsuperscript{581}

A UNHCR report issued on 27 May 2010 said that college and university professors viewed as politically active faced risks to their safety.\textsuperscript{582}

In 2011, the Santos government drew up reform plans which students feared would lead to further privatization of higher education but later withdrew them in the face of widespread student-led protests.\textsuperscript{583} In July 2012, the administrative body of the National University of Colombia denounced threats which had been issued to students who were looking into alternatives to the proposed higher education reforms.\textsuperscript{584} In October 2011, the FARC allegedly sent messages to six university leaders in the department of Antioquia identifying them as ‘military targets’ for continuing their classes during the ongoing strike by students against the proposed higher education reforms.\textsuperscript{585}

**Attacks on education in 2013**

Some 350 teachers were threatened\textsuperscript{586} between January and September 2013, according to the Ministry of Education, which was the highest number threatened in any year during the 2009-2013 period and represented a steep rise from 2012.\textsuperscript{587} According to a report by the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman in November, teachers in Córdoba department faced continued intimidation by guerrilla and paramilitary successor groups.\textsuperscript{588} In July, as death threats spread through the municipalities of Sucre, four teaching staff received text messages to their phones, claiming to be from the paramilitary successor group Los Rastrojos, stating that the teachers ‘had been declared a military objective’.\textsuperscript{589} In September, the government passed Decree 1782, which sought to ease teacher transfers through more detailed procedures. It also led to the establishment of a committee to monitor the incorporation of teachers into new schools.\textsuperscript{590}

Attacks against schools continued. Sixty-seven schools and hospitals were attacked by armed groups in the first half of 2013, according to the ‘Observatorio de niñez y conflicto armado’.\textsuperscript{591} For example, on 1 February, a blast levelled dormitories and classrooms at Guillermo Ruiz Mejía boarding school in Balsillas village, Caquetá, in an apparently intentional attack attributed to the FARC. No injuries were reported. The armed forces reportedly helped construct the school in 2011 and the project received funding from the American Embassy and the Caquetá government. The military said the school was attacked in retaliation for military operations against the guerrillas. Some locals believed the guerrillas were against the US and the
army being involved in building schools in the region, according to a report in El Tiempo newspaper.592

‘Invisible borders’ between territories disputed by rival armed and criminal groups were a key cause of school dropout in Medellín, according to the Association of Instructors of Antioquia and the Medellín human rights Ombudsman. On 20 February 2013, residents in Bello Horizonte and Villa Flora, District 7, received an anonymous leaflet telling them not to take their children to four specific schools because there was going to be a war; as a result, 4,000 children missed school for a day.593 In certain areas such as Villa Hermosa, District 8, Medellín, the drop-out rate reportedly rose to nearly 40 per cent.594

In higher education, teachers and staff at the University of Córdoba reportedly faced threats from Los Rastrojos in April.595 On 14 June, professors at the University of Antioquia went on strike to protest against harassment by illegal armed groups within the institution. The strike followed an incident the day before in which 15 masked men reportedly broke into lecturers’ offices and a laboratory, stole equipment, raised a FARC flag and addressed a crowd of 200 students on campus about the peace process.596 The university reported the presence of the FARC at the institution. The Government Secretary of the Department of Antioquia said 12 arrest warrants had previously been issued against members of the university community in 2013.597

According to the Ombudsman, in November a paramilitary successor group threatened to kill 11 students at the Institute of Higher Education.

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

In Côte d’Ivoire, armed groups and military forces destroyed, damaged, looted or used almost 500 schools and universities during the 2010-2011 post-election crisis598

Context

Civil conflict divided Côte d’Ivoire for more than a decade and caused the deaths of thousands of civilians. In 2002, a rebellion in the north led to a military-political stalemate in which the rebels, known as the New Forces, retained territory in defiance of the government-controlled south. At this time, the majority of teachers in the north fled and nearly all primary and secondary schools there ceased to function. Despite a 2007 peace agreement, few teachers returned to the north and, as a result, hundreds of thousands of children continued to miss out on education.599

People hoped that the presidential elections, held in October 2010 after repeated delays, would mark an end to the conflict. But renewed violence erupted when the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to concede victory to the internationally recognized president-elect, Alassane Ouattara, after a run-off vote in November 2010. Several months of failed negotiations led to fighting that left some 3,000 dead and at least 500,000 displaced.600 During this period, members of the Student Federation of Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI) – a pro-Gbagbo militant student group created in the 1990s – spread fear throughout the education system by attacking students, teachers and officials. The situation came to a head in April 2011 when pro-Ouattara forces overran the south and captured Gbagbo in Abidjan, with the support of French forces.

Gross primary enrolment was 90 per cent (2011), while the rate of transition to secondary school was 49 per cent (2011)601 and gross tertiary enrolment was 8 per cent (2009).602 The adult literacy rate was 57 per cent (2011).603

Attacks on schools

Attacks occurred throughout 2009-2012 but predominantly from late 2010 to mid-2011 in association with the post-election crisis. The UN reported a total of 477 schools destroyed, damaged, looted or used by armed groups and military forces during this period, although it is not clear whether they were all targeted.604

Monitoring undertaken by the Côte d’Ivoire Education Cluster indicates that a total of 224 attacks on education facilities in 15 education districts took place between January and June 2011,605 with at least half occurring in Abidjan.606 Approximately 180 schools were pillaged and 173 were destroyed, burned down or damaged.607 Twenty schools were attacked by bombs and eight were left with unexploded ordnance.608 At
least 23 administrative buildings were also attacked. As of July 2011, an estimated 67,000 children were prevented from accessing schooling as a result.

Though 97 per cent of schools reopened by late April 2011, some 140,000 previously enrolled students had not yet returned to school by July 2011. Teachers were also still absent in a number of areas, with almost 50 per cent missing from schools in Man and Odienné one month after the crisis.

Attacks on school students, teachers and education personnel

From 2009 through the post-election violence, members of FESCI created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation in secondary schools and universities by injuring and sometimes killing fellow students as well as teachers and administrators, often with impunity.

On 26 March 2010, for example, FESCI and the National Student Union of Côte d’Ivoire of the Dimbokro modern high school fought pitched battles in Dimbokro. Eight FESCI members, armed with machetes, attacked and killed a student in the city centre. Four FESCI members were arrested by police and schools subsequently closed for a period.

Military use of schools

At least 23 school premises were used by armed forces during the crisis, including three to store weapons and four as collective graves. These occupations of schools – especially in the west of the country – were predominantly committed by the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), formerly the ‘New Forces’, who fought for President-elect Ouattara. The FRCI typically used primary and secondary schools as well as adult education centres for relatively short periods of time when occupying one village to launch attacks on another, although in September 2011 five schools in the region of Moyen Cavally were reportedly still occupied by FRCI elements and at least one training centre remained occupied as of December 2012 after having become a de facto military camp. The UN also identified one incident where Liberian mercenaries and pro-Gbagbo elements had employed a school for military purposes in the Yopougon neighbourhood of Abidjan.

Following the end of the political crisis, military use of schools decreased dramatically, with only two incidents verified by the UN in 2012. However, the military continued to erect checkpoints near primary schools located in Touba, Ziriglo, Toa-Zéo and Keibly, among other towns and villages, making schoolchildren vulnerable to attack or intimidation by armed elements.

Attacks on higher education

Military use of higher education facilities

Following the 2010 elections, attacks on higher education increased as tension mounted between the pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara camps. Universities quickly became embroiled in the conflict, with FESCI, among others, operating alongside Gbagbo’s security forces. On 30 November, for example, FESCI members attacked pro-Ouattara students from the University of Cocody campus in Abidjan, forcibly ejecting some 50 students from their dormitories.

A number of universities, including in Abidjan, Daloa and Korhogo, were forced to shut down indefinitely. As fighting began, a university in Abidjan was transformed into an improvised military training camp for pro-Gbagbo militia. Gbagbo supporters gained control of most campuses in Abidjan. Hundreds of young men received military training in schools and university housing in 2011, typically conducted by members of the Ivorian security forces, according to accounts from the Abidjan neighbourhoods of Yopougon, Abobo and Port-Bouët, the political capital, Yamoussoukro, and the far western town of Duékoué.

Occupation and use of university facilities by forces on both sides led to substantial damage, looting and destruction. For example, in March 2011 during the most intense period of hostilities, the University of Abobo-Adjamé was first taken by pro-Ouattara forces, and then by Gbagbo’s security forces. At least 70 per cent of the campus was destroyed in the process, including key academic records. After the post-election crisis, the Ouattara government temporarily closed and renovated the country’s public universities, which had become hotbeds of violence and
militant politics, before reopening them in September 2012.631

Attacks on education in 2013
At the start of the 2013 academic year, at least two university residences, Cité d’Abobo and Cité de Port-Bouët, were still occupied by the FRCI.632 A third, Cité de Williamsville, had recently been vacated,633 following a government operation to restore public and private property that had been occupied by force during the post-election crisis.634

Democratic Republic of the Congo
Attacks on schools, including widespread looting, damage or destruction of facilities, and fear of abduction and recruitment by armed groups contributed to children missing out on education, particularly in the eastern provinces635

Context
Recurring conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), exacerbated by the struggle to control mineral resources in the east and south, has left more than 5 million dead since 1997.636 A 2003 peace agreement integrated many former belligerents into a unified national army – the Congolese Army (FARDC) – and created a power-sharing government, but conflict continued in the east. Since then, the main protagonists have been the Congolese Army; the Hutu-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); the Congolese Tutsi-led National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which subsequently became a political party in 2009 and no longer exists as an armed group; several other armed ‘local defence’ groups known as the Mai Mai; and, from April 2012 to November 2013, the largely Tutsi-led rebel group M23. The Ugandan rebel-group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has also been fighting in the north since 2006.637

School closures in conflict areas, damage of educational facilities, fear of abduction by armed groups and widespread displacement have led to many children and young people missing out on education in the east.638

The country’s vast size and the remoteness of many of the places where attacks occur, combined with ongoing insecurity, make it difficult to accurately monitor attacks. Many of the areas where they have occurred are not accessible by road, and armed groups are still in control. However, since the conflict began, significant incidents of forced recruitment from schools and along school routes, shooting or abduction of students and staff, sexual violence committed en route to and from school, looting and burning of schools, occupation of education buildings by military forces and armed groups, and persecution of academics have been documented.639

In 2011, gross primary enrolment in DRC was 105 per cent, gross secondary enrolment was 43 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment was 8 per cent.640 Adult literacy was 67 per cent in 2010.641

Attacks on schools
Attacks on education during 2009-2012 mostly occurred in the eastern provinces, where rebel groups and the Congolese Army were active. From October 2008 to December 2009, the UN reported 51 attacks on schools by armed forces and armed groups.642 In 2010, at least 14 schools were attacked,643 while in 2011 the UN recorded 53 incidents against schools and health centres.644 Of these, the FDLR was responsible for 21 cases of destruction and looting, and Mai Mai groups for six, but the Congolese Army and the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-Nalu) were also responsible for some incidents.645

In 2012, the reported number of attacks increased significantly, due mainly to fighting between FARDC and M23 forces and the activities of other armed groups who took advantage of the security vacuum created by the army’s focus on the M23. At least 561 incidents of looting and damage, affecting 548 primary schools and 13 secondary schools in North and South Kivu, were reported by local protection monitors – although the percentage damaged during targeted attacks or military use was not specifically indicated, and not all cases could be confirmed.646 As of March 2013, the Education Cluster had received 133 reports of schools affected by looting and damage in North Kivu in which the presence or activity of armed
forces or armed groups was noted, including the Congolese Army, the FDLR, the M23 and several Mai Mai groups. During attacks on two schools in Haut-Uélé district in January 2012, 10 classrooms were set on fire by alleged LRA elements.

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

Two incidents of attacks on students or education personnel were reported. On 4 October 2011, seven education workers belonging to the Banyamulenge ethnic group were killed near Fizi, South Kivu, in an ethnically-driven attack by Mai Mai Yakutumba fighters while on their way to lead a one-month teacher training programme; and on 13 November 2012, shots fired by soldiers and police reportedly killed four primary school students and injured nine others in Kantine during a student march.

**Military use of schools**

There was widespread military use of schools in 2012, particularly as temporary barracks or bases. Schools were occupied or used by the Congolese Army as well as the FDLR, Mai Mai groups and other militia. In Katanga province, where confrontations between Mai Mai militias and FARDC were ongoing, some 64 schools were reported to have been occupied by armed groups as of March 2013. Soldiers from the Congolese Army reportedly occupied 42 primary and secondary schools in Minova, South Kivu, and Bweremana, North Kivu, for varying lengths of time from 20 November 2012 until at least 24 December, preventing at least 1,100 children from going to school. They used chairs and desks as firewood and looted offices and stores, seriously damaging a majority of the schools they occupied.

**Child recruitment and sexual violence at, or en route from, schools**

A range of armed groups and the Congolese army have recruited children and some of the recruitment has taken place at schools. In April 2009, schools in the northern Masisi-Walikale border zone were temporarily closed in response to threats of recruitment by Mai Mai forces. Ongoing recruitment of children and threats of re-recruitment, including from schools in Masisi and Rutshuru territories in 2010 by former CNDP elements integrated within FARDC, were also documented. In November, ex-CNDP FARDC members who refused to leave North Kivu despite government orders reportedly visited schools and demanded lists of recently demobilized children. Between 19 April and 4 May 2012, M23 rebels forcibly recruited at least 48 boys around Kiloliwe, Kingi, Kabati and other locations on the road to Kitchanga, in Masisi, North Kivu province, according to Human Rights Watch; some of them were recruited at schools or on the way to or from school. On 19 April 2012, near Kingi, Masisi territory, M23 forces rounded up at least 32 male students at Mapendano secondary school.

At least one incident of sexual violence was perpetrated on the road from a school. On 25 June 2009, a Congolese army colonel in South Kivu allegedly raped a 15-year-old girl on her way back from school, and forced her to follow him on his redeployment after he learned she was pregnant – although she eventually managed to escape.

**Attacks on higher education**

There were two reported incidents involving higher education. In January 2011, university students protesting insecurity on the campus of the University of Kinshasa, following the murders of two of their classmates, clashed with police. The university administration reported three deaths resulting from police gunfire, though police said there were only injuries, and several buildings and vehicles were looted or set on fire. Student protests over tuition fee increases in April 2011 also resulted in the damage of administrative buildings and the deaths of a science student and a security.

**Attacks on education in 2013**

Destruction, looting and occupation of schools and the presence of unexploded ordnance in and around schools continued in 2013, as did the threat of recruitment from schools and along school routes in eastern DRC. As of late September, the UN had documented at least 49 attacks on schools and health facilities by armed groups. From 15 February to 18 March, the UN verified six attacks on schools and hospitals during fighting in North and South Kivu
and Orientale provinces. In March, UNICEF reported that 18 schools had been systematically destroyed in Katanga province. A joint investigation by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and local authorities in the Kamango area, Beni territory, North Kivu, found that the armed group ADF had ransacked 11 schools in July alone, destroying school furniture; the group had attacked at least one school in the preceding months. It also found that a FARDC integrated brigade had temporarily occupied five schools, burning the furniture as firewood. During clashes between armed groups in North Kivu on 27 September, witnesses reported the kidnapping of dozens of children and three teachers after their school was burned down.

University students and police clashed on at least two occasions, one of which reportedly resulted in casualties. In March, violence broke out at the Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural in Lubao, where students began protesting after a regional administrator allegedly made derogatory remarks about them on a local television channel. The police claimed that warning shots had been fired on the second day of protests but a student representative said that the police had opened fire on the protesters, some of whom were throwing stones, and had killed two students and wounded at least five others.

EGYPT

Political and sectarian tensions led to sporadic attacks against schools, damage and looting of university buildings, and arbitrary arrest and injury of students on campus

Context

On 11 February 2011, President Hosni Mubarak was ousted following a popular uprising, and after one-and-a-half years of military rule, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood was elected President. However, in July 2013, the military deposed him, leading to a violent crackdown on his supporters. Security forces killed more than 600 pro-Morsi protesters during the dispersal of two Cairo sit-ins on 14 August 2013. Sharp divisions, especially between Islamists and secular groups, continued to result in violent confrontations.

Under Mubarak, there was a history of staff and students at universities being closely monitored by plainclothes state security on campus. In October 2010, an administrative court ordered security forces off university campuses. Egypt’s net primary enrolment was estimated at 96 per cent (2011), gross secondary enrolment was 72 per cent (2010) and gross tertiary enrolment was 29 per cent (2011). The adult literacy rate was 72 per cent (2010).

Attacks on schools

On 25 January 2012, at least two Cairo schools, including the Ali Abdel Latif secondary school for girls and the Al Hawatiya secondary school, were gutted by fires during battles between police and demonstrators in the vicinity of Tahrir Square. The authorities blamed the fires on the protesters but it is unclear whether they were set deliberately.

Attacks on school students, teachers and education personnel

In February 2012, a court in the southern city of Assiut sentenced Makarem Diab, a Christian schoolteacher, to six years in prison on charges of defaming Islam. The case against Diab was brought by Islamist colleagues who accused him of mocking Islam’s prophet Mohammed. In September 2012, Nevine Gad, a Christian social studies teacher at a preparatory school in Manfalout, Assiut province, was arrested and charged with blasphemy after a student complained about a lesson on Islamic history she had given, with a section on the life of Mohammed.

Military use of schools

In November 2012, the Lycee Al-Horreya ‘Bab El Louk’ sustained heavy damage when Central Security Forces, Egypt’s riot police, used the school to launch attacks on protesters in Cairo over four consecutive days. Molotov cocktails left parts of the school in flames and soldiers threw school furniture at protesters.
Attacks on higher education

Attacks on higher education facilities

On 6 February 2011, in an attempt to quell protests, the Egyptian authorities closed all universities. The American University was damaged during protests in November 2011.688

During December 2011 clashes, in which the military opened fire and protesters threw Molotov cocktails, the Egyptian Institute, a research institution, was destroyed by fire and its invaluable collection of books and journals largely destroyed.689 The government accused protesters of throwing petrol bombs at the building.690

Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel

Protests, clashes and arrests related to the wider political unrest frequently took place on university campuses. On 6 April 2009, eight people were injured and 15 were arrested in clashes between opposition and pro-government students during a protest in Ain Shams University in Cairo.691

In early September 2012, hundreds of Egyptians protested in Alexandria over the alleged torture by police of a student who was arrested while participating in a demonstration at Alexandria University.692

Attacks on education in 2013

Schools and universities were affected by the many political protests that turned violent in 2013. Pro- and anti-Morsi demonstrators clashed around Cairo University on 2 July.693 Witnesses reported gunmen shooting from the top of the Literature Faculty and other university roofs.694 Protests just outside the university campus were ongoing for two months, before being violently dispersed by security forces on 14 August.695 In September and October protests took place on several campuses. Twelve people were wounded at Ain Shams University.696 Twenty-three were injured in clashes at Zagazig University between students or between students and residents for and against the Muslim Brotherhood: 15 in an incident of fighting between students697 and eight in an incident of fighting between students and residents.698 On 20 October, 55 students were arrested after they tried to take their protest onto the streets from the campus of Cairo’s ancient Al-Azhar University.699

Unrest also affected schools. In January, the Al-Howeiyaty Secondary School for Girls was burned down and the Lycee Al-Horreya was set on fire in violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces.700

A number of Christian schools were attacked during a wave of sectarian violence that targeted Christian churches and property across the country – predominantly in Upper Egypt – immediately following the events of 14 August. For example, in Minya city, the Coptic boys’ school complex and the Saint Joseph’s girls’ school, among other Christian buildings, were attacked and set on fire on 14 August.701 The same day in Bani Suef, 125 kilometres south of Cairo, a mob looted and set fire to a Franciscan girls’ school.702

With the start of the new academic year, a number of student supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood led protests or called on fellow classmates to boycott schools, rallying against what they called a ‘military coup’. Several students were arrested, including seven high school students in Fayyoum during a student-led protest in September and another two high school students in Marsa Matrouh who were distributing flyers calling for students to boycott school in protest.703

One Christian schoolteacher, Demyana Abdelnour, was arrested in May 2013 for blasphemy and ordered to pay the equivalent of more than 25 years of her salary after being accused by students of expressing disgust when speaking about Islam.704
ETHIOPIA

Arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and torture of university students, particularly of Oromo ethnicity, were documented, as were surveillance and intimidation of teacher trade unionists.

Context
Since the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnic-based parties, came to power in 1991, students – particularly Oromo students who are actual or perceived supporters of the insurgent Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) or of registered Oromo political parties – have frequently been the targets of excessive use of force by state security, as well as arbitrary arrests and mistreatment in detention.

Since disputed elections in 2005, the government has increasingly curtailed all forms of freedom of expression, association and assembly, and arrested members of the opposition.

In 2008, the Ethiopian Teachers’ Association was replaced by a pro-government union following the killing of its deputy secretary-general, the imprisonment of other officials, and the detention and torture of activists.

Net primary school enrolment was estimated at 78 per cent, while gross secondary enrolment was 36 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment was 8 per cent (2011). Approximately 39 per cent of adults were literate (2007).

Attacks on schools
One primary school was reportedly attacked in Badme in June 2012 by the Eritrean army – seemingly in response to Ethiopian military attacks in Eritrea.

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel
In February 2009, police shot and killed one student, wounded another in the chest and arrested two more during protests at Gedo Secondary School in West Shoa zone, Oromia.

Attempts in February 2010 to register an independent National Teachers’ Association (NTA), after the assets and name of the former Ethiopian Teachers’ Association were given to a government-appointed entity, were discouraged verbally, though no official notification from the Charities and Societies Agency had been received as of the end of 2012. NTA members were subjected to surveillance and harassment by government security agents, in part to intimidate them into abandoning their request.

There were reports of teachers who were fired, arrested or otherwise harassed by security officials because they refused to become EPRDF members, were outspoken about political activities, or refused to monitor the activities of their students for security officials.

In 2011, during the implementation of the Gambella Region’s ‘villagization’ programme, students were forced to go to neighbouring villages and build tukuls (huts) for the new villagers. Students who refused were not permitted to sit their year-end examinations. Teachers who refused to organize students for this activity were suspended or arrested.

Military use of schools
During the Ethiopian military’s response to an attack by unknown gunmen on a commercial farm in the Gambella region in April 2012, soldiers used a school in Chobo-Mender as a prison.

Attacks on higher education
The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, in its April 2009 Universal Periodic Review submission on Ethiopia, alleged that more than 80 Oromo students from Bahir Dar University were arrested and others were beaten in March 2009 during peaceful protests. The Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa (HRLHA) reported that a law student at Addis Ababa University, who had been active in the Union of Oromo Students, was arrested without a court warrant in front of the main campus by security agents in July 2009. Amnesty International reported arrests of students accused of supporting the OLF at the universities of Jimma, Haromaya and Nekemte in April 2011. Human Rights Watch documented arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment of a number of Oromo students at Addis Ababa’s Federal Police Crime
Investigation Sector, a detention centre also known as Maekelawi, between 2011 and 2013. Throughout Ethiopia, students were detained by security officials for organizing student associations, being politically outspoken or organizing cultural movements. The monitoring of students was one of the key methods through which rural Ethiopians, particularly Oromos, were targeted because of involvement in lawful political movements. There were anecdotal reports of Oromo students being released from detention and not being allowed to complete their schooling.

In January 2010, Oromia police shot two unarmed students, one fatally, during a disturbance at Ardayta College; one policeman was found guilty of murder and imprisoned.

In June 2012, according to the HRLHA, security forces stormed dormitories and arrested engineering students at Haromaya University in Oromia to break up a demonstration; they were held outside without food for two days.

Attacks on education in 2013

Arrests of university students continued in 2013, with at least three incidents reported. Security agents reportedly arrested and detained some 100 Addis Ababa University students, a majority of whom were Oromo, after a violent clash erupted between two groups of students on the Arat Kilo University Campus (College of Natural Science) on 2 January. It was reported that a number of these students were injured and several had to be hospitalized. The clash was said to have been triggered when Tigrean students put up posters with insulting messages about Oromo students. Police reportedly surrounded the campus and detained at least 100 more students of Arba Minch University in May who were said to have been responsible for organizing a protest over education-related grievances. One Addis Ababa University student was also arrested on campus in March after expressing concern via Facebook about alleged corruption among Arba Minch University officials and city administrators; he was subsequently charged with criminal defamation.

INDIA

Some 140 schools were attacked by militants in 2009-2012, and there was widespread use of schools as barracks or bases by government forces, mostly in the east of the country

Context

Most attacks on education occurred in states affected by a long-running insurgency led by Maoist and other left-wing armed groups – also referred to as ‘Naxalites’ – operating in at least 83 of India’s 600 districts, mainly in the east.

While the Maoists claim they are fighting on behalf of the poorest rural communities in each state, national authorities say they are obstructing desperately needed development initiatives. The exploitation of natural resources and how the profits are distributed are key issues of contention.

Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa were among the states most affected by the conflict in 2008. As part of their insurgency, Maoists attacked government infrastructure, including schools, police stations and armouries, and used landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to launch attacks.

Maoist attacks on schools and teachers and security forces’ use of school premises in operations against the militants have led to falling attendance and increased drop-out rates, particularly among girls. They have also reduced the quality of education provided to some of the country’s most disadvantaged children.

Pockets of tension fuelled by Hindu and Christian extremists in some areas, particularly in the northeast, and low-level insurgency by separatists or terror groups in several states, including in Jammu and Kashmir, have also led to attacks on education.

Net primary enrolment was 93 per cent, gross secondary enrolment was 69 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment stood was 23 per cent (2011). The adult literacy rate was 63 per cent (2006).
Attacks on schools

The number of attacks by Maoists on schools declined steeply over the 2009-2012 period from a peak in 2009. Human Rights Watch documented attacks by Maoists on at least 36 schools in Jharkhand and 23 schools in Bihar during 2009. The number of attacks appeared to increase in the run-up to Lok Sabha (House of Representatives) elections from April to May 2009. The Home Ministry, in a 2011 report, cited a total of 71 school attacks in 2009, 39 in 2010 and 27 in 2011 across Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Maharashtra and Jharkhand. It reported only three incidents in 2012 but the perceived risk of attack remained – for example, a school in Balangir, Orissa, was closed for 12 days in September 2012 after a Maoist poster was found pasted on the school, triggering fear among parents and teachers that Maoists would attack.

Maoists frequently cited use of school buildings by security forces as the reason for attacking schools, claiming them to be legitimate military targets. However, Human Rights Watch research found that Maoists had damaged or destroyed numerous schools that were not actually occupied by security forces at the time of attack. Some Maoists justified attacking newly built schools because they believed they would be used to house police carrying out operations against them. In many reported cases, Maoists also claimed to have attacked a school because it was previously rather than currently used by police.

Maoists tended to attack at night, often using cans packed with explosives – though, in at least one case, insurgents set fire to a school’s two generators. Destruction from these explosions ranged from minor structural damage to the collapse of entire structures.

For example, in one incident on 9 April 2009, Maoists blew up Belhara High School in Jharkhand. They triggered two dynamite blasts in the evening, leaving holes in the walls of two classrooms, a hole in the first floor and cracks around the building, making it unsafe. It was the tenth government building destroyed in a week during the run-up to elections on 16 April. Following the attack, one or two dozen...
fewer students attended the school and some classes had to be taken on the school verandas because of the damage.747 In another incident, on 14 April 2009, a witness told Human Rights Watch that Maoists planted mines in Gosain-Pesra Middle School, Bihar, and blew them up remotely, causing half of the two-storey structure to collapse to the ground.748

Seven incidents targeting Christian schools were also reported, primarily by Christian sources, five of them allegedly perpetrated by Hindu militants.749 For example, on 26 January 2009, a group of Hindutva activists attacked St Mary’s School at Kadiri in Andhra Pradesh, destroying the furniture and injuring several of the nuns, purportedly because the school had not hoisted the national flag on Republic Day.750 Others were attacked, apparently by Muslim protesters. On 16 September 2010, it was reported that one Christian school in Jammu and Kashmir, the Tangmarg branch of Tyndale Biscoe school, was razed to the ground,751 and another, the Roman Catholic Good Shepherd High School at Pulwama, was burned down during protests over alleged desecrations of the Koran in the United States.752

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

A tally of incidents reported by media and human rights groups indicates that at least 13 teachers,753 one catering staff member754 and four students755 were killed from 2009 to 2012. At least 73 teachers756 and 11 students757 were injured. Seven teachers were abducted, five of whom were subsequently found dead,758 and at least two students were kidnapped.759

Maoists were suspected in a number of attacks on teachers and the killing of at least four students. Motives were not always clear but often the Maoists alleged that their victims were police informers. In several cases, it appeared that the teachers were targeted after refusing to cooperate in some way: for example, by declining to send their students for Maoist training, refusing to pay levies to the People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA) or removing black flags hoisted outside their schools by Maoists on Republic Day.760 In one illustrative incident, the head teacher of Indiraboni primary school in West Bengal was reportedly gunned down by three Maoists on motorcycles amid claims that he had prevented students from taking part in rallies organized by Maoists.761 A number of teachers also seemed to have been targeted because of their affiliations with the Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPI-M). Many teachers refused to work in areas affected by the Maoist conflict out of fear for their safety.762

In at least two incidents, suspected Maoists were reported to have killed individuals at schools in front of students and teachers. On 14 September 2009, a group of Maoists shot dead a teacher and CPI-M member in Jamda High School in West Bengal after entering the classroom where he was teaching.763 On 20 March 2009, a Class 9 student, and son of a police officer who had been killed the previous year, was fatally shot and then stabbed by Maoist guerrillas in front of students at his school in Koyalibeda, in Chhattisgarh.764

One media outlet said in August 2012 that children in Maoist-affected areas of Jharkhand’s East Singhbhum district were carrying bows and arrows to school, fearing attacks from the insurgents. Local people had been training children to defend themselves because the children had to travel two kilometres to school through thick forests.765

Several abductions and killings of teachers by militants from separatist groups were reported in Assam, in most cases after teachers refused to give in to demands for money.766

In at least six incidents767 reported by Christian sources, staff or students at Christian schools were said to have been injured or threatened. For example, on 29 May 2009, Hindu militants allegedly attacked a Christian missionary school in Andhra Pradesh, beating several teachers, telling them not to work in the village and threatening to kill them.768

Insecurity also affected students and teachers in Jammu and Kashmir. Schools reopened in the Kashmir Valley in late September 2010 after a three-month closure following violence and curfews, and many students attended classes despite the separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s urging them not to do so. However, at one school only 100 of the 3,000 pupils turned up amid threats of further violence.
Some schools claimed the government was failing to ensure students were kept safe on school buses and premises. For example, on 7 October 2010, at least three students from a private school in Rainawari, Kashmir, were reportedly injured while on a school bus after it was pelted by protesters.

Military use of schools
During 2010, more than 129 schools were used as barracks or bases across the country, particularly in Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, but also in the country’s north-east, in Tripura, Manipur, Nagaland and Assam, disrupting education for an estimated 20,800 students. In the same year, some security forces began complying with government and Supreme Court directives to vacate schools. However, security forces continued to use schools into 2012 and 2013.

According to a 2009 report by Human Rights Watch, police and paramilitary forces occupied school buildings with no prior notification, either temporarily or for extended periods ranging from six months to three years, during their counter-insurgency operations. Some educational facilities had been occupied for over a decade. In many cases, security forces took over entire school facilities and campuses, completely shutting down schools, while in others, they occupied only a part of the school, forcing classes to continue in crowded quarters and alongside armed men.

Attacks on higher education
Attacks on higher education occurred during 2009-2012, but they tended to be isolated incidents, most often linked to students’ and academics’ political affiliation or activism.

One professor at Manipur University was shot dead on campus in May 2009, allegedly because he was the leader of a clique trying to usurp power within the university. An ethnic Meitei terrorist group known as Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup, which launched an ‘anti-corruption’ campaign in 2001 to ‘clean up’ the education system in the north-eastern state of Manipur, claimed responsibility for the attack.

Two student trade unionists, including the speaker of the Sumi Students’ Union and the former president and advisor to Kiphire Sumi Students’ Union, were shot by National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang militia in Dimapur on 2 May 2009.

Attacks on education in 2013
There were isolated reports of attacks on schools by suspected Maoist fighters and of recruitment of schoolchildren to their ranks, although it was not clear whether this happened on school premises. Minority and marginalized communities continued to suffer violence in education settings. In one incident, at least 20 masked men broke into a Christian school and abducted and raped four girls belonging to the Pahariya tribal group, aged 12 to 14, although it was not clear if the motive was sectarian. One report highlighted the continued siting of paramilitary camps next to schools, this time in Kashmir, and suspected military use of the school in question.

INDONESIA

Religious intolerance and tension between religious groups have led to attacks on schools attended by minority Muslim sects and Christian schools in particular

Context
Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population, including a range of Muslim sects; there are also other religious denominations and many ethnic groups. There are demands for independence in some provinces and threats from an Al-Qaeda-linked network, Jemaah Islamiyah. To combat this, the state has targeted religious militants.

Net primary enrolment was 94 per cent, net secondary enrolment was 75 per cent, and gross tertiary enrolment was 27 per cent (2011). Adult literacy was 93 per cent (2009).

Attacks on schools
At least a dozen attacks on schools attended by minority Muslim sects – Ahmadiya, Shia and Sufi – and on Christian schools were reported by media and human rights sources in 2009-2012.
In 2011, during a mob attack on Ahmadiya followers in Cisalada, militants burned down homes and schools. 787

On 15 February 2011, approximately 200 militants attacked an elite Shia boarding school for kindergarten to high school students in Bangil, East Java, throwing stones, smashing windows and destroying a guard post. The attackers left after the police fired warning shots, but the incident left nine students injured. 788 There were four more attacks on the school in 2010 and 2011. In one incident in 2010, bullets hit the windows of a female dormitory. In two incidents in February 2011, the female dormitory was stoned, damaging the ceiling. 789

On 29 December 2011, Sunni militants attacked the Shia community in Nangkernang hamlet, reportedly
burning a religious school (madrassa) in addition to several houses.\textsuperscript{790}

Five Catholic schools were attacked by young Muslim extremists. One of the assaults, on St. Bellarminus Catholic School in Bekasi in May 2010, was reportedly in retaliation for perceived ‘blasphemous’ comments on a blog.\textsuperscript{791} On 8 February 2011, a Catholic school complex was destroyed in Temanggung by an angry mob. Police believed the attack was the result of rumours spread by text messages that the defendant in a religious blasphemy case would be given a light sentence.\textsuperscript{792} In January 2012, three Catholic schools in Yogyakarta, Central Java, were attacked, one by a group of 25 militant Muslims. An investigation found that the motive was an alleged anti-Islamic posting on Facebook, but that it had been posted by someone falsely claiming to be a student at one of the schools.\textsuperscript{793}

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

Two people were killed and at least six were injured in a Sunni attack on a group of students and teachers from a Shia boarding school in Bangil, East Java, as they returned to school via minibus after visiting their families in Sampang, East Java, on 26 August 2012. Around 500 machete-wielding men were involved in the attack.\textsuperscript{794} Later that year, Sunni militants attacked a Sufi learning house in Jambo village, Bireuen regency, Aceh, and killed Teungku Aiyub, the leader of the house, allegedly because he was a heretic. A student-cum-assistant also died in the attack.\textsuperscript{795}

**Military use of schools**

A police raid in November 2012 on Darul Akhfiya School in Nganjuk, East Java, found rifles, ammunition and a cleaver. It was strongly suspected that the school was training Islamist militants.\textsuperscript{796}

**Attacks on higher education**

The director of the National Counter-terrorism Agency claimed in November 2010 that there had been an increase in religious extremism among university students and that a growing number of individuals engaged in terrorist activity were being indoctrinated on college campuses. A study by Islamic scholar Zulfi Mubarak from Malang Islamic State University said recruiters targeted science and engineering students to make explosive devices.\textsuperscript{797}

In August 2012, one student was reportedly killed during a raid by police, army and counter-terrorism personnel on Cenderawasih University, Abepura. A further 11 students were reportedly held by police and some were tortured. One possible reason for the attack was that the students came from the same tribal group as many members of the non-violent campaigning group, the West Papua National Committee.\textsuperscript{798}

**Attacks on education in 2013**

Isolated incidents continued in 2013. According to a Human Rights Watch researcher, in March a Sunni mob burned down the gates of the Al-Mujahadah Foundation, a Sufi madrassa, while police reportedly stood by; in July, a dormitory of the same school was burned down and a month later its compound wall was reportedly destroyed.\textsuperscript{799} The gates were destroyed on the same day that the South Aceh regency government ordered students to leave the facility in response to a ruling by Aceh’s Ulama Consultative Council that its teachings were “false”.\textsuperscript{800} On 6 August, a petrol bomb was thrown at a Catholic high school in Jakarta, an act that may have been timed to coincide with the end of Ramadan.\textsuperscript{801}

**IRAN**

Some students were killed when security forces raided university dormitories. Other students and academics were arrested, imprisoned or sentenced to death on charges based on confessions obtained under torture. Academics specializing in nuclear physics and engineering were assassinated.\textsuperscript{802}

**Context**

The reporting period witnessed many protests against the government’s attempts to block reformists from power. The protests, in which students played an important role, were sparked largely by the controversial re-election of conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in June 2009. The subsequent suppression of protesters led to a large number
of human rights violations, with journalists, students, academics and political activists imprisoned. Further protests erupted in 2011, partly influenced by the Arab Spring. Iran’s security forces, apparently supported by the justice system, repressed the dissent with methods that included arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture.

Failure to use due process led to extreme cases of injustice, including arbitrary execution. For instance, in 2010, Farzad Kamangar, a Kurdish teacher, was executed for being an ‘enemy of God’, after refusing to make a false confession on television. The authorities alleged he had links to the Iranian branch of the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK. He was reportedly tortured while in custody and sentenced to death after a seven-minute trial in which no evidence was presented. The Guardian reported that in a last message smuggled out of prison, Kamangar wrote: ‘Is it possible to be a teacher where there is a drought of justice and fairness and not teach the alphabet of hope and equality?’

From 2007 to 2013, the Iranian authorities systematically discriminated against politically active students by partially or completely banning them from higher education. Independent student organizations were also banned and faculty were purged, and the social sciences and humanities curricula were restricted. In total, at least 250 students and professors were expelled from April 2005 to March 2013. According to a compilation of media and human rights sources, since 2009 more than 200 university teachers were forced to retire each year, reportedly because they did not ‘share the regime’s direction’ or support the rule of the Supreme Leader.

Furthermore, followers of the Baha’i faith have been barred officially from attending higher education since 1979, and since 2009 they have been increasingly harassed in schools by staff. Several Baha’is affiliated with the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education – an alternative online system of teaching set up because Baha’is were barred from universities – were arrested. The activities of the institute were declared illegal and its diplomas and degrees were denied legal validity.

The election of Hassan Rouhani as President on 14 June 2013 raised hopes of political reform, and signalled an apparent thawing in relations abroad and a more liberal policy towards those in education at home, including the reinstatement of some students and professors.

In 2011, net enrolment at primary school level was 100 per cent, while at secondary level it was estimated at 79 per cent. Gross enrolment in tertiary education was 49 per cent. The adult literacy rate was 85 per cent (2008).

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

According to Human Rights Watch, at least 39 teachers were detained between January 2009 and October 2012 on charges related to national security, many of them in connection with their activities as teacher trade unionists. For example, 15 were imprisoned because of their trade union activity, including protests for higher wages. Some teacher trade unionists received long and severe sentences. In one case, the former head of the Mashad Headteachers’ Union was sentenced to six years in prison in 2009 on charges relating to his trade union activity. The sentence was later reduced to two years, but when he was due to be released he was tried on a new charge of ‘creating public anxiety’.

Attacks on higher education

In 2009 alone, there were at least 30 attacks on universities and colleges, including campus raids and arrests of students, faculty and staff. Attacks on academics and students primarily came in the context of anti-government protests. However, there was also a pattern of targeted killings of those specializing in physics and engineering. Iranian officials alleged that these incidents were perpetrated by foreigners and related to the development of the country’s nuclear capacity. Among these, on 12 January 2010, a remote-controlled bomb placed on the motorcycle of Masoud Ali-Mohammadi, 50, a physicist at Tehran University, detonated outside his
apartment as he was heading to work, killing him instantly.\textsuperscript{824} This was followed by similar assassinations of Majid Shahriari, a nuclear engineer at Tehran University, on 29 November 2010 and academic Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan on 11 January 2012. Another nuclear physicist, Fereidoun Abbasi, was also wounded on 29 November 2010.\textsuperscript{825} Further, on 23 July 2011, two gunmen on motorcycles killed a student who was studying for a master’s degree in the field of electrical engineering at Nasir al-Din University in Tehran and working with the Ministry of Defence.\textsuperscript{826}

Students were killed, arrested, imprisoned and sentenced to death around anti-government protests in 2009. Some of these incidents took place during student association activities or on campus.\textsuperscript{827} Days after the disputed 2009 election, security forces assaulted students in several provincial towns including Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, Bandar Abbas and Mashad.\textsuperscript{828} In one incident, on 14 June 2009, around 300 riot police and Basij forces armed with guns raided Tehran University’s dormitories, resulting in the deaths of at least five students and 133 arrests.\textsuperscript{829} One witness told The Guardian that police issued a warning on loudspeakers saying: ‘If you evacuate the building, we won’t harm you. Otherwise you will all be injured or killed.’ When the students came out with their hands on their heads, the police beat them with batons.\textsuperscript{830} In several cases, students or academics were executed after being convicted on spurious charges or confessing under duress. One charge known as \textit{moharebeh} (‘enmity with God’) has been defined very broadly. For example, Mohammad Amin Valian, a 20-year-old student who was active in the Islamic Association, a student organization, was charged with \textit{moharebeh} and sentenced to death in February 2010 for his role in the post-2009 election protests. His alleged crimes included shouting ‘Death to the dictator’; being affiliated with the Central Council of the Islamic Association of Damghan Science University and statements published by them; and organizing election debates at the university. He was convicted based on evidence that included photos of him at a demonstration in December 2009 throwing rocks into an empty area.\textsuperscript{831} Following international protests, the sentence was reduced to imprisonment and a fine.\textsuperscript{832}

After the 2009 post-electoral conflicts, cases of prolonged detention without charge, arbitrary arrest and sentencing of students and teachers for political reasons continued to be recorded. In the three years from March 2009, the Human Rights Commission of the Iranian student association, Daftar Tahkim Vahdat, identified instances of 436 arrests, 254 convictions and 364 cases of denial of education.\textsuperscript{833} As of April 2012, some 31 students were still being held in prison.\textsuperscript{834} The charges ranged from ‘putting up posters’ to attending an anti-government rally. Some were given the additional sentence of ‘prison in exile’, meaning they were sent to a distant prison.\textsuperscript{835} Omid Kokabee, a PhD student at the University of Texas, was arrested while visiting his family in Iran in 2011 and was held for 15 months before being given a verdict in a rushed trial in which no evidence was presented, according to his lawyer. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison for national security offences after refusing to co-operate on scientific projects in Iran, his lawyer said.\textsuperscript{836}

Another student, Majid Tavakoli, was sentenced to eight-and-a-half years after he spoke at a National Students’ Day rally at Amirkabir University of Technology in 2009.\textsuperscript{837} Charges against him included ‘participating in an illegal gathering’, ‘propaganda against the system’ and ‘insulting officials’. Tavakoli was convicted after an unfair trial, without a lawyer, and was held for months in solitary confinement and sent to Evin prison.\textsuperscript{838} He was released on bail in October 2013.\textsuperscript{839}

In early June 2011, following the arrest of many lecturers,\textsuperscript{840} the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education (BIHE) was declared illegal by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology.\textsuperscript{841}

**Attacks on education in 2013**

In January, three teachers were among five founder members of the Alhavar Science and Culture Institute who had their death sentences suspended pending new investigations. Their sentences had followed false confessions made after being tortured, according to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran. Alhavar members organized poetry nights and art classes for young Arabs at a location.
belonging to the education and development ministry, but the institute was banned after organizing demonstrations opposing discrimination against Arab people in 2005. Following Hassan Rouhani’s election as president, some measures against students were eased. In September, the Ministry of Science announced that student activists who had been expelled from universities after 2011 could resume their studies, but those who were banned earlier remained barred.

IRAN

There was a heavy death toll of school students, with 106 killed in 2009-2012 and numerous direct attacks on schools; and 46 university students and academics were reported killed in the same period. In 2013, there were numerous reports of students, teachers and academics being targeted, with shootings and bombings, including car bombs and suicide bombs.

Context

Sectarian fighting put significant pressure on Iraq’s education system in the years following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Hundreds of academics were assassinated and the Ministry of Education recorded 31,600 attacks against universities and schools.

After Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled, Iraq eventually fractured along sectarian lines as pro-Baathist forces and Islamist insurgents fought the US-led occupying forces and Sunnis and Shias fought each other. The levels of violence fell significantly by 2009 as a result of three main factors: US funding for militia comprised of Sunni tribesmen who had previously fought the US and Iraqi forces, a surge by US troops that pushed Islamist militants out of contested cities and provinces, and a Shia ceasefire. American combat forces withdrew from the country during 2011. However, education continued to be affected by violence and sectarian divisions.

Bombings remained commonplace, particularly in central Iraq, and armed groups, including Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), continued to carry out acts of violence targeting academics, security forces and government buildings. Violence also escalated in 2013 between Shias and Sunnis, partly provoked by the Shia-led government’s perceived marginalization of Sunnis, but also due to the growing strength of Al-Qaeda and other factors.

In addition to the direct violence against education institutions and targeted killings of university staff, sectarian divisions now shape the higher education sector, putting pressure on students and faculty of opposing groups. Different sects control different Iraqi cities including the universities located in them. There are also claims that control over particular universities is increasingly being handed to political parties. For instance, it was reported that Baghdad University had been ‘allocated’ to the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, Al-Mustansiriya University to the Sadr Group, and Al-Nahrain University to the Al-Dawa Party. These groups interfere in many aspects of university life, including admissions, hiring, course content and physical security on campus. After the appointment in 2011 of a leading member of the pro-Shiite Islamic Dawa party, Ali al-Adeeb, as Minister of Higher Education, the education ministry fired large numbers of former Baathists from university faculties. Subsequently, complaints of sectarian bias in appointments were presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council.

In addition, insurgent groups demanded changes to the curriculum or tried to deny access to education to students from targeted groups and often responded with violence when their demands were not met.

Net primary enrolment in Iraq was 89 per cent (2007), net secondary enrolment was 44 per cent (2007) and gross tertiary enrolment was 16 per cent (2005). The adult literacy rate was 79 per cent (2011).

Attacks on schools

There were 56 documented attacks on school buildings during 2009-2012. Five attacks on school buildings or facilities were documented in 2009, seven in 2010, 29 in 2011 and at least 15 in 2012. Methods of attack included suicide bombings, use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortar attacks and gunfire. For example, on 24 September 2012 –
the second day of the new school year – a suicide bomber drove his car laden with explosives into al-Kifah primary school in Anbar province, killing five children and injuring six others. The blast caused severe damage to the school building.\textsuperscript{863}

In addition, IEDs planted in the vicinity of schools impinged on access to school services: 54 incidents of IEDs affecting schools were reported in 2011 alone.\textsuperscript{864}

In some incidents, the detonation of bombs outside schools was linked to intentional efforts to damage them. For example, on 1 March 2012, an IED exploded in front of a secondary school in Kirkuk and a police search revealed a second bomb in the school.\textsuperscript{865} In other cases, IEDs were planted to attack passing military targets but also put students and teachers at risk. For example, an explosive charge hidden in a rubbish bin went off near a primary school in the al-Rashidiyah neighbourhood of northern Mosul on 25 March 2009, missing its passing US patrol target and instead killing four schoolchildren and injuring seven more as they were leaving the school to go home.\textsuperscript{866}

Militia groups also stored explosives at schools. Six schoolchildren were killed and 28 students and teachers wounded at the Abaa Dhar primary school for boys in 2009 when a cache of explosives hidden underneath the school's rubbish dump, presumably by militia groups, was accidentally detonated by the school principal while he was burning refuse.\textsuperscript{867}

Armed groups threatened several girls’ primary schools on different occasions by planting IEDs on the premises, attacking the schools at night and leaving threatening messages. In other incidents, the ethnicity or religious affiliation of the majority of the students turned schools and students into targets, particularly in areas such as Kirkuk, Salahaddin and Baghdad.\textsuperscript{868}

\textbf{Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel}

During 2009-2012, some 106 school students were killed, 200 injured and 22 abducted; however, the number of attacks on education was greatly reduced compared to earlier years.\textsuperscript{869}

Sectarian groups directly targeted students and teachers. In many cases, these appeared directly targeted and linked to their status as students or teachers.

Although a UN respondent reported no school student or teacher victims in 2009,\textsuperscript{870} there was one media report of three female students wounded in an armed attack in western Mosul, on 25 May 2009, when an unknown gunman opened fire on them as they left their school in the Tamouz neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{871}

According to a UN respondent, in 2010, 49 school students were killed, 26 injured and five abducted in attacks on education.\textsuperscript{872} The UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) separately reported more than 10 school teachers and university professors were assassinated in 2010 in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, al-Kut (Wassit governorate), al-Anbar and Diyala, although it did not indicate how many of the ten were teachers. The motives for many of the killings were not known.\textsuperscript{873}

In 2011, 37 students were killed, 33 students injured, and 13 students abducted, according to a UN respondent.\textsuperscript{874} Twenty-seven school personnel or education officials were killed or injured in incidents that included IEDs and direct shooting, mostly in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salahaddin and Anbar. In all these cases, armed groups, including Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISI, were responsible.\textsuperscript{875} For instance, on 11 December 2011, a bomb attached to a car carrying a Ministry of Education official in Baghdad’s northern Shaab district exploded, killing him.\textsuperscript{876} The same day, a bomb attached to a teacher’s car injured him when it detonated in the town of Muqdadiya.\textsuperscript{877}

In 2012, 69 students were killed, 167 injured and four abducted, according to a UN respondent.\textsuperscript{878} For example, in Salahaddin governorate, two secondary school students were killed and another wounded when five masked armed attackers entered the school, made their way to a specific classroom and shot at the students on 22 April 2012. The UN reported that according to local sources, including local police, AQI was allegedly behind the attack, some mentioning that AQI had attempted to recruit the victims before the incident.\textsuperscript{879} The UN also reported that 19 school-level education staff were killed or injured in 2012.\textsuperscript{880} On 12 March 2012, a schoolteacher from the Riyadh district, south of Kirkuk, died when a bomb attached to his car exploded.\textsuperscript{881}
Roadside bombs along school routes also killed or wounded a number of students and teachers, although they were not necessarily targeting education. In one incident, Baghdad high school students travelling by bus from Sadr City to sit their final examinations were caught in a roadside bomb explosion in June 2009. Police said that three pupils were killed and 13 people wounded, although the US army said there was one dead and eight injured. On 10 January 2012, three boys were killed by a roadside bomb while leaving their school in Yathrib, near Balad.

Throughout 2009-2012, there were also several instances of arrest or harassment of students, teachers and teacher trade unionists. Ibrahim al-Battat, a leader of the Iraqi Teachers’ Union, was arrested and then released on 22 February 2010 after an eight-day detention for his involvement in strikes and his refusal to divulge union members’ names. A warrant was also issued for Jasim Hussein Mohammed, the national leader of the Iraqi Teachers’ Union (ITU), on 26 February 2010, who was subsequently arrested and released.

**Attacks on higher education**

**Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel**

Almost 500 Iraqi academics were killed in the nine years from the fall of Saddam Hussein to April 2012, but the vast majority of assassinations occurred before 2009. Since then, attacks on higher education have continued at a much lower rate, with 26 killings recorded by media and human rights groups from 2009 to 2012. In two cases in 2010, professors who had recently returned to Iraq from exile were killed, contradicting the higher education ministry’s claims that it was safe for academics to come back. UNAMI reported the separate killings of six academics and the combined kidnapping of two professors in 2011. The majority of those killed were shot or targeted by explosions caused by magnetic or ‘sticky’ bombs, often placed under vehicles, or other devices planted near the victims’ homes. However, at least one professor was stabbed to death and another was hanged after unidentified attackers stormed his house. In another incident in July 2011, the Director-General of Iraq’s Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Dawood Salman Rahim, was reportedly assassinated, along with his son, in their car in west Baghdad’s Ghazaliya district by a group of unknown armed men.

A compilation of media and human rights reports suggests that as many as 20 higher education students may have been killed and 115 injured between 2009 and 2011. Of those killed, most were reported to have been shot, many in drive-by shootings in which the perpetrators and motives were not known.

In 2010, at least 100 students were injured when a convoy of buses, escorted by Iraqi forces and transporting college students from Christian towns and villages in the Nineveh Plain back to classes at the University of Mosul, was attacked. A car bomb exploded as the first buses crossed a checkpoint along the internal border between the semi-autonomous Kurdish region and the rest of the country. Shortly afterwards, another roadside bomb went off. The area around Mosul University had already experienced several attacks and threats of attacks in 2009, which is why students travelled in these types of convoys. The attacks on Christian students were part of a spate of dozens of attacks against Christians in general in 2010. According to Worldwatch Monitor, nearly 1,000 students stayed away from class for the rest of the semester as a result of the attack.

Students in Kirkuk and the northern city of Mosul were repeatedly targeted. In another incident on 11 August 2011, five Shiite university students were shot dead by a drive-by assassin on a motorcycle while they were swimming. On 6 June 2012, another student was killed by a magnetic bomb attached to a vehicle.

**Attacks on education in 2013**

School drop-out rates in 2013 were the lowest for a decade, which the education minister said resulted from better security, removal of armed groups, rebuilding of schools and increased recognition of the value of education. However, there was an upturn in the level of general violence in 2013, approaching
the levels of 2008, and there were numerous reports of attacks on education, including against school students, tertiary-level students, teachers, academics and education ministry officials. There were multiple accounts of teachers being targeted individually and some reports of large numbers of students being killed. For example, on 6 October 2013, a suicide bomber drove a truck full of explosives into the wall of a primary school playground in Tel Afar, north-west of Mosul, and detonated them, killing at least 12 pupils and their head teacher.

Attacks on higher education institutions and students and academics continued. In January, Dr Abbas Fadhil Al-Dulaimy, the President of Diyala University, survived an assassination attempt in which his convoy was hit by the detonation of a roadside bomb, which killed two of his bodyguards. Tikrit University was repeatedly targeted. In March, a bomb went off on its campus, injuring five students. In June, a suicide bomber attacked the campus, killing a police officer. Four university staff members were also reportedly killed in a bomb attack in March north of Tikrit, but it is not clear whether they were targeted as university staff members. In the most serious incident affecting students, two suicide bombers blew themselves up inside and outside Habib al-Asadi Shiite mosque in Baghdad in June 2013, killing 34 people and injuring 57 others. Most victims were students from the nearby Imam al-Sadiq University for Islamic Studies who regularly attended the mosque for midday prayers.

ISRAEL/PALESTINE

Palestinian schools and universities have been targeted with air strikes, attacked by Israeli settlers and in some cases used by Israeli defence forces as interrogation centres or surveillance posts. Israeli schools have been hit by indiscriminate rocket fire.

Context

Hundreds of incidents of attacks on education – including deaths and injuries to students and teachers, and damage to schools during fighting – were documented in Israel/Palestine in 2009-2012 by the UN. The great majority of incidents occurred in connection with the Israeli military operations ‘Cast Lead’ (27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009) and ‘Pillar of Defence’ (14 November 2012 to 21 November 2012) in Gaza, and with Israeli administrative and military arrangements in Area C of the West Bank.

Palestine is comprised of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, with Israel located between the two. Control of the land and education systems is divided between different authorities. The Israeli Ministry of Education is responsible for education in Israel and the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education, the Hamas-run education ministry in the Gaza Strip, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the private school system run schools in the West Bank and Gaza.

Attacks on education in the West Bank are largely linked to territorial, administrative and security arrangements. Following the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (commonly known as the Oslo Accords), it was divided into Areas A (Palestinian National Authority (PNA) military and civil control), B (PNA civil/Israeli military control) and C (Israeli civil and military control, comprising more than 60 per cent of the West Bank). Sources of tension and violence include the expansion of Israeli settlements that dot Area C, restrictions on Palestinian construction and movement imposed by the Israeli military, violence and intimidation by the Israeli military and the violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers and Palestinians. In particular, education is adversely affected by restrictions on movement, curfews, denial of building permits and the issuing of demolition orders against schools, settler attacks on schools and universities, and actions of Israeli military forces.

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel also alleged in 2013 that Palestinian education was being systematically underserved by the Israeli authorities in East Jerusalem.

In Gaza and southern Israel, education suffers primarily from active armed conflict between Israel and the Hamas government, which violently ousted the PNA from Gaza in 2007, and other Palestinian factions. An ongoing back-and-forth pattern of Palestinian rocket launches and Israeli artillery fire
and airstrikes has damaged schools primarily in Gaza but also in Israel.

UNOCHA reported in July 2013 that 13 schools located within the Access Restricted Areas in Gaza, established in 2000, had been damaged or had classes disrupted by the enforcement of restrictions on access in the area extending up to 1.5 kilometres from the border with Israel. According to UNESCO, schools in the restricted area have also been damaged by the activity of Palestinian armed groups, some of whose rockets have fallen short and hit schools in Gaza during the reporting period.918

Israel’s closures of border crossings, limits on sea access, and restrictions on access to land areas limit the entrance of building materials and prevent travel of Gazan students and education staff.919 Moreover, Egyptian authorities have imposed tight restrictions on Palestinian students and education staff crossing the border at Rafah, in southern Gaza. Gazan authorities have also limited students’ travel outside the area.920

Conflict has also caused physical harm and psychosocial distress to students and education staff. In Gaza, during Operation Cast Lead, 265 students and teachers were killed and 875 injured;921 during Operation Pillar of Defence, 21 students and school staff and teachers were killed and 343 injured. In both cases, it is not known how many casualties resulted from targeted attacks.922 In southern Israel, students and staff face the constant fear of intermittent attacks on civilian areas by unguided rockets and mortars launched by Palestinians from Gaza, which have hit schools and school transport, killing one student and injuring another, and injuring a bus driver, during 2009-2012.923

The first Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in three years restarted on 29 July 2013.

Net primary school enrolment in Israel was 97 per cent and net secondary school enrolment was 98 per cent (2010), while in Palestine, these figures were 87 per cent and 81 per cent (2011) respectively.924 At tertiary level, gross enrolment was 62 per cent (2009) in Israel and 51 per cent (2011) in Palestine.925

In both the West Bank and Gaza, educational achievement has dropped in recent years, with examinations showing a decline in overall results. In Israel, rocket attacks have caused thousands of students to miss out on learning.927

**Attacks on schools**

Both Israeli armed forces and settlers and Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip allegedly perpetrated attacks on schools and other education facilities.

During Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, at least 280 out of 641 schools in Gaza were reportedly damaged and another 18 destroyed.928 It is not specified how many were damaged in targeted attacks; many were damaged during firing at Palestinian military positions and training sites. Incidents during the reporting period included the total destruction by aerial bombardment on 3 January 2009 of the American School in Beit Lahia, in the north of the Gaza Strip, which Israel claimed Palestinian armed groups were using as a firing position (this was disputed by local residents and the school’s director);929 and the damage to the Beit Lahia Elementary School, an UNRWA school, as a result of Israeli forces’ shelling with white phosphorous, killing two boys and injuring 13 others who were using the school as an emergency shelter.930 The impact of the destruction of schools was subsequently compounded by an ongoing blockade imposed by Israel931 that restricted access to building materials and other education supplies required to repair the damage, resulting in substandard school facilities, overcrowded classrooms and the under-resourcing of educational activities.932

In 2009 and 2010, the UN reported instances of Israeli forces being in schools following raids, forced entry, and search and arrest operations. In some cases, tear gas was used on students. The incidents resulted in damage to schools, interruption of education and placed students’ safety at risk. A number of incidents involving the vandalizing of school buildings in the West Bank by Israeli settlers were documented in UN and media reports. On 21 October 2010, for example, vandals alleged to be settlers set fire to a storage room in a West Bank Palestinian girls’ school and left graffiti on its walls.933
An Islamist Palestinian armed group claimed responsibility for setting fire to an UNRWA summer school for Palestinian children in Beit Lahia in May 2010; and an unidentified group of 25 armed militants set fire to a similar summer school in Central Gaza in June 2010. One Palestinian rocket landed near an Israeli kindergarten in 2010.

In 2011, according to the UN, there were 46 incidents related to education. In six instances, settler violence targeted schools in the West Bank; these cases involved settlers throwing objects such as rocks and bottles at schools, physically assaulting children and teachers inside schools, and vandalizing schools with graffiti and arson. In one case, Israeli settlers set fire to a prayer room at a school in the Nablus governorate.

In 2011, there were 11 incidents during 2011, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) fire on Gaza, targeting military installations or training sites, damaged schools. Among these was an UNRWA school, reportedly damaged by Israeli airstrikes in December 2011. Two schools were damaged in 2011 by Palestinian rockets aimed at Israel, but which landed in Gaza. In one instance, unknown masked and armed men attacked and vandalized an UNRWA summer games facility.

In 2011, there were 11 instances of IDF personnel entering schools in the West Bank – with no reasons given or known. In some of these instances, schools were affected as a result of clashes occurring close to them and tear gas canisters landing inside school grounds. According to a UN respondent, in some instances the IDF entered schools to ‘intimidate’ staff and pupils against stone throwing.

Also in 2011, there were four instances of indiscriminate rockets launched from Gaza resulting in damage to schools in southern Israel. In one specific instance, an anti-tank missile from Gaza hit a school bus and killed a 16-year-old Israeli boy. It is not possible to ascertain if any of these attacks was targeted.

In November 2012, the Israeli military operation Pillar of Defence, in which Israeli forces targeted military installations and training sites, resulted in the damage of more than 290 school buildings in Gaza, including 60 UNRWA school buildings. Rockets launched by Palestinian armed groups during the hostilities damaged six school buildings in seven incidents in southern Israel.

The UN documented 27 additional incidents related to education in the West Bank in 2012. There were 21 instances of ISF personnel entering Palestinian schools. Israeli military personnel conducting security sweeps ahead of Israeli settlers’ night-time religious events entered the Haj Ma’azoz Al Masri Secondary School for Girls in Nablus on six separate occasions. Eleven other times, Israeli forces tried, sometimes successfully, to enter school premises, often during search operations, disrupting classes and sometimes damaging schools. Israeli forces fired tear gas or live ammunition at schools in another four instances in 2012. For instance, on 13 November 2012, Israeli police allegedly fired tear gas inside Aba Secondary Mixed School, causing 29 students to seek medical attention, after violence erupted when interior ministry officials attempted to post demolition orders for illegal building work.

In 2012, Israeli settlers from the Yitzhar settlement threw stones at the Palestinian school in Urif (near Nablus) on four separate occasions. One incident, on 23 April 2012, triggered clashes between Palestinians and Israeli forces and settlers during which teargas was fired, injuring eight Palestinian children.

Demolition and stop-work orders

In 2011 alone, Israeli authorities issued nine schools in Area C of the West Bank with demolition or stop-work orders, bringing the total number of such schools to 38, including several considered at imminent risk, and affecting 4,300 children. Under these orders, schools cannot be rehabilitated to meet minimum humanitarian standards or could be demolished at any time. Such orders can represent a denial of access to education or a threat to deny access. A school in Khirbet Tana, near Nablus, was demolished in 2010 for the sixth time by Israeli forces. In Dkaika village, South Hebron, another was partially demolished in 2011. In 2012, Israeli authorities issued demolition orders against three Palestinian schools in Area C and East Jerusalem for being built
without a permit. On 14 May 2012, Haaretz reported that a Palestinian elementary school was shut down after Israel’s Civil Administration confiscated the vehicle used to transport teachers to it. The school also had a demolition order against it, although the nearest alternative school was 20 kilometres away.

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

In southern Israel, in April 2011, an anti-tank missile fired from the Gaza Strip struck a school bus, killing a 16-year-old boy and injuring the driver. It was not possible to ascertain if it was targeted. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the al-Qassam Brigades, an armed wing of Hamas.

In the West Bank, schoolchildren, teachers and other personnel faced intimidation by Israeli settlers and military forces. Out of 101 communities surveyed by the Education Cluster and the Child Protection Working Group in 2011, 28 experienced settler violence against students and teachers and 26 experienced threats against them. In one case, at Qartaba School in Hebron, there were reports of pupils and staff being harassed or threatened. In October 2011, a guard at the school was allegedly assaulted by a group of settlers after he tried to stop them from throwing glass and empty bottles at the building. In December 2011, according to Ma’an News Agency, settlers allegedly tried to stab a sixth-grade pupil at the school and hit another who tried to defend him, while Israeli soldiers allegedly looked on without intervening. During the incident at a Palestinian school in Urif in April 2012 mentioned earlier in the ‘Attacks on schools’ section, in addition to throwing objects at schools, Israeli settlers physically assaulted children inside schools and on their way to and from school.

One-quarter of Palestinian communities questioned in the 2011 Education Cluster and Child Protection Working Group survey also reported that schoolchildren, youth and teachers experienced Israeli military harassment or violence while en route to and from school, and 31 per cent indicated that students and teachers had to cross at least one military checkpoint to reach their schools, affecting more than 2,500 children each day. Sixteen per cent of children in the communities surveyed claimed to have experienced delays and harassment by military and security personnel while crossing these checkpoints or the separation barrier.

Military use of schools

The UN found evidence of the military use of schools in the West Bank in 2011 and 2012. For example, in March 2011, the Israeli military used a school in the village of Awarta as a detention and interrogation centre after five members of an Israeli family were killed, allegedly by Palestinian youths. In April 2011, Israeli forces broke into a Nablus school and went on the roof to provide security to a nearby area that settlers were visiting at night. According to a UN respondent, in one instance in 2011, the ISF occupied a school and used it as an interrogation centre for two weeks. In 2012, there were two incidents of ISF occupying schools. In one of the incidents, according to the International Middle East Media Centre, Israeli soldiers used a school east of Jenin city as a military post and monitoring tower in November 2012.

Attacks on higher education

Higher education was affected by similar violence. In Gaza, during Operation Cast Lead, 14 of the 15 higher education institutions were damaged, with six directly targeted, according to the Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights in Gaza. Three colleges and six university buildings were fully destroyed. The total damage was estimated at USD 21.1 million. Seven universities in Gaza were also damaged during Israeli airstrikes in November 2012. University students and faculty were injured or arrested by Palestinian and Israeli forces. In one incident, Gazan police entered the campus of Al-Azhar University in Gaza and attacked protesting students, allegedly beating them with clubs. According to media and human rights reports, Israeli security forces arrested 20 university students during the reporting period. For example, Israeli forces reportedly detained a 20-year-old university student from Tulkarem city because of his graduate research project on the construction of a pilotless plane, which they said posed a threat to Israel’s national security. One academic who called for a one-state solution was
detained without charge by the Israeli authorities in 2011 and was still being held two years later. At least nine academics and university staff were reportedly detained by the Palestinian Authority – including eight from An-Najah University accused of being affiliated with Hamas and attempting to start a new university in the West Bank.

Palestinian students and professors experienced restrictions on movement that negatively impacted their educational activities, including a blanket Israeli ban on travel for Gazan students and professors to study or lecture at Palestinian universities in the West Bank. In October 2009, the Palestinian interior ministry and an NGO campaigning for freedom of movement reported that 838 Gazan students who were formally offered places and/or enrolled at foreign universities were unable to leave Gaza because of travel restrictions and bureaucracy. Hamas also barred seven students from travelling to the United States for a year of study under a US programme, citing worries over their supervision.

Attacks on education in 2013
A wide range of types of attack on education continued to be reported in 2013. These included demolition orders against primary and secondary schools in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, settlers stoning schools and students and school buses carrying students, acts of intimidation by settlers, the use of tear gas in and near Palestinian schools by Israeli police, and shootings of students by Israeli soldiers. Arab schools in Israel were reportedly used to stash military weapons and explosives. There were also reports that the Ministry of Education in Gaza was organizing military-style training for school children aged 15-17, with training provided by the Hamas National Guard and militants with Hamas’s armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, and that the Prime Minister was planning to extend it to 12-year-olds.

KENYA

Several students and teachers were killed by militants, tribesmen or troops in sporadic attacks on schools or attacks en route to school.

Context
Kenya experienced post-election inter-ethnic violence between December 2007 and February 2008 following a dispute over presidential results. The conflict was resolved by the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement between the Opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, and President Mwai Kibaki. During the violence eight schools in the former Rift Valley province were set on fire or looted.

Although the formation of the coalition government restored calm, inter-tribal disputes and banditry affected education during the reporting period. There was also growing concern about the activities of Al Shabaab, the armed group based in neighbouring Somalia. Kenya accused Al-Shabaab militants of launching a series of attacks in Kenya in 2011, kidnapping and killing tourists and aid workers. In October that year, Kenya’s military entered Somalia to try to counter the threat from the group, but the incursion led to retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya, sometimes affecting schools and teachers.

Net primary enrolment was 83 per cent and net secondary enrolment was 50 per cent (2009). At tertiary level, gross enrolment was 4 per cent (2009). The adult literacy rate was 87 per cent (2010).

Attacks on schools
On 30 September 2012, one child was killed and three seriously injured after a grenade was thrown into a Nairobi Sunday school class. In June 2010, a five-kilogramme bomb was discovered on the compound of Mwangaza primary school in Isiolo. On 26 May 2012, unidentified assailants threw grenades at Horseed primary school in Dadaab refugee camp, injuring five school construction workers.
Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

On 27 October 2011, a secondary school headmaster and a government official were among at least four killed when gunmen ambushed their vehicle 70 miles from Mandera, near the Somali border. In January 2011, a teacher from Gerille Primary School in Wajir district was killed during an attack, causing teachers to flee and the school to close for two months. The slain teacher, Julius Gitonga, had been at the post for less than a week.

Eight children were killed in a Kilelengwani village classroom on 10 September 2012 during a raid allegedly mounted by members of the Pokomo community, an incident within a long-running dispute between the Pokomo and Orma over pasture.

In November 2012 in Garissa, Kenyan soldiers reportedly entered a school and shot at students while they were waiting to go into an examination, injuring two. The incident occurred as soldiers were searching the area for attackers in the wake of the killing of three soldiers in the town.

In March 2009, it was claimed that four education officials from Wajir South district and a driver on their way to a provincial primary school games tournament in Mandera town were abducted, allegedly by Al-Shabaab militants.

Military use of schools

In September 2012, police sent to curb inter-tribal violence reportedly created a camp inside a school in Dide Waride.

Attacks on higher education

In March 2009, one student was shot dead during demonstrations over the killing of two human rights activists on the University of Nairobi campus, when police employed tear gas and live ammunition. Although Kenyan police said three officers were under investigation, no one had been prosecuted for the killing as of 2013. Kenyan police, however, have regularly fired at protesting students.
Attacks on education in 2013

At least two attacks occurred along the Somali border. In one incident in February, an IED was set off at the Garissa primary school, where a campaign rally for a presidential contender was scheduled to be held the following day. In another incident, a teacher was among six people killed during attacks in Damajaley and Abdisugow villages in May; the Kenya National Union of Teachers subsequently asked teachers to flee border-town schools for their safety in the absence of adequate protection. There were also allegations that extremist groups were recruiting young militants in Kenya, in some cases in schools where students were reportedly being indoctrinated.

A library, an administration building and various offices at Kamwero Primary School were also set alight by bandits raiding villages in parts of Baringo county in early April. At least nine schools in the area were shut down as a result of these raids and more than 2,000 students reportedly dropped out of school.

LIBYA

More than 200 schools were used by armed groups during the 2011 uprising against the Gaddafi regime and more than 1,900 schools were damaged or destroyed

Context

Libya’s conflict began in February 2011 when protests in Benghazi against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime were crushed by security forces firing on the crowd. This led to a rapid escalation between forces loyal to Gaddafi and those seeking political and social change. In March 2011, a NATO coalition intervened with an air campaign following Security Council Resolution 1973 and on 16 September 2011, the UN recognized the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legal representative of Libya. The following month, on 20 October 2011, Gaddafi was captured and subsequently killed by rebels.

In total, more than 1,900 schools were damaged during the 2011 uprising, of which 476 sustained heavy damage and 19 were completely destroyed. It is not known how many of these were intentionally targeted.

Fighting in 2011 caused extensive damage to universities in Misrata, while in June 2011, the Libyan government said NATO bombing in Tripoli had damaged university buildings.

A nationwide school-based survey, reporting conflict-related causes of drop-out, indicated that a total of 338 pupils had been killed, 268 injured and 48 disabled during the war in 2011.

The priorities of the new Ministry of Education during the transition period included curriculum reform, clearing schools of unexploded ordnance and repairing damaged infrastructure.

Gross enrolment rates in Libya were 114 per cent (2006) at primary level, 110 per cent (2006) for secondary and 54 per cent (2003) for tertiary.

The adult literacy rate was 90 per cent (2011).

Attacks on schools

A total of 27 intentional attacks on schools were documented in 2011, affecting more than 14,000 children. Most attacks were reported to have been carried out by the Gaddafi government’s forces and opposition forces led by the NTC, and one attack by NATO forces was documented.

In 2011, 89 schools reported unexploded ordnance on their premises, affecting 17,800 students. This problem continued into 2012.

Schools were used as polling stations during elections to Libya’s General National Congress in July 2012, which may be the reason that some were attacked by armed militias.

The Ministry of Education reported attacks on at least five schools that were being used as polling stations during the elections in July 2012. For instance, on 6 July 2012, a polling station in a school compound in Benghazi was attacked by small arms fire and improvised explosives.

Military use of schools

According to a UN respondent, 221 schools were used by armed groups during 2011, with a further 35 used by the government or local administration.
respondent said both pro-Gaddafi forces and forces aligned with the NTC used schools as military bases, thus making them a target for attack. At least one school in Misrata, Al-Wahda High School, was used to detain hundreds of prisoners and remained a detention facility as of 2013. During the revolution, there was a pattern whereby rebels, when they liberated areas, used schools as detention centres to hold prisoners. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) reported that Gaddafi forces had also used an elementary school in Tomina as a detention site where women and girls were raped.

Attacks on higher education
In October 2011, forces of Libya’s interim government seized control of two strategic areas in the city of Sirte, at the university and at a huge construction site that was meant to be its new campus.

Attacks on education in 2013
There were isolated reports of explosive devices being placed inside or near schools and fears that girls
were being abducted by armed men. On 28 September 2013, it was reported that four girls had been abducted from outside schools in Tripoli, with at least one incident involving armed men. Government officials strongly denied a claim that up to 47 girls had been taken in less than a week. Nonetheless, teachers staged a sit-in to demand increased security outside schools.

MALI

Some 130 schools were looted, destroyed or used by armed groups and government forces during fighting in the north of the country, notably in 2012 and early 2013. The conflict caused widespread disruption of education.

Context

Conflict erupted in northern Mali in early 2012 when Tuareg insurgents began pushing for autonomy. A military coup in March undermined the government’s response to the conflict, leading to considerable political instability, and by April the armed groups had consolidated control over the northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

The Tuaregs drove the Malian army out of the north in April 2012, formed an alliance with armed Islamist groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa – and declared the area to be an Islamic state. Ansar Dine began imposing strict Sharia law and the armed Islamist groups soon turned on their Tuareg allies, taking control of most of northern Mali’s cities. In January 2013, after the armed Islamist launched an offensive southward, the Malian government asked France for assistance in driving back the armed groups. Within several months, the joint efforts of the French, Malians and other African troops had largely cleared the Islamists from their strongholds.

The armed conflict in the north caused hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee, including most teachers and school administrators, and temporarily reversed gains in education access and quality. In February 2013, 86 per cent of pupils remaining in the north were still without education. By October 2013, tens of thousands of civilians had returned to the northern regions but the conflict, large-scale displacement and the accompanying disruption of schooling adversely affected education for hundreds of thousands of children.

In 2011, net primary enrolment was 71 per cent, net secondary enrolment was 34 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment was 7 per cent. Approximately 31 per cent of adults were literate.

Attacks on schools

The Education Cluster reported in March 2013 that 130 schools had been occupied, looted or destroyed. Schools throughout the north were damaged while being pillaged, primarily by the Tuareg insurgents, but also, to a lesser extent, by armed Islamist groups and local populations. Landmines and unexploded ordnance located in and around schools in conflict-affected communities also placed thousands of children at risk and, in at least one case, damaged a school in Bourem in 2012.

Military use of schools

In August 2012, NGOs reported that armed groups were using 21 schools. According to the UN, in September 2012, military troops and pro-government militia, notably the ‘Ganda-koi’, were using at least 14 schools in the region of Mopti, affecting 4,886 students.

Human Rights Watch identified 18 places, including private, public and Koranic schools, where armed Islamist groups were reportedly training new recruits, including children as young as 11. For example, one witness described seeing some 20 children both studying the Koran and receiving weapons’ training at a Koranic school in a northern town in July 2012.

Attacks on education in 2013

During the first part of 2013, French aerial bombardment was reported to have damaged several schools reportedly being used by armed groups including one in Bourem, one in Douentza, one in Timbuktu town and at least one other in Diabaly. In early January, a schoolyard shared by a primary school and a secondary school in Konna was occupied by Malian Armed Forces as they prepared for combat, closing the schools for nearly a month. Landmines
and unexploded ordnance located in and around schools continued to place students and teachers at risk. 1060

MEXICO

Teachers in more than 75 schools were threatened, more than 50 students, teachers, academics and education officials were killed, or abducted with their whereabouts unknown, and nanotechnology researchers were targeted with bombs in 2009-2012

Context

Attacks on teachers, academics and students took place in the context of high levels of general violence, including the abduction without trace of large numbers of children and adults. 1061 Heavily armed criminal groups fought over territory and control of the drug trade – the main source of heroin and cocaine entering the United States – and against security forces trying to dismantle them. 1062 The drug cartels, which have thousands of armed men, have increasingly diversified their operations, turning to other illicit trades such as kidnappings and extortion. The federal government began intensive security operations against them in 2006, backed by 96,000 troops. 1063 In the course of counternarcotics operations, security forces have committed widespread human rights violations, including killings, torture and forced disappearances. 1064 According to the government, more than 70,000 people were killed in drug-related violence from December 2006 to December 2012, and more than 26,000 more were victims of disappearances or otherwise went missing. 1065

Teachers were among a long list of targets, reportedly because of their regular salary. 1066 Parents and children were attacked at schools and police were targeted while trying to protect educational establishments. In many cases, there was insufficient evidence to establish who was responsible for the attacks because few crimes were properly investigated by the authorities.

In primary education, net enrolment was 96 per cent in 2011 and in secondary education it was 67 per cent; gross enrolment at tertiary level was 28 per cent. Adult literacy was 93 per cent in 2009. 1067

Attacks on schools

During 2009-2012, there was evidence of three direct attacks on school buildings plus other direct and indirect threats.

In early December 2010, for example, gunmen set fire to a kindergarten in Ciudad Juárez on the northern border because teachers refused to pay extortion fees, 1068 and in September 2011, threats of grenade attacks on schools in Santiago, in the north-eastern state of Nuevo León, caused panic among parents. 1069

Additionally, in July 2012, a kindergarten and a primary school were destroyed in Turicato, Michoacán state, by a Catholic sect called the Followers of the Virgin of the Rosary. Members used sledgehammers and pick-axes to destroy six classrooms, six bathrooms, furniture and computers and then burned down the buildings after a leader claimed she had received an order from the Virgin Mary to destroy them. The sect, whose rules prohibit formal schooling, refused to accept the secular government curriculum, especially on science and sexuality, or government uniforms, preferring robes and a headscarf. 1070

In 2009 and 2010, there were numerous gun battles in the vicinity of schools, in some cases resulting in the deaths of students, teachers or parents. In Reynosa, in 2009, 20 teachers reportedly struggled to keep up to a thousand students lying on the floor with their heads down while, for over two hours, grenades exploded and classroom walls were peppered with bullets around them. 1071 On 30 August 2010, a shootout between gunmen and marines in Tampico, Tamaulipas state, as students were leaving school, left two children dead and two adults wounded. 1072

Attacks on students, teachers and other education personnel

At least 14 school students, 1073 12 school teachers 1074 and two education officials 1075 were killed in 2009-2012. One teacher who was a leading teacher trade unionist was abducted and his whereabouts remain unknown. 1076 Several school students were also abducted. 1077

The threat of violence related to criminal groups

Armed criminal groups in many cases demanded that teachers pay them a proportion of their salary or face...
A girl walks amid the rubble of what is left of a primary school, destroyed by members of the religious sect ‘The Followers of the Virgin of the Rosary’, Turicato, Michoacán state, Mexico, 18 July 2012.

© 2012 YURI CORTEZ/AFP/Getty Images
kidnapping or other violence. But there were also killings of students and teachers by gunmen whose affiliation and motive were unexplained.

In Ciudad Juárez, in November 2010, there were both threats against individual teachers and threats posted on school walls warning that students would be kidnapped if teachers failed to hand over money to the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{1078} One vice-principal of a primary school said criminals “wrote graffiti on the school’s walls saying: “If you don’t pay up a massacre will happen”.”\textsuperscript{1079} In December 2010, the Chihuahua state senate called on the Governor and President to adopt a security plan to protect educational institutions in Ciudad Juárez from extortion.\textsuperscript{1080}

On 30 August 2011, at least 80 primary schools in Acapulco, in the south-western state of Guerrero, closed when up to 400 teachers went on strike in protest against threats of extortion and kidnapping.\textsuperscript{1081} One week later, it was reported that this figure had increased to 300 schools, affecting 30,000 students in the area.\textsuperscript{1082} The trigger for the strike was reportedly a blanket demand issued to primary schools ordering teachers to give up 50 per cent of their pay before 1 October and part of their Christmas bonus, or face the consequences. The threat was reportedly made by phone, leaflets dropped off at schools and banners posted outside them.\textsuperscript{1083} One teacher, also referred to as the ‘paymaster’ for teachers in a specific area, received a letter requesting details of teaching staff earning more than 8,000 pesos bi-weekly, with those earning over 20,000 pesos underlined, among all those working in a specific area of the Acapulco education system. The letter also demanded the teachers’ names, addresses and cell phone numbers, their voter registration cards and the names and addresses of their schools, plus the names of anyone who declined to divulge information.\textsuperscript{1084} According to the online newspaper Examiner.com, the threat was confirmed by an official in Guerrero’s Department of Education for the region of Acapulco-Coyuca de Benítez, and it was believed that a violent criminal group known as La Barredora had sent the message.\textsuperscript{1085}

Acapulco officials argued that teachers were over-reacting.\textsuperscript{1086} However, the payroll officer at La Patria es
Primero primary school, Acapulco, who was told to hand over information about teachers’ salaries, fled the city. Teachers demanded that military personnel be stationed outside schools. The threats were made amid a climate of pervasive violence. Three weeks earlier, gunmen reportedly broke into a school and snatched a student whose body was later found in La Sabana. At the start of term, teachers in at least 75 Acapulco schools received threats, according to a CNN report. In September 2011, police found a sack of five decomposed men’s heads dumped outside a primary school in Acapulco along with threatening messages. Also in September, it was reported that in a three-month period 43 teachers had been ‘express kidnapped’, meaning they were held for a limited period but released after a payment was made.

In Acapulco, 12 schools reportedly did not reopen after the Christmas break due to the continuing demand that teachers hand over half their salaries and all of their bonuses. On 2 January 2012, the body of one murdered Acapulco teacher, Maria Viruel Andraca, 51, was left in the boot of a taxi on the Acapulco-Mexico highway with a note reportedly left by a criminal group, sparking new protests by teachers on the need for security measures to be implemented.

Elsewhere, gunmen attacked parents waiting for their children outside a Ciudad Juárez elementary school on 25 August 2011, wounding one man and four women.

Police officers assigned to protect schools and students were also killed. On 24 February 2010, a police officer, PC Marco Antonio Olague, was shot dead in front of dozens of pupils as they were going into a primary school in Chihuahua city, although the reason was unclear. Separately, on 12 September 2010, three police officers deployed to provide security at schools and campuses were shot dead while parked at a primary school in Ciudad Juárez while waiting for a colleague who had gone inside. Gunmen using AK-47 rifles sprayed the patrol vehicle with bullets. When crime investigators arrived, the gunmen reportedly returned and opened fire again.

Two teachers who were trade union members were killed and one teacher who was a leading teacher trade unionist was abducted, and his whereabouts remain unknown, in incidents which appeared to be linked to intra-trade union rivalries over the control of education in Oaxaca state as part of the wider struggle between those for and against more autonomy for the indigenous population.

Attacks on higher education

Attacks on higher education included kidnappings and murder of students and academics by gunmen; bombings aimed at nanotechnology researchers and facilities; and violence by police or security forces against students.

Killings and kidnappings of students and staff

A compilation of media reports suggests that seven academics or university personnel were murdered, four were injured and six were threatened; in addition, at least 15 higher education students were killed, one was tortured and one was injured. Some kidnappings ended in the victims being killed. In some cases, it could not be verified whether the crime was linked to the victim’s education role or place of education. According to the Justice in Mexico Project, the level of violence reportedly caused some professors at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, where three professors were killed in a year, to leave their positions.

At least seven higher education students were kidnapped. In one incident on 5 March 2012, three technical school students and one high school student, aged between 13 and 21, were abducted from their schools by heavily armed men and killed in Cuernavaca, Morelos, in central Mexico. Their dismembered bodies were found in plastic bags together with a message from a drug cartel.

Anti-nanotechnology bombings

In 2011, according to a compilation of media reports, six university campuses or research institutes were targeted with bombings and one researcher was separately assassinated in violence allegedly directed at staff involved in nanotechnology research. A group called ‘Individuals Tending towards Savagery’ (ITS or ‘Individuales tendiendo a lo salvaje’ in Spanish) reportedly claimed responsibility for seven bombings and the assassination.
For instance, on 8 August 2011, two professors at the Monterrey Institute of Technology were wounded when a package containing a tube of dynamite in a 20 centimetre-long pipe exploded. ITS, which was also linked to attacks against nanotechnology in France and Spain, claimed responsibility and named five other researchers at Monterrey Tech as targets. The group was reportedly motivated by a fear that development of nanotechnology could lead to nanoparticles reproducing uncontrollably and threatening life on Earth.

According to Nature magazine, ITS also claimed responsibility for two bomb attacks against the head of engineering and nanotechnology at the Polytechnic University of the Valley of Mexico in Tultitlán in April and May 2011, the first of which wounded a security guard. In May 2011, ITS issued a general threat to professors and students warning them about any suspicious packages on campus: ‘because one of these days we are going to make them pay for everything they want to do to the earth’.

After the Monterrey bombing, the group reportedly listed five more researchers it was targeting at the Institute and six other universities. The group also claimed responsibility for the killing of Emeesto Mendéz Salinas, a researcher at the Biotechnology Institute of the National Autonomous University of Mexico in November 2011.

Human rights violations by police and security forces

One university student was wounded when police fired warning shots at a student demonstration against violence and the militarization of responses to violence, in front of the Ciudad Juárez Autonomous University Institute for Biomedical Sciences on 29 October 2010.

In another incident, on 12 December 2011, police fired live ammunition while dispersing around 300 or more student teachers blocking the motorway outside Chilpancingo. They were demanding better resources for rural education. The police killed two protesters and injured three others. One of the protesters was detained and tortured.

On 19 March 2010, military personnel killed two students as they left the campus at Monterrey Institute for Technology, planted firearms on their bodies and falsely claimed they were "hit men".

Attacks on education in 2013

At least six teachers were killed in 2013 for reasons that were never established. For example, on 10 September in Acapulco, it was reported that teacher José Omar Ramírez Castro had been shot and killed less than 10 metres from his school as he went to give his class, sparking a strike by 144 teachers over insecurity and disrupting the education of over 10,000 students. Threats of kidnap and extortion against teachers also continued, with, for example, one school in the state of Morelos responding by moving teachers from one school to another to reduce the possible targeting of specific teachers. Police were alleged to have used excessive force and illegally detained protesters when they used electric batons to disperse 300 teachers and students demonstrating against education reforms in Veracruz in September. In higher education, attacks against nanotechnology researchers persisted.

MYANMAR

Schools were attacked by the armed forces of the state in ethnic conflicts, and students and teachers were targeted during an upsurge of sectarian violence between Buddhists and Muslims in 2013

Context

Since 1948 when British colonial rule ended, armed ethnic groups have sought greater autonomy. The democratic elections in 2010 led to ceasefires with several groups since 2011 and with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in 2013. However, threats to education persist as ethnic and religious violence between Buddhists and Muslims, the descendants of Indian Muslims who arrived under British rule, has continued to erupt periodically.

Gross primary enrolment was 126 per cent and net secondary enrolment was 51 per cent (2010). Gross tertiary enrolment was 14 per cent and adult literacy was estimated at 93 per cent (2011).
Attacks on schools

Schools have been damaged during fighting in eastern and northern Myanmar. In Kayin state, prior to the January 2012 ceasefire with the Karen National Liberation Army, the Myanmar army destroyed schools as well as other properties when they shelled entire villages. For instance, in early February 2010, 200 soldiers attacked K'Dee Mu Der village and destroyed 15 Karen homes, a middle school and a nursery school; in the same month, a high school and nursery school in Thi Baw Tha Kwee Lah village tract were destroyed by Myanmar light infantry battalions; and on 23 July 2010, government forces shelled and then set alight 50 Karen homes, a school and a church in Tha Dah Der, a predominantly Christian village in northern Kayin state. In Kachin state, several schools were hit by artillery, although the intention was unclear. In August 2011, it was reported that Myanmar military had laid mines close to a school in Myitkyina township to prevent the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) from using it.

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

Children have also been killed and injured in attacks. On 19 February 2010, Myanmar Army soldiers in northern Kayin state allegedly killed a 15-year-old student and injured two others when they fired a mortar into a camp for internally displaced persons, hitting a school during examinations. The Karen Human Rights Group claimed the attack was deliberate. In Kachin state, between June 2011 and January 2013, at least two schools were targeted. Five children and one teacher were seriously injured when the Myanmar Army fired on their school in Mansi township in August 2011. On 13 November 2011, 11 young students were killed and 27 injured in a drive-by motorcycle bomb attack on a boarding school in the state capital, Myitkyina.

Military use of schools

Myanmar soldiers have occupied educational premises and forced teachers and students to work for them, according to the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict. In May 2011, for example, the army reportedly used village schools as barracks for two weeks, causing some students not to return.

Attacks on higher education

On 21 May 2010, a prominent imprisoned Burmese student, Kyaw Ko Ko, was sentenced to an additional five years for ‘illegal association and subversion’ because of a speech he had given to students in front of Rangoon City Hall in 2007. Kyaw Ko Ko, who has since been released and is acting as chairperson of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, was originally arrested for ‘possessing politically sensitive videos’ and ‘trying to reorganize the students’ union’.

Attacks on education in 2013

Education in Myanmar faced a new and violent threat from Buddhist nationalists in 2013 as schools and students were attacked in outbursts of sectarian violence. On 17 February, it was reported that around 300 Buddhists had attacked an Islamic religious school in Thar-Kay-Ta township, Rangoon, and later another Muslim school was burnt down in Lashio. During 20 to 21 March, while armed security forces allegedly stood by, a mob of more than 200 Buddhists torched an Islamic school in Meiktila and killed 32 Muslim students and four teachers; many of them were clubbed, drenched in petrol and burned alive, and one was decapitated, after trying to evade the attackers by hiding in bushes nearby. Seven Buddhists were later jailed in connection with the school massacre.

One month later, in July, it was reported that 15 students had been refused permission to attend university in person because they had been absent through imprisonment for fighting for democracy. They were allowed only to resume their studies via distance-learning courses.
NIGERIA

A large number of schools were targeted – many of them bombed, set on fire or attacked by militants in the north – and increasingly militants turned their attention to students and teachers. Dozens of school teachers were murdered, and at universities there were very heavy casualties in attacks by gunmen firing indiscriminately and in some cases also using bombs.

Context

After Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, it suffered ongoing inter-communal, political and sectarian violence which had claimed the lives of more than 15,700 people by 2011. The unrest, which continued into 2013, was seen by observers as being underpinned by endemic corruption, poverty, poor governance, unchecked violence by the security services and discrimination against ethnic minorities.

Misuse of public funds was seen as having a devastating impact on education quality and on attempts to widen access to education. Considerable disparities in access and quality existed among Nigeria’s states, with education levels generally lower in the north. There remained an enduring distrust of Western education dating back to British colonial rule when missionary schools were largely kept out of the north and the few that did operate there were seen as vehicles for converting Muslim youths to Christianity.

From 2009 onwards, violence spiralled across northern and central Nigeria. Boko Haram, a militant Islamist group whose commonly used name means ‘western education is a sin’ in Hausa, sought to impose a strict form of Sharia, or Islamic law, in the north and end government corruption. It launched hundreds of attacks against police officers, Christians and Muslims whom it perceived as opponents.

Attacks on education between 2009 and early 2011 most often involved kidnappings of students or staff for ransom in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, apart from a spate of attacks on schools during an uprising by Boko Haram in July 2009. However, in 2011 and 2012, the targeting of education, particularly schools and universities, escalated, with increasing reports of killings by Boko Haram, and reprisals against Islamic schools and suspected Boko Haram supporters. Schools, universities, students and personnel also came under attack during fighting between Christians and Muslims.

Net enrolment in primary school was 58 per cent (2010), gross secondary enrolment was 44 per cent (2010) and gross tertiary enrolment was 10 per cent (2005). The adult literacy rate was 61 per cent (2010).

Attacks on schools

During an offensive by Boko Haram militants in July 2009 in Maiduguri, Borno state, a number of schools were targeted, although the reported number varies greatly. According to the Sunday Trust newspaper, which provided the only detailed report, 57 schools were destroyed and that number was confirmed by the chairman of the state Universal Basic Education Board. Some of the schools were named: Lamisula School was destroyed, and at Damgari Yerwa Primary School, two blocks of six classrooms were burned down. Classroom blocks at Abbaganaram Primary School, Low Cost Primary School and Goni Damgari Primary School were also targeted. The same newspaper reported that, a year later, only a few of the schools had been rehabilitated and none fully, and students were studying in temporary sheds. However, most media sources reported only one school destroyed in July 2009, the Goodness Mercy primary school, also in Maiduguri, which was reduced to rubble.

No attacks were reported in 2010 and only isolated attacks in 2011. In Jos, in July 2011, a rocket was fired at a co-educational Muslim-owned school during student examinations, though responsibility for the attack was unconfirmed. The city has a long history of violence between Christian and Muslim communities.

On 27 December 2011, in an apparent reprisal attack following a series of church bombings by Boko Haram, a homemade bomb was thrown into the window of an Arabic school in Delta state while a class was in session, wounding seven people – six of them children under the age of nine.
Then, in January 2012, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was reported to have issued a chilling threat via an internet audio message stating: ‘You have primary schools as well, you have secondary schools and universities and we will start bombing them…. That is what we will do.’ This caused fear among parents, many of whom were reported to have stopped sending their children to school.\textsuperscript{1162} From January to March 2012, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the damage and destruction of 12 schools in and around Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, citing retribution for state security force attacks on a Tsangaya (Koranic) school and the arrest of Koranic students in January 2012.\textsuperscript{1163} At least 5,000 children were unable to attend classes as a result,\textsuperscript{1164} in a state with one of the country’s lowest primary school attendance rates.\textsuperscript{1165} The methods of attack varied and included burning buildings and using explosives. All of the attacks occurred at night or in the early morning when schools were vacant, and in several cases, watchmen were tied up or held at gunpoint to prevent their intervention. The schools targeted were either non-denominational or provided both Western and Islamic education.\textsuperscript{1166}

In May 2012, suspected Boko Haram militants used explosives and gunfire to attack two primary schools in the northern city of Kano.\textsuperscript{1167} From September to November 2012, according to media sources, at least a dozen more primary and secondary schools in Maiduguri, Damaturu, Zaria, Barkin Ladi, Potiskum and Fika were set on fire or damaged by explosives, including in attacks by Boko Haram, but also during fighting between Boko Haram and state security forces, or in clashes between Muslims and Christians.\textsuperscript{1168}

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

Prior to 2011, and in contrast with attacks on schools, most attacks on school students, teachers and personnel involved kidnapping for ransom and appeared to be carried out for criminal rather than political objectives. For example, in Abia state, in the south-east, a school bus carrying 15 nursery and primary school students to the Abayi International School was hijacked in September 2010.\textsuperscript{1169} Similarly, a head teacher at a primary school funded by ExxonMobil in Eket, also in the south-east, was abducted in October 2010.\textsuperscript{1170} Some shootings also occurred in the north, including at a military-run secondary school near Kano in December 2011, which left four air force personnel dead and two injured, but the perpetrators and motives were unknown.\textsuperscript{1171} Similarly, another shooting resulted in the death of the principal of the Government Day Secondary School in Potiskum, Yobe state, in October 2012. According to a witness, when he discovered the principal’s occupation, one of the gunmen said: “You are the type of people we are looking for.”\textsuperscript{1172}

In addition, one incident appeared to be linked to Boko Haram: the killing of Sheik Bashir Mustapha, a prominent Muslim cleric critical of Boko Haram, and one of his students, while he was teaching in his home in October 2010.\textsuperscript{1173}

**Attacks on higher education**

**Attacks on university campuses**

Boko Haram was believed to be responsible for a series of threats to, and bombings of, universities in 2011-2012. In July 2011, during a spate of Boko Haram attacks in Maiduguri, officials shut the campus of Maiduguri University after receiving an anonymous letter warning that the student senate and examination and records buildings would be burned down.\textsuperscript{1174} Hours later, two lecturers were reportedly killed during clashes that took place between Boko Haram and military forces near the campus.\textsuperscript{1175} In September 2011, at least 15 universities reportedly received an email message from Boko Haram, warning them that their campuses were on a target list for bombings.\textsuperscript{1176} Boko Haram also claimed responsibility for bomb attacks on universities in Kano and Gombe in late April 2012.\textsuperscript{1177} The attack in Kano took place at Bayero University, where around 20 people were killed by explosives and gunfire while worshipping at two Christian church services on campus, one held indoors and the other outdoors.\textsuperscript{1178}

**Attacks on higher education students, teachers and personnel**
At least 25 people, most of them students, were killed when unknown gunmen burst into a university residence in the north-eastern town of Mubi, in Adamawa state, on the night of 1 October 2012, and shot victims or slit their throats. Earlier, a demand to evacuate the university, widely believed to have been written by Boko Haram, had been posted on a women’s student hostel.

In addition to students, university staff members were also been targeted for attack, mainly in the south. Seven were kidnapped from the Federal College of Education, Rivers state, between January and October 2012, and one of them died, allegedly from torture. Kidnap victims included two lecturers and two professors, the Provost of the College of Health Sciences at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, the Vice-Chancellor of Enugu State University of Technology and the Delta State Commissioner for Higher Education. In the north, one lecturer from the University of Maiduguri was also shot and killed, reportedly by Boko Haram.

Violence also occurred due to sectarian clashes. During post-election violence in April 2011, on the outskirts of Zaria in northern Kaduna state, a mob of youths supporting former military leader Mohammadu Buhari, who backed the imposition of sharia law in the north, cornered four Christian students and a Christian lecturer in the staff quarters of the campus of Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic and beat them to death with sticks, clubs and machetes.

**Attacks on education in 2013**

Schools, universities, students and teachers were attacked during January to September in northern Nigeria. A majority of these incidents were suspected to be the work of Boko Haram, which claimed responsibility in several cases. According to Amnesty International, more than 50 schools were attacked and partially destroyed or burned down in 2013, most of them in Borno state and a few in neighbouring Yobe state. In the Borno state capital, Maiduguri, an official reported to Amnesty that at least five government secondary schools and nine private schools were burned down between January and April. According to one Borno State Ministry of Education official, some 15,000 children in the state stopped attending classes between February and May as a result of attacks.

While most previous attacks on schools had targeted infrastructure and were carried out at night when schools were empty, there appeared to be a marked change in tactics with reports of teachers and school students increasingly targeted. In March, at least three teachers were killed and three students seriously injured in a simultaneous attack on four schools in Maiduguri. In June, two secondary schools were targeted in Yobe and Borno states: seven students and two teachers were killed when suspected Boko Haram militants attacked their school in Damaturu; and the following day, gunmen attacked a school in Maiduguri while students were sitting their examinations, killing nine students.

In one incident in July, gunmen attacked a government secondary boarding school in Mamudo, Yobe state, at night, while students were sleeping. Sections of the school and dormitory were set ablaze, and a number of students were shot as they tried to escape. At least 22 students and one teacher were killed.

School teachers appeared to be targeted specifically, with some 30 reported to have been shot dead, sometimes during class, from January to September. A number of teachers also said they had been intimidated by Boko Haram elements or subjected to close surveillance by the group in remote towns in Borno state. In a video statement made in July 2013, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau threatened teachers, saying: ‘School teachers who are teaching Western education? We will kill them! We will kill them!’; he also endorsed recent school attacks and claimed that non-Islamic schools should be burned down.

One major attack also occurred on a college in Yobe state in September. Unknown gunmen suspected to be affiliated with Boko Haram entered the campus of the Yobe State College of Agriculture in the middle of the night and began firing on students in their dormitories as they slept. While casualty figures varied, reports suggested that as many as 50 students were killed. The gunmen also reportedly set fire to classrooms. Some 1,000 students were said to have left the campus in the wake of the attack.
Several other incidents involving higher education were reported. Students alleged that the police used tear gas and fired live ammunition to break up a protest against university transport prices at the University of Uyo in June, killing a student; police, however, denied this claim, saying that the students had brought the body to them outside the campus, which they were prohibited from entering. University equipment was reportedly destroyed in anger after the killing and 45 students were arrested, of whom 44 were charged with arson and murder.1200

In another incident, on 13 February, local police detained between 10 and 12 lecturers at Rivers State University of Science and Technology for holding a meeting of the local chapter of the Academic Staff Union of Universities on campus. They were held for five hours before being released.1201

PAKISTAN

There were an estimated 838 or more attacks on schools in Pakistan during 2009-2012, more than in any other country, leaving hundreds of schools destroyed; militants recruited children from schools and madrassas, some to be suicide bombers. There were also targeted killings of teachers and academics.

Context
The extremely high number of schools attacked in Pakistan during 2009-2012 was the result of multiple sources of tension but, in particular, the Pakistan Taliban insurgency in the north-west.

In addition to the unresolved conflict with India over Kashmir, a series of conflicts, internal disturbances and sectarian tensions have plagued Pakistan in recent years. Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have periodically launched attacks against one another, frequently causing high numbers of casualties. In Balochistan, armed nationalist groups not only fought the federal government but also killed non-Balochs. The Pakistani military fought repeated offensives against Taliban militant strongholds in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan throughout the period from 2009 to 2012.1202 They also regained control of the Swat Valley and surrounding districts from the Pakistani Taliban. Moreover, militants carried out attacks well beyond their strongholds, infiltrating all major cities. The southern port city of Karachi was periodically brought to a standstill by political and sectarian shootings and bomb attacks as well as violence by armed criminal gangs.1203

In the two years preceding the reporting period, several hundred schools were damaged or destroyed, mostly burned down by militants, as they sought to gain control of areas of the north-west, including in Waziristan and Swat. When the Pakistan Taliban did gain control of Swat Valley, they first banned girls’ education and banned women from teaching, through an edict in December 2008, and later amended their edict to permit the education of girls, but only up to grade 4.1204

Many children are unable to access education for reasons that range from cost to community attitudes towards education, attacks on school structures or the long distance to the nearest school. Many who enrol may not complete a full course of study and, for those who do, other problems, such as teacher absenteeism and poor facilities, impinge adversely on the quality of their education. The nature of the curriculum and the parallel existence of a private, public, and madrassa school system are seen by some as contributing to social divisions.1205 Boys from urban areas attend school for 10 years if they come from the country’s richest 20 per cent; poor rural girls, on the other hand, receive an average of just one year of education.1206

In primary education, net enrolment was 72 per cent; in secondary education, it was 35 per cent and gross enrolment in tertiary education was 8 per cent (2011). Adult literacy was 55 per cent (2009).1207

Attacks on schools
In areas affected by Taliban militancy, hundreds of schools were blown up and proponents of female education were killed. A conservative estimate puts the total number of militant attacks on schools during 2009-2012 at between 838 and 919.1208 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported 505 schools damaged or destroyed in 2009 alone.1209

There was a strong trend for schools to be blown up at night in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the
Typically, perpetrators set off small, improvised devices remotely or with timers, rarely causing casualties. The schools were mostly government-run but private schools catering to higher socio-economic groups were also affected. Madrassas were not targeted. Pakistani Taliban groups sometimes claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Daytime attacks on schools included bombings and grenade and gun attacks; one school was shelled with mortars two years in a row.

The bombing of schools was an alarmingly efficient campaign for which few of the perpetrators have been held to account despite hundreds of schools being destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of children were deprived of education as a result.

Whether the intention was to target school buildings as symbols of government authority, because of their use as army bases or because of the education imparted in them, or for all of these reasons, is not documented. However, the Pakistan Taliban’s record in Swat demonstrated that preventing girls’ education was one of their objectives.

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

Attacks on school students

Human rights and media reports suggest that at least 30 children were killed in attacks on schools and school transport from 2009 to 2012 and more than 97 were injured. At least 138 school students and staff were reported to have been kidnapped, of whom 122 were abducted in a single incident when armed Taliban militants seized control of a convoy of 28 school buses transporting secondary school students and teachers in North Waziristan, bordering Afghanistan, and tried to take them to South Waziristan. However, 71 of the students and nine teachers were freed in a military operation. Forty-two students and teachers remained in custody. Initially, the militants tried to kidnap 300 students and 30 teachers but more than half were able to escape. The Taliban reportedly used kidnapping to fund their operations and buy weapons.

At the start of 2009, Taliban militants were in control of the Swat Valley in the North West Frontier province (later renamed Khyber Pukhtunkhwa), enforcing their hard-line interpretation of Sharia law and conducting a violent campaign against female education. In January 2009, they banned girls’ schooling outright, forcing 900 schools to close or stop enrolment for female pupils. Some 120,000 girls and 8,000 female teachers stopped attending school in Swat district. Over the following months, the Pakistani military regained control of the area but many schoolgirls and female teachers were too scared to return to school. Some children remained afraid to return to school and some teachers continued to be fearful of returning to work nearly a year after the military ousted the Taliban.

On 9 October 2012, Malala Yousafzai was shot, along with two other students, Shazia Ramzan and Kainat Riaz, on their school bus by a gunman who escaped from the scene. The gunman asked for Malala by name before shooting her in the face and neck and then turning his gun on the two girls on either side of her. Malala required life-saving surgery. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, claimed responsibility, saying that the 15 year-old was attacked for promoting values he said were secular and anti-Taliban. Malala had written an anonymous blog for the BBC about life as a schoolgirl under the Taliban. She then campaigned publicly for girls’ education after the military ousted the TTP from the Swat Valley. Malala survived and went on to campaign internationally on the same issue, and was invited to address youth representatives at the UN General Assembly in New York in July 2013.

Across Pakistan, there were at least five school bus attacks. In one attack in September 2011, Taliban militants fired a rocket at a school bus transporting students home from Khyber Model School near Peshawar. When the rocket missed they opened fire with guns on one side of the vehicle. A pupil aged 15 said he managed to help some younger pupils off the bus under gunfire, only to encounter another volley of bullets opening up from the second side. He was one of 12 injured children. Four students and the driver died. Most of the other bus attacks were bombings, including one on a bus carrying disabled schoolchildren in Peshawar in May 2009.
Attacks on school teachers and other education personnel

A compilation of media and human rights reports suggests that at least 15 school teachers were killed in 2009-2012 and at least eight were injured, of whom four were female victims of acid attacks. At least four education personnel, comprising one provincial education minister, two school bus drivers and a security guard, were killed and two more were injured. Many of the attacks, particularly against women, appeared to be motivated by the militant stance against female education and against women working outside the home. But in most cases, the motive was not confirmed.

Other attacks took place in the context of civil conflict in Balochistan. Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan documented a campaign of targeted killings of teachers and other education personnel considered to be ethnically non-Baloch, or who appeared to support the federal government, for example, by flying a Pakistani flag at school, teaching Pakistani history or asking children to sing the national anthem. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF) most commonly claimed responsibility for the attacks. Most of these teachers were from Punjab province. According to Human Rights Watch, teachers, especially ethnic Punjabis, are seen as symbols of the Pakistani state and of perceived military oppression in Balochistan. The human rights organization reported that at least 22 teachers and other education personnel were killed in targeted attacks in Balochistan between January 2008 and October 2010, including Shafiq Ahmed, the provincial minister for education, who was assassinated by the BLUF in October 2009 outside his home.

In one incident, Anwar Baig, a teacher at the Model High School, Kalat, was shot nine times en route to school by gunmen on motorbikes. The BLA claimed responsibility for his death. On 24 July 2012, Abrar Ahmed, the deputy director of schools in Balochistan, was severely injured but survived an attack on his car in Quetta.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented allegations of Pakistani intelligence and security forces arbitrarily detaining or enforcing the disappearance of students and teachers it suspected of involvement in armed Baloch nationalist activities, including the Baloch Student Organisation-Azad.

Fear among those who fit the armed nationalist groups’ target profile led to lower teacher recruitment, more transfer requests and lower attendance. In addition, Human Rights Watch cited a senior government official who estimated that government schools in Balochistan were only open for 120 working days in 2009 compared to an average of 220 days for the rest of the country.

Teachers opposed to the Pakistani Taliban or its ideology or methods were also targeted, particularly in the north-west. For example, on 22 January 2009, Taliban militants killed a teacher at a private school in Matta, Swat Valley, because he had refused to follow the dress code. On 12 June 2009, the head teacher of a religious school in Lahore was killed in his office within the religious school complex during a suicide bomb attack. He appeared to have been targeted for his outspoken view that suicide bombings and other Taliban tactics were un-Islamic.

Accusations of blasphemy adversely affected teachers as well as students. A Lahore teacher was threatened and went into hiding after omitting a section of a religious text she was copying by hand and erroneously juxtaposing a line about the Prophet Mohammad and one about street beggars. A 200-strong mob stormed the Farooqi Girls’ High School where she taught, accused her of blasphemy, vandalized the school and set fire to the property. The 77-year-old head teacher of the school where she taught was arrested despite not having seen the text until after the accusations of blasphemy emerged.

Attacks on education aid workers

Pakistani and foreign organizations promoting education were unable to operate freely in many areas of the country due to the threat of militant violence, notably in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP).

Six education aid workers were killed from 2009-2012. Two teachers, one education aid worker and their driver, working for an NGO which promotes girls’ education, were shot dead in Mansehra, KP, in April 2010.
2009. Farida Afridi, director of the NGO SAWERA in Jamrud, Khyber Agency, which provides education and training for women, was shot dead on 4 July 2012.

On 8 December 2011, Zarteef Khan Afridi, the coordinator of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in Khyber Agency, was shot dead on his way to the school in Jamrud where he also worked as a head teacher. He had been threatened for his anti-Taliban stance and work for women’s rights.

In September 2009, the Taliban kidnapped a Greek teacher who raised funds for a school for the non-Muslim Kalash community in the north-western Kalash Valleys.
Child recruitment from schools

Militant recruitment took place from mainstream schools as well as madrassas.\(^{1249}\) Public perception most commonly associates recruitment of militants with unregulated madrassas promoting radical agendas. Recently, however, a clearer picture of militant recruitment from schools has emerged. Studies from the Brookings Institution\(^{1250}\) and the International Crisis Group\(^{1251}\) notably blamed the lack of quality mainstream education for children’s vulnerability to recruitment. Documentary maker Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy also collected first-hand accounts from children who had been trained as suicide bombers\(^{1252}\) and from their militant recruiters. She described a radicalization process that starts by isolating the child from outside influences, including education, and only later introduces the more extreme and violent tenets of militant ideology in a second setting. Some children were recruited from madrassa schools,\(^{1253}\) others were abducted.\(^{1254}\) Several children who later escaped have described how they only realized they were expected to become suicide bombers after they were trapped. Some suicide missions took place under coercion or the influence of drugs.\(^{1255}\)

In July 2009, the Pakistan Army claimed that up to 1,500 boys as young as 11 had been kidnapped from schools and madrassas and trained in Swat by the Taliban to become suicide bombers. Many were reportedly used to attack US and NATO forces over the border in Afghanistan. There was no independent corroboration of the Army’s claims.\(^{1256}\) In August 2013, The Guardian published evidence that children in Afghanistan were being sent to madrassas in Pakistan to be trained as suicide bombers.\(^{1257}\)

Military use of schools

According to media reports, there were at least 40 cases of schools being used by the military,\(^{1258}\) five incidents of militants based in schools\(^{1259}\) and one case of the police being billeted right next to a school.\(^{1260}\) For example, one media report indicated that schools in Swat district had been used as bases by the Pakistani military for over a year, preventing the education of around 10,000 students.\(^{1261}\) In another case, the Pakistani military showed journalists a school that had been used by militants in Sararogha as a courthouse and a base.\(^{1262}\) At another boarding school in Ladha, the army claimed that it had been used to train suicide bombers and store military hardware, including explosives, ammunition, weapons and bomb-making chemicals, and that texts related to combat remained. It was not possible to verify the army’s claims.\(^{1263}\)

Attacks on higher education

Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel

Lahore and Karachi were the worst affected cities for regular clashes between armed political student groups on university campuses, a spillover of the political, ethnic and sectarian violence in these cities. Students and teachers were also affected by Karachi’s communal violence and a trend of kidnapping for ransom.

Higher education staff and students were victims of regular violence and intimidation by student political groups on campuses, many of whom carried firearms openly, particularly in Lahore and Karachi. In addition to dozens of injuries, the US State Department observed that these groups used threats of physical violence to influence the studies and lifestyles of students and teachers, including the course content, examination procedures, grades, the financial and recruitment decisions of university administrations, the language students spoke and the clothes they wore.\(^{1264}\)

Seven students were injured in the early hours of 26 June 2011 when about 25 members of the Islami Jamiat Talba (IJT) student organization at Punjab University attacked philosophy students with sticks, bike chains and bricks as they slept in their halls. There were reports of the sound of gunfire and some students brandished pistols but did not shoot anyone. One student was thrown from a first floor window. The IJT had accused the philosophy department of vulgarity and un-Islamic behaviour.\(^{1265}\)

In addition, higher education students and staff were attacked by those opposed to female education or were victims of kidnappings for ransom, which often also affected the drivers of those attacked. As with school attacks, some simply targeted universities
because they associated them with authority. The Taliban said that they were responsible for launching a double suicide bombing on the International Islamic University in Islamabad on 20 October 2009, which killed two female and three male students, in retaliation for a Pakistani army offensive in South Waziristan.1266

In Balochistan, there was a clear pattern of targeted killings of academics or students of non-Baloch ethnicity or opponents of Baloch nationalism, with gunmen on motorbikes launching attacks in daylight in public, usually when the victim was en route to or from university. The BLA claimed responsibility for the murder on 5 November 2009 of Kurshid Akhtar Ansari, the head of library sciences at the University of Balochistan1267 and for the murder on 27 April 2010 of Nazima Talib, a professor at the same institution.1268 Students and academics linked with nationalist organizations disappeared in a number of cases. For example, Amnesty International reported that a student and member of the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO) allegedly disappeared from his hometown of Panjgur, Balochistan, on 21 January 2011.1269 In another incident, on 4 July 2011, a Baloch Students Organisation (BSO-Azad) activist was abducted from Hub town, Lasbela district, Balochistan. His corpse was found on 6 July with three bullet wounds to the upper body.1270

In Karachi, students were affected by outbreaks of city-wide political and sectarian violence. On 26 December 2010, a bomb on the Karachi University campus targeted praying students of the Imamia Students Organisation, injuring five. It led to protests demanding that the administration prevent sectarian fighting on campus, claiming that bombs and weapons were being brought in.1271 Shot by unidentified assailants on a motorbike while they were talking at a tea stall outside their seminary in November 2012, six students were among 20 people killed during sectarian violence in one day.1272 An academic was killed in Karachi: Maulana Muhammad Ameen, a teacher at Jamia Binoria Alamia University and a distinguished Sunni cleric, was gunned down by assassins on motorbikes in October 2010.1273

Also in October 2010, Taliban assassins shot dead Dr Mohammad Farooq Khan, in Mardan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Khan was the vice-chancellor of a new liberal university in Swat, due to be inaugurated a few days later, and had also devoted his time to teaching 150 boys liberated from the Taliban by the Pakistan Army at a school set up by the military in Swat with support from international donors.1274 According to the New York Times, he was one of six university professors and Muslim intellectuals to have been murdered in the previous 12 months.1275

Attacks on education in 2013

Students from kindergarten, schools and colleges, teachers of both sexes and education institutions across the country were attacked in Pakistan in 2013. There were continuing attacks on schools, including bombings,1276 grenade attacks1277 and shootings. Female education and schooling in the north-west and tribal areas bordering Afghanistan continued to be targeted prominently.1278 For instance, in January, militants shot dead five female teachers and two health workers returning by bus from their community project near Swabi, in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province.1279 In November, militants abducted 11 teachers from Hira Public School in the Khyber tribal agency after they helped in a polio vaccination campaign for school children.1280

There were also attacks on schools in the south-west, in Karachi, where the Taliban has increased its influence,1281 and in Balochistan.1282 One primary school in western Karachi was attacked with guns, killing the head teacher and wounding three adults and six children attending a prize-giving ceremony in March.1283 Another head teacher, who ran a private school, was shot dead in Karachi in May.1284 At least two schools designated to be used as polling stations in 11 May elections in Baluchistan were bombed.1285

In higher education, clashes continued between rival armed student political groups1286 and there were direct attacks on the institutions themselves, including the detonation of one kilogramme of explosives packed with ball bearings in the conference hall of the University of Peshawar’s Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies on 3 January, which injured five students.1287 In the most serious incident, on 15 June, a
coordinated attack was launched against the Sardar Bahaddur Khan Women’s University in Quetta and the hospital ward where the casualties were taken. A bomb exploded on a bus at the campus killing 14 female students and wounding 19. Ninety minutes later, two suicide attackers and between two and 10 gunmen attacked the Bolan Medical Clinic, destroying the casualty department and operating theatre and killing 11, including two senior doctors and the Quetta Deputy Police Commissioner, who had come to offer security. Seventeen were wounded. The BBC reported that the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militant group, which has carried out many attacks against Shia Muslims, was responsible, but said the attack may have been targeting women in general rather than Shias, as the university is the sole all-women university in Balochistan.

THE PHILIPPINES
There were killings and abductions of teachers, bombing and shelling of schools and universities, with some incidents related to their use as polling stations. The armed forces continued to use numerous schools for military purposes in breach of Philippines’ law.

Context
Two main conflicts in the Philippines have led to intermittent violence. In the communist insurgency, the New People’s Army is fighting the government with the aim of creating a socialist state; and in the Moro conflict, concentrated in the south, militant groups, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), are fighting for self-rule. Civilians have been targeted via bombings, kidnappings, and the forced recruitment and use of children in fighting forces. Thousands have been killed and hundreds of thousands more displaced.

The Abu Sayyaf Group, which began as an Islamic separatist group but has also become involved in banditry and other crimes, remains active in parts of the southern Philippines. In Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, rival clan disputes and a proliferation of criminal activities have compounded the pattern of violence in the region.

Recurrent attacks on education in Mindanao and other parts of the country have disrupted schooling for many, causing fear among students, teachers and parents and inflicting damage on learning facilities. The UN verified some 43 incidents countrywide involving damage, destruction or occupation of education facilities, placement of landmines and unexploded ordnance near schools, and violence or threats of violence against teachers and students from 2010 to 2012; and 92 more incidents were recorded but could not be verified due to geographic and human resource constraints. Collectively, these 135 incidents were estimated to have affected some 8,757 students.

Net primary enrolment was 88 per cent, net secondary enrolment was 62 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment was 28 per cent (2009). The adult literacy rate was 95 per cent (2008).

Attacks on schools
The UN reported 10 incidents of attacks on schools and hospitals in 2009, resulting from ongoing clashes between the military and armed groups. Levels of violence appeared to increase around the 2010 elections, during which schools were used as polling stations in May and October, with 41 schools and hospitals attacked that year. In 2011, there were 52 incidents affecting schools and hospitals, although this number included both direct attacks and military use. Twenty-seven cases, of which 16 were verified by the UN, were attributed to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and its associated auxiliary force, Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), including one school being set on fire during an airstrike. Six incidents were attributed to the MILF, four to the New People’s Army, three to the Abu Sayyaf Group and another 12 to unknown perpetrators.

In 2012, at least 19 attacks on schools were recorded by August. For example, Abu Sayyaf Group fighters partially burned down Tipo-Tipo Central Elementary School in an effort to distract a military pursuit by the national armed forces after skirmishes in Basilan province in July 2012.

Some 15 landmines and unexploded ordnance were found within the vicinity of schools from 2010 to 2012,
and six grenade attacks and three instances of mortar shelling were also recorded. At least 17 schools were partially damaged and three schools destroyed in the same period.

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

From 2010 to 2012, at least 14 teachers were killed, three injured, five threatened or harassed, six abducted and one arbitrarily detained. Three students were abducted. In a number of cases, teachers or students were abducted, sometimes for ransom, by the Abu Sayyaf Group. For example, in October 2009, Abu Sayyaf gunmen allegedly abducted an elementary school principal from a passenger jeep transporting a group of teachers and later beheaded him after his family refused to pay the requested ransom.

In other incidents there was an observable pattern of targeting teachers in connection with their duty as election poll officers. During 2010, some 11 teachers were killed, with a significant number of attacks recorded at the height of the presidential election in May 2010 – although attacks were still taking place in and outside of school premises months later, perpetuated mostly by unidentified assailants – and during
local elections. For example, a few days after the 25 October 2010 barangay (village) elections, the principal of Datu Gumbay Elementary School in Maguindanao was shot dead by unidentified gunmen; weeks later, on 2 December 2010, a lone gunman killed another teacher at the same school while he was standing near the gate in sight of students and other teachers.

Military use of schools

The practice of military use of schools is explicitly banned in the Philippines, both under national legislation and military policy. Despite this, at least 56 incidents of military use of schools, mostly involving use by government armed forces, were recorded by the UN from 2010 to 2012. School buildings, particularly in remote areas, offered convenient protection and were often used as temporary barracks or for other military purposes ranging from a period of one week to more than a year.

For instance, according to the UN, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and its Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units used functioning schools as weapons and ammunition stores in 2010 and, in 2011, used at least 14 schools during the course of counterinsurgency operations. Troops slept in teacher housing and also used several classrooms at Nagaan Elementary School in Mindanao for at least seven months. In 2012, the UN verified four incidents involving the stationing of national armed forces’ military units in public elementary schools in Mindanao, as well as the establishment of a detachment next to Salipongan Primary School in Tugaya municipality, Lanao del Sur province, that closed the school for two weeks.

Attacks on higher education

Media reports documented several attacks or attempted attacks on university buildings and grounds, including one related to use of the buildings as polling stations: on an election day in 2010, two bombs exploded at Mindanao State University where several polling stations were based.

In August 2012, the main campus of Mindanao State University was sealed off by the Armed Forces of the Philippines after gunmen opened fire in an attack inside the campus during which three soldiers were killed and 10 others wounded.

Attacks on education in 2013

Abduction and killing of teachers were reported in 2013. Three teachers and three head teachers were reported to have been shot dead or in one case shot and ‘disappeared’ in separate incidents. Mostly, the attackers were unidentified and the motives were not confirmed. In one of the incidents, on 22 January, Sheikh Bashier Mursalum, a respected Muslim scholar and a principal of a madrassa, was reportedly shot and abducted by suspected state security agents in Zamboanga City; he remained missing at the end of August. On 31 July, it was reported that Abu Sayyaf Group rebels had released abductee Alrashid Rojas, an employee of Western Mindanao State University, and head teacher Floredeliza Ongchua, who had been forcibly taken from her home by 13 men in June.

On 11 September, during a battle between Muslim insurgents and the Philippine army in Zamboanga, soldiers used a school as a base for an unspecified period. In September, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters used nine teachers as human shields during fighting with government forces after earlier holding 13 teachers and some students hostage at a school.

In higher education, a bomb planted by unknown militants exploded on the University of Southern Mindanao campus, causing widespread panic among staff and students.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The main threat to education came in the Caucasus, where schools were attacked and teachers and academics were murdered

Context

Teachers, academics and religious scholars in the Russian Federation have been targeted for assassination by suspected armed Islamist militants seeking to impose their religious views.

Vladimir Putin has held the political reins since December 1999, during which time the country has
grown economically but also faced increasing attacks by Islamist insurgents in the northern Caucasus. The militants’ objective was a regional emirate based on Sharia law. The issue of whether students should be allowed to wear a headscarf was contentious in parts of the Russian Federation. In Dagestan, two head teachers were killed because they wanted to prevent students from wearing a hijab. Official permission to wear a headscarf in school was later granted by the government of Dagestan, a mainly Muslim republic, in September 2013, whereas in the nearby Stavropol Region, the ban had been upheld by the Supreme Court five months earlier.

The Russian Federation’s net primary enrolment was 93 per cent, gross secondary enrolment was 89 per cent and gross tertiary enrolment was 76 per cent (2009). Adult literacy was 100 per cent (2010).

Attacks on schools
From 2009 to 2012, at least three schools were attacked. Two were attacked as an apparent response to their designated use by government forces. In June 2009, militants reportedly fired grenades at a school in Grozny, Chechnya. The reasons were not known.

Separately, at least four bomb and gun attacks in the vicinity of schools were identified in the North Caucasus. In one incident, alleged terrorists exploded several bombs near School No.1 in Kizlyar, Dagestan, in March 2010, killing 12 people and injuring around 30; however, no students from the school were reported dead or injured.

Another school in Buinaksk, Dagestan, was pelted by mortar bombs after an army commander gave the wrong directions to the mortar crew who were targeting rebels nearby.

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel
During the period 2009-2012, five teachers were killed in Dagestan, several of them by suspected Islamist insurgents, the others by unidentified assailants, according to news reports. In one case, a physical education teacher, opposed to extreme Islamist beliefs, was cut down by sub-machine gunfire as he left a mosque after praying, in Tsbari village, Tsuntin region, in June 2012. In at least two cases, head teachers were reported to have been assassinated because they were against the wearing of headscarves or hijab at school. In one of these incidents, a headmaster was shot dead in July 2011 by two assassins in front of his family in the courtyard of his home in the village of Sovietskoye near the Azeri border, Dagestan.

Military use of schools
Two schools were set aside for use as military bases during 2009-2012: in June 2012, suspected armed militants burned down one school and then attacked another in Tsyntuk village, Dagestan, apparently because government forces had earmarked them for use as bases for counter-insurgency security operations.

Attacks on higher education
Five academics and scholars were shot dead or killed in explosions by armed Islamist militants, and the attacks intensified during 2009-2012. In December 2010, a leading Kabardino-Balkaria scholar, Aslan Tsipinov, was killed by armed militants. His work on Adyghe national culture was seen by Islamic extremists as spreading paganism. In March 2012, a medical school director, Magomedrasul Gugurchunov, was killed in Makhachkala after receiving death threats from extremists in an attempt to force him to pay their extortion demands. Fear of armed Islamic militants in the North Caucasus caused academics to curtail their research.

Attacks on education in 2013
In 2013, teachers continued to be targeted. On 4 March, it was reported that Magomed Biyarslanov, a teacher at an Islamic school in Karabudakhkentsky in Dagestan, died after being shot eight times in the chest. On 15 July, a teacher in the Tsumada district of Dagestan was killed by armed attackers wearing illegal military-style uniforms who arrived at his home, separated him from his family, then shot him several times at close range.
SOMALIA

Islamic militants recruited large numbers of children from schools by force and girls were abducted and forced to become fighters’ wives. Suicide bombings targeting students took a very heavy toll and schools and universities were used as military bases for fighting, resulting in heavy damage to facilities.

Context

Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has been wracked by a civil conflict marked by widespread abuses against civilians and with devastating effects on education, including the destruction and damage of schools and universities and the closure of education facilities for long periods of time, particularly in the south and central parts of the country. In many areas, only private schools are operational. Today, an estimated 1.8 million school-age children are out of school in the south-central zones of Somalia.

School enrolment rates were among the lowest in the world; the net attendance rate was 18 per cent for boys and 15 per cent for girls at primary school level, and 12 per cent for boys and 8 per cent for girls at secondary level (2007-2011). Only 20 per cent of the population was literate in 2012.

The conflict intensified in late 2006, following the overthrow of the Islamist Court Union (ICU) by Ethiopian armed forces. An offshoot of the ICU, an armed Islamist group known as Al-Shabaab slowly began to establish control over Mogadishu and other areas of south and central Somalia. Government forces, backed at different times by Ethiopian, Kenyan and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops, along with government-affiliated militia including the Sufi Islamist group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) and more recently the Ras Kamboni clan militia, have been fighting Al-Shabaab to date. After mid-2011 and especially in 2012, the African Union forces and Ethiopian troops, alongside Somali government forces and allied militia, regained control of a number of towns held by Al-Shabaab in south-central Somalia. However, Al-Shabaab retains authority over large swathes of south-central Somalia, particularly in rural areas of the country.

Attacks on schools

The UN verified 79 attacks on education between January 2011 and December 2012 alone, affecting at least 5,677 children. However, security challenges and lack of access to large areas of south-central Somalia made it impossible to determine the exact number of schools, students and education staff attacked.

Indiscriminate mortar fire exchanged in civilian areas, particularly in the country’s capital Mogadishu, has endangered schools, damaging and destroying buildings and killing or wounding students and teachers. For example, a mortar shell that landed in a Koranic school killed four students and wounded 10 others during fighting between Transitional Federal Government armed forces and armed groups in Mogadishu on 13 January 2009. On 25 February 2009, two schools were damaged, six schoolchildren killed and another 13 wounded during an exchange of fire between the TFG/AMISOM military and insurgents, also in Mogadishu.

Several students reported to Human Rights Watch that their schools had been targeted by Al-Shabaab, including during the Ramadan Offensive in August 2010. For example, one boy recounted that his school had been ‘continually attacked’ by Al-Shabaab during the offensive and that, in one incident, a neighbouring classroom had been shelled. Another student claimed that Al-Shabaab militants had pulled up outside his school in Baidoa in late 2010, and had shelled the school from their vehicle as students started to shout and run away.

Explosives placed on or near school grounds seriously endangered students and teachers. In one case, a bomb planted near Mahamud Harbi Secondary School exploded in November 2011, killing four children. In August 2012, explosives left outside a school killed at least six children aged from 5 to 10 and injured at least four more who were playing with them in the town of Balad.

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

In October 2011, a suicide attack by Al-Shabaab at the Ministry of Education killed an estimated 100 or
more people,1375 many of whom were students and parents waiting for scholarship examination results. Another suicide bombing at Benadir University’s graduation ceremony (see Attacks on higher education) in Mogadishu killed the Minister of Education in December 2009;1376 and eight students were killed in a suicide bombing on school grounds carried out by an 11-year-old disguised as a food seller in October 2009.1377

In areas it controlled, Al-Shabaab imposed its interpretation of Islam on schools and threatened or killed teachers for refusing to comply with its demands.1378 This has included prohibiting the teaching of English, geography and history; forcing the separation of girls and boys in schools and restricting girls’ dress; preventing women from teaching; imposing their own teachers in schools; and using class time to teach extreme Islamist ideology.1379 The US State Department reported that, in at least one instance in 2011, Al-Shabaab offered to reward academic achievement with AK-47 rifles.1380 In September 2009, Al-Shabaab warned against using UN-provided textbooks, claiming they were teaching students ‘un-Islamic’ subjects. They also called for parents not to send their children to schools using UN-supported curriculum.1381 In April 2010, Al-Shabaab reportedly forbade schools in Jowhar from announcing the end of classes with bells because they were reminiscent of those rung in churches.1382 This violence and harassment has caused teachers to flee, hundreds of schools to close for varying lengths of time, and students, particularly girls, to drop out in large numbers.1383

In one instance, a teacher reported to Human Rights Watch that he fled Somalia in 2011 after the headmaster and deputy at his school were shot for refusing to stop teaching certain subjects. At his previous school, Al-Shabaab fighters had stabbed him in the upper lip with a bayonet while he was teaching a geography lesson and had abducted a female teacher not wearing a hijab. Her body was later found near the town mosque.1384

In a similar vein, Hizbul Islam, an armed Islamist group which merged with Al-Shabaab in late 2010, reportedly arrested a headmaster who had raised a Somali flag over his school in December 2009. The group replaced the flag with a black Islamist one. Students took to the street in protest, drawing fire from Hizbul Islam militants that killed at least two students and injured another five.1385 In other instances, teachers were targeted for refusing to enlist students as Al-Shabaab fighters (see Child recruitment from schools).

Some teachers, students and education officials were also kidnapped and held for ransom during 2009-2012 including the education minister for the region of Galmudug, reportedly for refusing to pay a ransom for the release of a kidnapped student.1386

Insecurity and Al-Shabaab threats impeded humanitarian and development assistance for education, with particular agencies, humanitarian workers, offices and supplies targeted and looted.1387 Al-Shabaab proclaimed a ban on more than a dozen individual agencies from 2009 onwards and imposed another ban in 2011 on 16 aid organizations operating in areas under its control, including several UN agencies.1388 On 6 January 2009, three masked gunmen shot and killed 44-year-old Somali national Ibrahim Hussein Duale while he was monitoring school feeding in a World Food Programme-supported school in the Gedo region.1389

Military use of schools

Between May 2008 and March 2010, armed groups used at least 34 schools.1390 In some cases, multiple groups occupied the same school at different times. For example, Waaberi primary school located in Gedo was used by TFG forces, ASWJ, Ethiopian Defence Forces (EDF) and Al-Shabaab in August 2009. One group used it as a defensive fort, resulting in heavy damage to the buildings.1391

Military use of schools continued in 2011 and 2012. According to the UN, Al-Shabaab used a school in Elwak district, Gedo region, in August 2011, interrupting the education of over 500 children; the school had been used intermittently by armed groups since February 2011.1392 In December 2011, Al-Shabaab militia established an operations centre at a secondary school in Merka district, Lower Shabelle region.1393 TFG forces also reportedly used schools in
Mogadishu. A UN respondent reported that in 2012 at least five schools in the Bay, Gedo and Hiraan regions of central and southern Somalia were occupied or used as hospitals, police stations or prisons by Al-Shabaab, EDF, Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) and regional authorities, affecting some 1,933 children. In late May 2012, following the takeover of the Afgooye corridor by AMISOM and TFG forces, the TFG and its National Security Agency (NSA) rounded up dozens of people and used the Afgooye Secondary School as a base and a detention centre.

Schools were also used as firing bases. Al-Shabaab launched artillery attacks from school grounds, drawing return fire from TFG and AMISOM forces. In some cases, students and teachers were inside. For example, Human Rights Watch reported that in 2010 Al-Shabaab fighters used a school in Mogadishu as a firing position while students were still in the classrooms. Pro-government forces returned fire, and five rockets hit the school compound. One rocket struck just as the students were leaving, killing eight.

Al-Shabaab occupied some schools after they had been closed due to insecurity, making it impossible for classes to resume and risking damage or destruction of education facilities. Others were used as weapons caches.

**Child recruitment from schools**

When fighting intensified in Mogadishu in mid-2010, Al-Shabaab increasingly recruited children from schools in order to fill its dwindling ranks. Boys and girls were recruited from schools by force as well as by enticing them with propaganda and material rewards. A number of children interviewed by Human Rights Watch in May and June 2011 reported that Al-Shabaab members had taught in their classrooms, encouraging them to join the group and promising ‘entry into paradise’ for those who died fighting.

While the exact numbers of children recruited are not known, the UN indicated that Al-Shabaab abducted an estimated 2,000 children for military training in 2010. At least another 948 children were recruited in 2011, mainly by Al-Shabaab and mostly from schools and madrassas. Human Rights Watch reported that it had interviewed 23 Somali children recruited or abducted by Al-Shabaab in 2010 and 2011; 14 had been taken from schools or while en route, which gives some indication of the extent to which schools were ready sites for forced recruitment and abduction. Of the 79 attacks on education recorded by the UN from January 2011 to December 2012, 15 involved the recruitment of 202 children (16 girls and 186 boys) from schools and six involved both abduction and recruitment of 42 children (five girls and 37 boys) from schools by anti-government elements.

Teachers and school managers also received orders from Al-Shabaab and other armed groups to enlist students or release them for training. The UN reported that in June 2010 alone, Al-Shabaab ordered teachers and school managers in Lower Shabelle to release more than 300 students to be trained, threatening punishment for failure to comply. In October 2011, Al-Shabaab was reported to have closed two of the biggest schools in the capital of the lower Shabelle region after the headmasters refused to recruit students to fight. In May 2011, the UN reported the murder of a teacher in the Hiraan region by Al-Shabaab for having objected to child recruitment. In February 2012, five teachers were reportedly arrested for failing to enlist their students in military training.

Human Rights Watch research in Somalia found evidence of girls being lined up at schools and taken to be ‘wives’ of Al-Shabaab fighters. In one case, the girls were selected at gunpoint; one who refused to be taken was shot in front of her classmates. In another, after 12 girls were taken by Al-Shabaab, the teacher reported that some 150 female students dropped out of school. He also reported that a 16-year-old girl who was taken was beheaded and her head was brought back and shown to the remaining girls at the school as a warning because she had refused to marry a fighter much older than she was.

**Attacks on higher education**

*Attacks on higher education facilities*

Bombs and mortar fire damaged at least two universities, in one case killing university personnel. For
example, Al-Shabaab allegedly destroyed a Sufi Muslim university in central Somalia in 2009. In March 2011, a mortar hit a Somali University building in the Bar Ubah neighbourhood of Mogadishu, killing a university lecturer, wounding two security guards and destroying a section of lecture halls. It is unclear whether the attack was intentional. In November 2011, a bomb left in the middle of the road in the vicinity of Gaheyr University also exploded.

**Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel**

At least one attack on higher education students and personnel was reported. In December 2009, a male suicide bomber disguised as a veiled woman blew himself up during a Benadir University medical school graduation ceremony in Mogadishu, killing 22 people including the ministers of education, higher education and health, the dean of the medical school, professors, students and their relatives, and wounding at least 60 more. Though suspected, Al-Shabaab denied having committed the attack.

**Military use of higher education facilities**

Reports indicate that armed groups, AMISOM and government troops also used university campuses, particularly during the 2012 military campaigns that drove Al-Shabaab out of several of their urban strongholds. In January 2012, after a heavy gun battle, AMISOM troops succeeded in forcing Al-Shabaab out of its positions in and around the buildings of Mogadishu University, among several other key areas in the northern outskirts of Mogadishu. In September 2012, AMISOM and Somali National Army troops captured Kismayo University in the northern part of Kismayo during an operation to take control of the city and used it as a temporary military base for nearly a month. Gaheyr University was reported to have been serving as an AMISOM base in 2011, while Ethiopian troops used Hiraan University as a military base in early 2012, forcing the university to set up a makeshift campus inside the town of Beletweyne.

**Attacks on education in 2013**

The number of attacks reported to the UN during the period from January to September was lower by comparison to the same period in 2012, most likely due to lower general levels of conflict. As of September, a total of 42 attacks on education had been reported compared with 63 attacks during the same period of the previous year. Almost half of these attacks occurred in the Benadir region and many were associated with security operations conducted by government security forces while searching for Al-Shabaab elements.

In January, AMISOM troops were alleged to have fired mistakenly on a religious school in a village 120 kilometres west of Mogadishu while pursuing militants, killing five children under the age of 10. In March, two children died and three more were injured when a student unwittingly triggered an IED at a Koranic school in Heraale, Galgadud region.

**SOUTH SUDAN**

Schools were destroyed, damaged and looted by armed groups and armed forces during inter-communal violence and border incursions during 2009-2013. Dozens of schools were used for military purposes, some for up to five years.

**Context**

South Sudan gained independence in July 2011. However, cross-border skirmishes and inter-communal violence continued to pose threats to civilians. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) also launched sporadic incursions and abduction raids during the first half of the reporting period.

Two decades of civil war prior to its independence from Sudan greatly hindered the development of the education system. Schools were occupied and damaged or destroyed, teachers and students displaced and children abducted or forcibly recruited by both sides. Gross enrolment was 64 per cent at primary level and 6 per cent at secondary level. Protracted conflict has left South Sudan with an adult literacy rate of only 27 per cent.

**Attacks on schools**

Attacks on schools became less frequent after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
2005, but some school buildings were damaged or destroyed during inter-communal violence, LRA activity and incursions along the contested border with Sudan during 2009-2012.

In one incident, during fighting between Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces and cattle-keepers in Warrap state in March 2010, four schools were destroyed. Thirteen schools were set on fire during inter-ethnic fighting in Jonglei state from late 2011 to early 2012.

From July 2009 to February 2012, the UN verified two attacks on schools by the LRA.

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

Before independence, there were a few isolated attacks on students and education officials by the LRA in Southern Sudan. For instance, in Tambura county, Western Equatoria, in 2010, the LRA killed two state education ministry officials, and in a separate incident abducted three children between the ages of 8 and 15 from schools during raids on villages. The LRA also abducted five children from a school in the same county in February 2011.

Several student protests were met with excessive use of force and resulted in arrest, injury and, in one case, death. For instance, at a school in Central Equatoria state on 28 December 2009, Southern Sudanese anti-riot police shot and killed a 16-year-old who was taking part in a demonstration against the non-payment of teachers. Two people, including a teacher, were wounded when police used live ammunition to break up a protest at Juba Day Secondary School over an alleged land-grab of school property in October 2012.

**Military use of schools**

Primary and secondary schools were used by armed forces, often with the consent of local authorities,
either for temporary accommodation while travelling, or as a base for operations against rebel militia or in response to inter-communal violence. Mostly, schools were used temporarily but some were used for up to five years. An estimated 2,400,000 South Sudanese Pounds (USD 800,000) of damage was caused by military use of schools in 2011.

Between 2011 and 2012, 34 schools were used for military purposes, affecting 28,209 learners across nine states. For example, the SPLA was reported to have used two schools as places to torture suspects in 2010. At Kuerboani Primary School, in Unity state, soldiers occupied the school at night while children used the same facilities during the day. UN staff witnessed children using classrooms where weapons and grenades were stored. By December 2012, 15 of the 18 schools occupied that year were vacated.

Attacks on higher education
Military use and looting of Upper Nile University was recorded during clashes between South Sudanese government forces and a militia group in Malakal in early 2009.

Attacks on education in 2013
Despite successful advocacy efforts resulting in a number of schools being vacated, military use was consistently documented throughout the first three quarters of 2013. Negotiations resulted in the vacating of most schools occupied by the SPLA by the end of 2012; however, the first quarter of 2013 saw a rise in incidence, with at least 18 schools occupied in Jonglei, Western Bahr el Gazal and Lakes states by the end of March. Two schools were newly occupied by the SPLA in Jonglei state, though vacated shortly thereafter, and three schools were occupied and vacated by Auxiliary Police in Eastern Equatoria state; while six schools were vacated in Jonglei, Lakes and Western Bahr el Gazal, seven remained occupied. The number continued to fluctuate but, by the end of September, armed forces were using at least six schools. However, on 14 August, the SPLA issued an order prohibiting its forces from recruiting or using children or occupying or using schools in any manner.

Fighting between ethnic Murle rebels from the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and the SPLA in Pibor county, Jonglei state, resulted in the looting and damage of schools in April and May. Human Rights Watch reported the looting of at least three schools and the destruction of classroom materials; the majority of these actions were said to have been carried out by the SPLA. Soldiers also reportedly destroyed a school in the Labrab area. During the capture of Boma town by SSDM/A rebels and the subsequent recapture by the SPLA in May, part of an NGO teacher training centre was set on fire and all its contents taken, while a school supported by the NGO was ransacked and destroyed.

At Maban refugee camp in Upper Nile state, landmines were found behind the Darussalam School on 21 March and caused the suspension of Child Friendly Spaces activities.

SUDAN

More than 1,000 university students were arrested, more than 15 killed, and more than 450 injured in 2009-2012, mostly in demonstrations on campus or in education-related protests. Many of the injuries resulted from security forces using excessive force. There were dozens of incidents of attacks on, and military use of, schools

Context
In Sudan’s western region of Darfur, fighting between government forces and pro-government militia and rebels over the past decade has left 300,000 people dead and more than two million displaced, with schools set on fire and looted and students and teachers targeted by armed groups. Sudan’s protracted civil war between the government and southern rebels ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in July 2011. However, unresolved secession issues have led to cross-border violence, particularly in the three disputed areas of Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan.
Students, teachers, schools and universities have been targeted during decades of conflict and instability. The government exercises tight control over higher education, appointing public university vice-chancellors and determining the curriculum. As of 2011, approximately 72 per cent of adults were literate. In 2009, before the secession of the South, gross enrolment at primary level was 73 per cent and 39 per cent at secondary level. Tertiary gross enrolment was 6 per cent in 2000.

Attacks on schools
There were different accounts of how many schools were attacked during 2009-2012. According to Arry Organization for Human Rights and Development, 48 schools were destroyed in attacks by government forces in South Kordofan between April 2011 and February 2012, but it was not specified if these were targeted attacks. Other UN, human rights and media reports documented 12 cases of schools or education buildings being destroyed, damaged or looted, including primary and secondary schools and

Pastor Zachariah Boulus stands next to a building at the Heiban Bible College, destroyed when Sudanese military dropped two bombs into the compound of the school in Southern Kordofan, Sudan, 1 February 2012.
© 2012 AP Photo/Ryan Boyette
a teacher training institute, in the areas of Darfur, Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan during 2009-2012, but again it was not specified how many were targeted.\textsuperscript{1468}

According to the UN, three instances of burning, looting and destruction of schools occurred between January 2009 and February 2011.\textsuperscript{1469} For example, militia attacked a school in Tawila, North Darfur, in September 2010, killing four children who had sought refuge there.\textsuperscript{1470} The reported number of schools bombed or shelled then increased between June 2011 and April 2012 as fighting intensified between the government and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) in Blue Nile and South Kordofan,\textsuperscript{1471} and aerial bombing of civilian targets by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) took a significant toll,\textsuperscript{1472} although it has not been verified whether the schools were deliberately targeted. For example, in August 2011, an SAF Antonov bomber dropped four bombs on Al Masha Secondary School in Kauda\textsuperscript{1473} and in February 2012, the SAF destroyed two buildings of a bible school in the village of Heiban, dropping two bombs into its compound.\textsuperscript{1474} Mortar shelling, for which the SPLM-N claimed responsibility and which the UN criticized as indiscriminate, also damaged one school in Kadugli in October 2012.\textsuperscript{1475}

The UN estimated that as of December 2011, 137,900 schoolchildren in South Kordofan were missing out on education because their schools had been damaged, destroyed or contaminated by explosives, or were being used as shelters by armed forces and IDPs.\textsuperscript{1476}

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

Media and human rights reports suggest that at least 29 school students, two teachers and one headmaster were killed and another three students and a headmaster’s assistant were wounded in attacks in 2009-2012 by rebels, soldiers or unidentified armed men in the Darfur region, though the motives were not known in all cases.\textsuperscript{1477}

In some incidents, the perpetrators appeared to be members of armed groups. For example, a group of armed men killed two Fur high school students from Tournato village on their way to pay their school fees at Kass High School on 13 December 2009.\textsuperscript{1478} Members of a militia allegedly killed a primary school student in Zam Zam camp in North Darfur in December 2012, while he was studying with six classmates who escaped unharmed.\textsuperscript{1479} In October 2011, four armed men reportedly shot and killed the headmaster of Shagra Eltadamoun primary school and wounded his assistant while they were on their way to submit the names and fees of students sitting for the national primary examinations.\textsuperscript{1480} In one of the most serious incidents, but not necessarily a targeted one, suspected pro-government militia reportedly killed 18 school children when they opened fire in a market next to the elementary school in Tabra, North Darfur, in September 2010.\textsuperscript{1481}

In other incidents, teachers and students were killed, injured or arrested by government authorities. On 31 July 2012, at least six secondary school students, aged 16 to 18, were killed and more than 50 other people injured during confrontations between police and anti-government protesters during reportedly largely peaceful demonstrations in Nyala. According to Human Rights Watch, the protests started at the schools and spread into the streets with protesters burning tyres.\textsuperscript{1482} On 1 November 2012, the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) reportedly arrested and tortured a dozen secondary school and university students in Nyala, South Darfur. One of them received acid burns on his hand.\textsuperscript{1483} Relatives said the victims were given electric shocks using water and car batteries.\textsuperscript{1484} The students were accused of stealing money from the NISS agents\textsuperscript{1485} but their families said the real motive for their arrest was their presumed participation in the Nyala protests.\textsuperscript{1486}

In another incident on 19 December 2012, police used teargas and batons to disperse teachers protesting against low wages and alleged corruption in the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{1487}

**Military use of schools**

According to the UN, as of February 2011, three schools were used by the SAF in South Kordofan, including one primary school in El Buram town which was occupied despite the fact that pupils were attending classes nearby.\textsuperscript{1488} Military use of schools in El Buram by the SAF continued throughout 2011.\textsuperscript{1489}
Attacks on higher education

Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel

A compilation of human rights and media reports suggests that 15 or more university students were killed and at least 479 were injured, many when police and security forces used excessive force against students demonstrating on campus over university policies, including limits on political and cultural activity on campus and the charging of tuition fees for Darfuri students from which they were supposed to be exempted by government agreement.

These incidents took place across the country including in Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum, Nyala, Port Sudan and River Nile state. Furthermore, according to figures compiled for this study from over 50 human rights and media reports, at least 1,040 students were arrested by security agents, the majority of them in protests related to education or which began at, or took place at, education institutions. Many reported torture or intimidation during their detention. Two academics, one university staff member and a group of researchers were also reported to have been arrested during 2009-2012.

In addition, a group of seven Southern Sudanese students was reportedly abducted and forcibly conscripted in Khartoum by Southern militias and taken to a training camp outside Khartoum.

Nearly half of the arrests were made during a series of student protests and police violence that began at the University of Khartoum in December 2011. Over the course of two months, raids on student residences and arrests led to dozens of student injuries and at least 552 student arrests during protests sparked initially by the displacement resulting from construction of the Merowe Dam. Riot police initially injured at least 20 students and arrested scores during a campus rally on 22 December 2011. They raided dormitories and detained 16 more students that evening and arrested more than 100 students in a student residential compound the next morning as demonstrations continued. Some students were injured in the arrests. Several days later, police reportedly took into custody at least 70 more when they broke up another sit-in, using tear gas, batons and warning shots to disperse students. The university was closed on 29 December but the sit-in continued. By 1 January 2012, three student leaders and at least four other students had been arrested. More than 300 students continuing to stay at the university were reportedly arrested on 17 February 2012 in pre-dawn raids on dormitories. The university remained closed until mid-March 2012.

Student demonstrations were similarly suppressed at Gezira University in early December 2012, when authorities shut down the university after four Darfuri students were found drowned in a nearby canal. The four had been arrested, along with at least 50 other students, while participating in a peaceful sit-in over tuition fees, according to the Darfur Students Association (DSA). Dozens of other students were reportedly injured in the first sit-in, and an additional 60 were injured in fighting between police and students during the demonstrations that occurred after the bodies were found. The violence spread to other universities. On 11 December 2012, in protests at Omdurman Islamic University in Khartoum over the same issue, around 140 students were arrested, another 180 injured, 450 student rooms burned down, and laptops and mobile phones allegedly looted by security agents and supporters of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP).

Other students were similarly targeted during and after protests or meetings at academic institutions. Examples include the arrest on 20 April 2011 of 17 students affiliated with the United Popular Front, a political party supporting Abdul Wahid Al Nour, a Darfuri rebel leader, from the campus of their university, Al Nilein, after they held a demonstration calling for regime change in Khartoum; and the arrest on 17 January 2012 of 11 student members of the Democratic Unionist Party following a public talk on 13 October 2011 by a graduate student at the Faculty of Engineering in the University of the Nile Valley in Al Damer. Forty-two Darfuri students reportedly resigned from the Red Sea University in protest over arrests and harassment by security services.

Students, primarily of Darfuri background, were targeted, killed and tortured at academic events and
in academic spaces. On 11 March 2009, for example, a group identified as current and former students and NISS officials disrupted an authorized student forum attended by approximately 200 students at Dilling University. Ten students were injured after being hit with sticks and iron bars.1511

Additionally, on 11 June 2009, 15 female Darfuri students at the University of Khartoum were assaulted by men dressed in black abayas, who had reportedly entered their dormitory. The NISS detained many of the women who had been assaulted, along with others living in the same dormitory. Five of those injured sought medical treatment at a hospital but police forced them to leave. 1512

In other cases, students of Darfuri origin and Darfur activists were allegedly tortured by state agents. For instance, the NISS seized a Darfuri student of the Department of Education at the University of Khartoum in front of the campus in early February 2010. His body, found the next day in a street in Khartoum, showed signs of torture, and the NISS sought to have it buried without an autopsy.1513 Similarly, the body of another student, reportedly abducted by NISS agents from the University of Khartoum and found on 18 June 2011, showed signs of torture; the previous day, the student had delivered a speech about the situation in Darfur. The NISS denied involvement.1514

Disputes between rival student movements also turned violent. Between October 2010 and May 2012, several clashes occurred between students supporting rival political movements that left at least 20 students wounded,1515 one of them critically. For example, at Nyala University, some eight students were injured in violence between NCP-affiliated students, who were supported by security personnel, and pro-Sudan Liberation Movement students.1516

In another incident, on 24 May 2010, an armed group believed to be an NCP-influenced student organization broke up an engagement party in the female dormitories at Dalmaj University, allegedly at the request of a dormitory supervisor. The group beat the women with iron sticks and critically wounded a third-year student in the Faculty of Science. According to the Sudan Human Rights Monitor, the student was reportedly denied medical care by the Students Support Fund and the dormitory administration, and later died. The next day, a group of students demonstrating in solidarity with their peers was fired at with live ammunition and tear gas by police forces. Two students were killed and at least 20 injured.1517

Security services also targeted professors, researchers and campus speakers perceived to be undertaking controversial research or making anti-government remarks. For example, on 24 November 2011, the NISS arrested and raided the offices of members of an AIDS prevention group from Al Gezira University that had just carried out a survey on the prevalence of HIV and AIDS. The members were released later in the day, but all reports and data related to the survey conducted were confiscated and the Director-General of the Ministry of Health suspended the research.1518 On 20 February 2012, NISS agents arrested Professor Mohamed Zain Al-bideen, Dean of the College of Higher Education at the University of Al Zaiem Al Azhari in Omdurman, while leaving his university office, and interrogated him about an article he had written that was critical of Sudan’s President. He was held for 15 days in a small cell and denied contact with his family as well as a lawyer, before being released without charge.1519

**Attacks on education in 2013**

During the first half of 2013, SAF aerial bombardment of civilian targets, primarily in South Kordofan but also in North Darfur, damaged or destroyed several schools, injuring at least one student in the process;1520 shelling in the area of Dresa, north-east of East Jebel Marra, North Darfur, reportedly razed one school to the ground in January.1521 It is not known if these were targeted attacks.

A number of schools in Al Sareif Beni Hussein locality in North Darfur were reportedly damaged or destroyed by looting and arson during fighting between the Beni Hussein and Abbala tribes in the first half of the year.1522 At least one secondary school student was shot dead and another 10 or more injured as police armed with tear gas and live ammunition attempted to disperse protesters demonstrating over the increased cost of requirements for sitting for the Sudan Secondary
School Leaving Certificate.  

Another student was killed and four more were injured outside a National Service centre while waiting to obtain a seal required for their university applications when a soldier fired live ammunition after students had reportedly become impatient over delays and perceived corruption.

Arrests and injury of university students by security forces continued in 2013. By the end of September, at least 11 university students had been injured and another 65 arrested.

In one incident in May, nine students sustained injuries after being shot on the main campus of El Fasher University, North Darfur. The students had reportedly been attending a meeting when an estimated 70 armed student militia members entered the campus, trying to garner support for a government ‘mobilization’ campaign against armed opposition groups. When the students failed to react, clashes broke out and the militia group began firing into the air, wounding one student. As students attempted to flee, they were met at the campus gate by police and NISS forces who began firing live ammunition into the crowd, wounding eight more.

In September, some 22 Darfuri students were arrested and several injured after security forces stormed the campus of the University of Peace in Babanusa, West Kordofan, to break up a sit-in protesting against a university policy requiring Darfuri students to pay tuition fees, despite a political agreement exempting them from doing so. The police reportedly used live ammunition, tear gas, batons and air rifles against protesters. The university subsequently banned 30 Darfuri students from the university for a period ranging from one to two years.

SYRIA

By April 2013, an estimated 2,500 schools had been damaged or destroyed over two years and as many as 1,000 schools were alleged to have been used as detention or torture centres. There were very heavy casualties in attacks on universities.

Context

Tensions rose in Syria beginning in March 2011. Some of the first protests were sparked by the arrest and torture of 15 boys who painted revolutionary slogans on their school wall. After security forces killed several protesters, more took to the streets, calling for President Bashar al-Assad to step down. By July 2011, hundreds of thousands of people were demonstrating across the country. Security forces clamped down, targeting specific groups, including schoolchildren and students. During 2011 and 2012, the government gradually lost control of parts of the country to the Free Syrian Army and other groups including the Al-Nusra Front. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, continuing conflict had left more than 125,000 people dead by December 2013. Bombings, killings, targeted attacks, arbitrary arrests, torture, abductions and sexual violence led to large-scale displacement of people and an unfolding humanitarian disaster.

Education was hit hard by the war. Net primary enrolment in 2011, the year the conflict began, was 93 per cent, net secondary enrolment was 68 per cent, gross tertiary enrolment was 26 per cent and adult literacy was 84 per cent. The UN reported in April 2013 that an estimated 2,445 of the country’s 22,000 schools were damaged or destroyed and 1,889 were being used as IDP shelters instead of for educational purposes. Some 69 of 118 UNRWA schools for Palestinian refugees were also closed. A report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, based in London, said 450 schools had been completely destroyed. By September 2013, almost two million children aged 6 to 15 had dropped out of school because of conflict and displacement.

The Assad regime kept tight control over the education system. The Ba’ath party had a security unit monitoring student activities at every university.
Students had no right to form an association, join a protest or speak out in public; and university appointments were controlled by the Ba’ath party. The Syrian government prevented teachers from expressing ideas contrary to government policy and prohibited the teaching of the Kurdish language.

Attacks on schools

In reports by media and human rights sources, including video evidence and eyewitness accounts of individual attacks on schools, details were given of at least 10 incidents of schools being destroyed or partially destroyed in attacks in 2012. The schools were attacked by forces on both sides of the conflict, with some being hit by rockets and others by shelling or air strikes. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria (15 July 2012 to 15 January 2013) documented government attacks on more than 17 schools in its 5 February 2013 report and noted that in some cases anti-government forces were present at the schools at the time of attack.

Although it is hard to determine from reports how many of the destroyed and damaged schools were specifically targeted, there is evidence that some were deliberately attacked. The UN reported that government forces looted and set fire to schools on several occasions in 2011 in retribution for student protests. Human Rights Watch claimed in mid-2013 that Syrian armed forces launched ground and air attacks on schools that were not being used by combatants. It said that Syrian forces fired on schools while classes were going on inside them, using automatic weapons and tanks, and Syrian fighter jets and helicopters dropped bombs and incendiary weapons on school buildings when no opposition forces were in or near them, according to witnesses.

Attacks on school students, teachers and education personnel

Schoolchildren were frequently killed when schools were targeted for attack or were damaged as a result of collateral damage: in 2012, nine were killed in their schoolyard in an alleged cluster bomb attack on Deir al-Asafir, and nine students and a teacher were killed in a mortar attack on al-Batiha school, Damascus for example.

Students were arrested, detained, tortured and killed for their participation in protests that took place in schools. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that security forces entered schools in Daraa, Homs and the Damascus suburbs to collect intelligence on students and their families, or they employed school staff to conduct interrogations. Security forces and pro-government militias used excessive force and even gunfire against peaceful demonstrations at three schools, according to Human Rights Watch.

The UN received information that in May 2012 government forces allegedly raided the local primary school in As Safira, Aleppo governorate, taking hostage 30 boys and 25 girls between 10 and 13 years of age. The forces used the children as human shields by walking them in front of their forces to clear out a local Free Syrian Army unit that had recently gained control of the town.

UN figures suggest that by the end of February 2013, a total of 167 education personnel, including 69 teachers, were reported to have been killed, although it is not clear how many were targeted for attack.

Military use of schools

Numerous incidents were reported of government forces, including the Syrian Armed Forces, the intelligence forces and the Shabbiha militia, using schools either as temporary bases, military staging grounds, sniper posts or detention and interrogation facilities. The Syrian Network for Human Rights alleged in early 2013 that government forces had turned approximately 1,000 schools into detention and torture centres and used schools to house security and intelligence personnel or as positions from which to shell the surrounding area.

The opposition Free Syrian Army also used schools in a number of areas as bases, makeshift hospitals and detention centres, as well as for ammunition storage. For example, the UN reported that Free Syrian Army elements in Idlib governorate used two classrooms of the Al Shahid Wahid Al Jusef High School as barracks for a number of days when children were in class.
documented military use by forces on both sides – reported that opposition groups used schools for barracks and command posts and that government forces attacked schools because they had been taken over by the opposition forces.\(^{1563}\) Similarly, a newspaper article alleged that a school was bombed by rebels in 2012 because it was being used as a base by security forces and pro-government militia.\(^{1564}\)

**Attacks on higher education**

State security forces killed students in raids on universities and student protests. Three higher education students were killed, 21 injured and 130 arrested during a raid of student dormitories by security forces at Damascus University in June 2011 after students refused to participate in pro-government rallies.\(^{1565}\) Another student was killed during an attack by security forces on a protest at Damascus University in April 2011.\(^{1566}\) In May 2012, four students were killed, 28 injured and 200 arrested during a raid at Aleppo University in which teargas and bullets were fired at protesters by security forces.\(^{1567}\)

Four academics were assassinated in one week in Homs in September 2011, with responsibility for the...
Attacks on education in 2013
As the conflict between the government of President Bashar al-Assad and rebel groups continued into 2013, attacks persisted against Syrian schools and universities, their students and staff. Schools were affected by aerial attacks, car bombs and missile strikes, often with high numbers of victims. In September, an incendiary bomb was dropped on the playground of the Iqraa Institute Secondary School, Aleppo province, killing 10 pupils and at least one teacher and causing severely burns to 19 more students. Later that month, a fuel-air bomb landed on a high school in Raqqa killing 15 civilians, of whom 14 were students and one was the school janitor. It has not been verified whether the schools were the intended targets in either of these two attacks.

In higher education, two of the country’s most prestigious universities were hit by multiple explosions. Two explosions killed at least 82 and wounded dozens more, possibly as many as 150, at Aleppo University on the first day of mid-term examinations in January. Students and university staff were believed to be among the dead. The rebels blamed a government air strike, although one rebel fighter said that the blasts could have resulted from a ground-to-ground missile attack; the government said rebels had attacked with rockets. A mortar shell hit the café of Damascus University’s engineering campus on 28 March, killing at least 10 students and wounding 20. The government and rebels blamed each other.

THAILAND

During 2009-2012, more than 120 Muslim and Buddhist students, teachers, school officials and education staff were killed or wounded by insurgents in the far south, who also did much of their recruiting in schools in 2009. Widespread military use of schools by armed forces and paramilitary forces made them a target for attack.

Context
Since early 2004, an insurgency by Muslim separatists seeking autonomy in Thailand’s four southernmost provinces – Songkhla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat – has led to more than 5,000 deaths, 9,000 injuries and human rights abuses by all sides. Three of the provinces are predominantly ethnic Malay Muslim in a country that is 90 per cent ethnic Thai Buddhist. Despite an agreement between the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) on 28 February 2013, hostilities were continuing in the southern border provinces at the end of the year.

Insurgents have carried out bombings and shootings of both Buddhist and Muslim security forces, teachers and civilians. There have also been revenge attacks on mosques, Islamic schools and Muslim teashops, allegedly by Buddhist vigilantes and security forces.

Elsewhere during the reporting period, Thailand was embroiled in a bitter power struggle between the ‘Red Shirts’, supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra who had previously been ousted as premier by a military coup, and the anti-Thaksin opposition ‘Yellow Shirts’ who were supported by the military. This resulted in mass protests and crackdowns. During 2005-2011, there was a surge in the use of lèse majesté law as a means to prevent criticism of the monarchy and to stifle debate on reform, thus limiting academic freedom and free speech among scholars.

Historically, Thai governments have used schools as a tool to assimilate the southern population into the Thai Buddhist mainstream. In the 1940s, the government banned Islamic schools, Islamic attire, the local Malay dialect, Muslim names and the teaching of local history. Malay students were forced...
to pay their respects to images of the Buddha. Such repression and discrimination gave birth to BRN, which has now become the backbone of the separatist insurgency. Separatist militants still see state schools as imposing Buddhism, Thai as a language of instruction and Thai versions of history. During 2009-2012, in response to ongoing violence, the provincial education authorities switched from using Thai Buddhist teachers to employing more local Muslim teachers and extended the time allowed for Islamic studies. Other new measures included teaching Malay and the local language (see Global overview).

Net primary enrolment in Thailand was 90 per cent (2009), net secondary enrolment was 82 per cent (2011) and gross tertiary enrolment was 53 per cent (2011). Adult literacy was 94 per cent (2005).

Attacks on schools

Government schools in southern Thailand were destroyed and damaged by attacks during 2009-2012, mostly due to buildings being set on fire or bombings. According to the Ministry of Education, at least nine schools were set alight in 2009. The UN reported

A burnt-out school after it was set on fire in Narathiwat province in southern Thailand, 19 April 2012.
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attacks on at least five schools in 2010, while in 2012, at least 11 schools were partially damaged or destroyed by improvised explosive devices or arson. Direct attacks on military outposts set up on school grounds were also reported.

Some arson cases were linked to specific political activities. For instance, on 13 March 2009, two schools were destroyed by insurgents in Pattani, as authorities boosted security for the anniversary of the founding of the BRN separatist group. On 18 April 2012, Ban Ta Ngo School in Cho Ai Rong district, Narathiwat, was set ablaze on the eve of the Deputy Prime Minister and army chief’s visit to the area. An explosive was then set off by remote control targeting the team of soldiers and police who responded to the attack. On 29 November 2012, a two-storey building was burned down by insurgents. The building contained the school director’s office, computer rooms and 11 classrooms. The majority of arson attacks on schools occurred overnight, when students were not present. However, sometimes there was a staff presence. On 3 December 2012, a group of 15-20 insurgents entered Ban Thasu School in Panare district during the night, tied up a temporary staff member, and set fire to the school.

Several bombs, allegedly intended for attacking units of soldiers assigned to protect teachers, were detonated on school premises. Five teachers and two defence volunteers were wounded by a bomb at the entrance of a school in Muang district, Yala, on 25 July 2012. The explosive was hidden in an iron box in front of the school. In other cases, bombs were found hidden inside fire extinguishers and other spaces in or near schools. On 27 May 2012, insurgents detonated a bomb hidden in a rest area inside Ban Kalapor School in Pattani’s Saiburi district. The bomb was an ambush targeting a paramilitary unit that escorted teachers and students. Two soldiers were killed and four others seriously wounded. The school was closed down immediately after the attack.

Teachers who joined convoys as part of teacher-escort programmes were not spared from the gun or bomb violence. On 2 June 2009, suspected Muslim insurgents, disguised as government soldiers, attacked a pick-up truck carrying six teachers home from schools in Ja Nae district, Narathiwat province. The explosion injured two school directors.

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

At least 121 Muslim and Buddhist students, teachers, school officials and janitors were killed or wounded during 2009-2012, according to UN figures. At least 32 students and ten teachers and education personnel were killed or injured in targeted attacks in 2009. In 2010, at least two students and 12 teachers and education personnel were killed and another five students and six teachers or education personnel were injured. At least 31 government teachers and educational personnel and one student were killed in the southern border provinces in 2011, and at least five teachers and three students were wounded. In 2012, the UN reported a spike of violence in the final quarter of that year, with six teachers killed and eight others injured.

The vast majority of teachers and other education personnel killed have been Thai Buddhists, but ethnic Malay Muslim teachers at government schools and Islamic school administrators were also targeted. Many teachers requested transfers out of the southern region due to continued insecurity.

Many teachers were assassinated while travelling to or from work. A typical example is the death of Natthapol Janae, a primary teacher at Nikhom Pattana Park Tai School in Bannang Sata district, Yala, who was shot dead on 19 May 2009 as he travelled to school via motorcycle. Janae was ambushed by five attackers on motorcycles, six kilometres from the school. In another case, a Bango Yuebang schoolteacher, Samrit Panthadet, was shot in Kapho as he returned home from school on 8 February 2010 and gunmen burned his body.

Teachers who joined convoys as part of teacher-escort programmes were not spared from the gun or bomb violence. On 2 June 2009, suspected Muslim insurgents, disguised as government soldiers, attacked a pick-up truck carrying six teachers home from schools in Ja Nae district, Narathiwat province. The men forced the truck to stop at a fake roadblock set up by other gunmen in their group. One Buddhist Thai teacher was
shot dead and three were wounded including Atcharapon Tehpsor who was eight months pregnant. She died on her way to hospital. A more typical tactic was the detonation of roadside bombs by mobile phone as security convoys carrying teachers passed by, wounding or killing both teachers and security personnel.

Some teachers were killed in ambushes on school grounds. For example, on 11 December 2012, five men wearing camouflage, some of them carrying assault rifles, invaded the canteen of Ban Ba Ngo School in Mayo district, Pattani. They shot dead two Buddhist teachers after isolating them from five Muslim teachers. At one point, the school’s Buddhist director tried to hide behind one of the Muslim teachers, but he was still shot at close range. The other Buddhist teacher was also shot dead. According to insurgent sources, this attack was in retaliation for an alleged Buddhist vigilante attack on a Muslim teashop in Narathiwat’s Ra Ngae district earlier that day.

Attacks on teachers often forced school closures in response. For instance, after the director of the Tha Kam Cham School in Nong Chik district, Pattani province, was killed in November 2012, the Confederation of Teachers of Southern Border Provinces closed 332 schools in the region for 10 days. As a result of the 11 December 2012 killings, the Confederation closed 1,300 government schools serving more than 200,000 students in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces. The Confederation additionally closed four districts of Songkhla for another two days.

Other education personnel, such as teacher assistants and janitors, have also been targeted by separatist insurgents. For example, a Muslim teacher assistant at Ban Budee School in Pattani’s Yaring district was shot dead by insurgents while returning home on his motorcycle in Pattani’s Mayo district on 26 May 2013. On 11 June 2013, a janitor at Ban Than Mali School in Yala’s Betong district was shot dead by insurgents as he was riding his motorcycle back home.

Generally, students were not targeted, but sometimes they were casualties. On 27 September 2011, for instance, two students were wounded by shrapnel when a roadside bomb hit their school bus while being escorted by a military vehicle in Narathiwat’s Yee Ngor district. Police believed that insurgents intended the bomb to hit soldiers escorting the students.

Military use of schools

To accommodate the additional military and paramilitary forces that the Thai government deployed in the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala, camps were established inside school buildings and compounds. Security forces occupied at least 79 schools in 2010, and continued to use schools as barracks and bases for at least the next year. In 2011, reacting to domestic and international concerns, the army reportedly ordered security units to stop using government schools as barracks.

Military outposts at schools were targeted for attack, putting the schools at risk. On 18 March 2011, ethnic Malay Muslim insurgents attacked an outpost of the Pattani Task Force 21 at a school in Yarang district, killing one soldier. Attackers climbed over the fence of Sano Pitthayakhom School in Tambon and opened fire at the operations base of the 3rd Rifle Platoon of the 8023rd Infantry Company; they fled after soldiers returned fire. The military base at Ban Langsad School in Tambon Ka Sor was attacked by suspected insurgents on 6 December 2012. M-79 grenade explosions damaged the school wall. Grenades were also used in June 2012 to attack a school in Krongpinang district during a security briefing in the schoolyard; three soldiers were killed.

The presence of security forces in schools made schools a target for attack and in some cases caused parents to keep their children at home. For instance, local people removed children from Ban Klong Chang elementary school, Pattani, after 30 Rangers established a camp in the back of the school compound in 2010. Parents feared that the presence of soldiers would increase the risk of attack, and staff and students complained of overcrowding, inability to use school latrines and the poor behaviour of soldiers.

Security forces also conducted raids in search of suspected insurgents and weapons at Islamic
schools, some of which turned violent or resulted in arbitrary mass arrests. On 4 September 2012, the government’s Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) seized the assets of an Islamic religious school in Narathiwat province for allegedly using the school as a centre for making bombs.

**Child recruitment from schools**

The International Crisis Group reported in 2009 that insurgents did much of their recruiting at Islamic schools. The most active separatist group, the National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate (BRN-C), selected students from Islamic primary schools and private Islamic schools for after-school indoctrination programmes, carried out within special religious lessons, educational trips and team sports activities such as football. Recruiters used the activities to assess who were the most suitable individuals to join the movement. According to a police interview in 2009, a BRN-C plan outlined how school compounds were used to give recruits fitness training before they could progress to military and combat training. Mostly, children were given non-military jobs such as intelligence gathering, laying spikes on the road, graffiti painting and arson.

**Attacks on higher education**

Attacks on higher education came largely in the form of academic censorship, threats toward professors related to lèse majesté law, and the detention of students following protests. Several professors were detained or threatened on charges of lèse majesté under article 112 of the Penal Code and under the Computer Crime Act. An assistant professor at Chulalongkorn University, Dr Suthachai Yamprasert, was detained by the Thai authorities for seven days in May 2010 and interrogated at the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) because his name was on a CRES list of people suspected of conspiring to overthrow the monarchy. In another case, Somsak Jeamteerasakul, a professor of history at Thammasat University, received threatening phone calls and visits following a speech he made about reforming the monarchy. On 11 May 2011, he reported to police at Bangkok’s Nang Lerng Police Station to acknowledge the charges filed by the army over two articles he had written in response to a televised interview by Princess Chulabhorn.

Two professors were also threatened due to their attempts to reform lèse majesté laws. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, an associate professor at Kyoto University has led a campaign from outside Thailand to modify Article 112 of the laws. On 12 June 2012, he received two anonymous phone calls from Thailand threatening him if he continued the campaign. Worachet Pakeerut, an assistant professor of law at Thammasat University and member of a group of law professors that has campaigned to liberalize lèse majesté laws, was assaulted by two men outside his university in March 2012.

Three student leaders, including the secretary-general of the Student Federation of Thailand, were summoned and interrogated by the CRES on 2 May 2010.

**Attacks on education in 2013**

Attacks on teachers, education staff and soldiers protecting schools continued in 2013. On 17 January, a school minivan driver was killed by shots to his head and torso by two men riding a motorcycle. The attack happened while he was taking seven students to kindergarten. On 23 January, two militants walked into a Narathiwat school dining hall and shot dead a teacher in front of dozens of students.

In February 2013, the government and insurgents agreed to begin peace talks and in July they announced a 40-day ceasefire during Ramadan, although this did not prevent further violations against civilians by suspected militants. On 29 April, it was reported that a teacher and another man on security duty at Buke Bakong School in Narathiwat were injured when militants opened fire on them, and on 24 July, two Muslim teachers were killed and one seriously injured when the car they were travelling to school in was blown up. On 21 August, a teacher was killed by gunfire while on his way home, resulting in the temporary closure of 12 schools.

Separatist bomb, arson, gun and grenade attacks, both at and near educational establishments, also continued with frequency. Often they had fatal
consequences for the soldiers protecting schools.\textsuperscript{1652} Atypically, in what may have been a revenge attack, an Islamic religious teacher who worked at an Islamic school, and who had overseen Islamic elementary schools based in villages for four years, was shot and killed by men riding a motorcycle in Pattani. It was not known who killed him\textsuperscript{1653} but Human Rights Watch, citing his case, urged the government to investigate the murders of ethnic Malays to allay fears of state inaction over perceived reprisal attacks.\textsuperscript{1654}

**TURKEY**

 Numerous schools were reportedly firebombed and 28 teachers abducted in 2010-2012, mostly in the south-east, where Kurdish insurgents were active. Hundreds of university students were arrested in protests that were suppressed with excessive use of force\textsuperscript{1655}.

**Context**

During 2009-2012, the long-running insurgency led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continued in south-eastern Turkey. Armed clashes between the PKK and the Turkish military escalated in 2011 but in 2013 there was a ceasefire in the context of a peace process. The government has demonstrated a restrictive attitude towards the right to protest and constraints on academic freedom continued. There was a deepening polarization between the religious conservative government and the secularist Republican People’s Party.\textsuperscript{1656} Police violence against demonstrators rose and protesters, including students, were beaten at protests. In the past few years, there have been some arrests of academics in the context of investigations into coup plots against the government and serious violations of due process occurred during the controversial trials that followed. There have also been arrests of academics in the context of the Kurdish issue. On 30 September 2013, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan announced a package of legal reforms, two of them relevant to education for Kurdish students and teachers.\textsuperscript{1657} Instruction would be allowed in minority languages, including Kurdish, in private schools but not in the state sector.\textsuperscript{1658} An oath of national allegiance, to which many Kurds objected for its Turkish ethnic bias, would no longer be obligatory in primary schools.\textsuperscript{1659} In addition, the ban on headscarves in the civil service, including for teachers in schools and universities, a contentious issue between secularists and advocates of religious freedom, would be lifted.\textsuperscript{1660}

Net primary enrolment was 96 per cent, net secondary enrolment was 85 per cent, and gross tertiary enrolment was 61 per cent (2011). Adult literacy was 91 per cent (2009).\textsuperscript{1661}

**Attacks on schools**

Media reports suggest that there were dozens of attacks on schools from 2009 to 2012,\textsuperscript{1662} mainly in south-eastern Turkey. In one incident, attackers shouted pro-PKK slogans but in many cases the perpetrators have not been identified. Kurdish militants were assumed to target schools because they believed they were being used as tools of assimilation. The majority of attacks were fire-bombings.\textsuperscript{1663} For instance, it was reported that on 9 October 2012, a student and two teachers were injured when masked men threw Molotov cocktails at a high school in Diyarbakir.\textsuperscript{1664} During a two-week spate of attacks in October 2012, suspected PKK activists set at least 20 schools on fire\textsuperscript{1665} including a kindergarten.\textsuperscript{1666}

A car bomb suspected to have been detonated by the PKK exploded outside a secondary school in Ankara in September 2011, killing three people; the schoolyard was used to treat the injured.\textsuperscript{1667}

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

According to a compilation of media reports, 28 teachers were abducted in 2011-2012,\textsuperscript{1668} including 12 in one week.\textsuperscript{1669} Most were kidnapped by PKK members; many were released shortly afterwards. In one incident, armed militants broke into a teachers’ staff room and kidnapped six of the 19 teachers present but released them under pressure from local people.\textsuperscript{1670} In one incident in December 2011, a group of PKK supporters reportedly threw Molotov cocktails and stones at a housing unit for dozens of teachers, yelling at them to leave the area and threatening to burn them.\textsuperscript{1671}
Media and trade union reports suggest that more than 40 teacher trade unionists in the teachers’ union Eğitim Sen were arrested or detained as state authorities suppressed union activism including on the right to education in Kurdish.²⁰²² Twenty-seven teacher trade unionists arrested in May 2009 were charged with providing intellectual support to illegal organizations.²⁰²³ In October 2011, 25 teacher trade unionists were sentenced to six years and five months’ imprisonment under anti-terrorism laws. According to the International Trade Union Confederation, the evidence against them included the possession of books that were freely available in bookshops and the holding of trade union meetings.²⁰²⁴

**Attacks on higher education**

*Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel*

Police beat and used excessive force against students during two demonstrations against government higher education and other policies, one held in central Istanbul in early December 2010 and the other at Middle East Technical University on 18 December 2012. At the second protest, the police allegedly fired 2,000 tear gas canisters, pepper spray and water cannon at the 300 gathered students, causing injury, according to the International Human Rights Network of Academics and Scholarly Societies (IHRNASS).²⁰²⁶

The research group GIT Turkey reported in June 2012 that there had been an increase in academics’ rights violations in recent years and noted that those who suffer most are academics working on subjects deemed sensitive by the government, particularly Kurdish and minority issues.²⁰²⁷

Kemal Gürüz, a leading republican secularist and a former president of both the Turkish Higher Education Council (YÖK) and the Turkish science-funding agency TÜBİTAK, was one of many people accused of plotting to overthrow the elected government in a case that was opened after a cache of grenades and other explosives was found in the home of a retired non-commissioned Turkish army officer. The IHRNASS reported that there was no evidence supporting the claims in relation to Gürüz, who believed he was jailed because of his stance on secularism. As head of YÖK, he implemented a ban on wearing headscarves in universities which Prime Minister Erdogan’s party strongly opposes.²⁰²⁸ He was sentenced to 13 years and nine months in jail. In September 2013, he was released pending an appeal.²⁰²⁹

**Attacks on education in 2013**

A bomb exploded at a school in Cizre in January injuring three students, but the perpetrator was unknown.²⁰³⁰

In September and October, police used rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannon against Middle East Technical University students protesting against a road planned through their campus.²⁰³¹

The acquittal of sociologist Pınar Selek on terrorism charges was overturned in 2013 and she was given a life sentence. An advocate for the rights of socially disadvantaged children and women who has researched Kurdish groups, she had been repeatedly arrested and tried on allegations of participating in a 1998 explosion at a spice market. Court investigations found that the explosion resulted from an accidental gas leak rather than a bomb and, in the 14 years following the incident, Selek was acquitted three times of terrorism charges due to lack of admissible evidence.²⁰³² She was also allegedly tortured to elicit the names of her interview participants in contravention of the ethics rules governing research, and in contravention of domestic and international law.²⁰³³

**YEMEN**

*There was widespread destruction of schools in direct attacks, including bombing, shelling and looting, as well as general fighting. Schools and universities were used as barracks, bases and firing positions, and extremely high numbers of university students were reported killed or injured during protests, though it is not known how many were killed on campus*²⁰³⁴

**Context**

A political crisis in 2009 between the ruling General People’s Congress party and the main opposition bloc, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), led to the postponement of parliamentary elections.²⁰³⁵ In 2009,
the country witnessed fighting break out again between the army and rebels from the Houthi community in the far north, as well as escalating protests by supporters of independence or greater autonomy for southern Yemen, and the emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an affiliate of the global terrorism network, Al-Qaeda. Inspired by the Arab Spring, student groups took a prominent role in the uprising from February 2011, peacefully occupying ‘Change Square’ in front of Sana’a University, which became a focal point for protesters. Following a military crackdown on civilian protests, pro- and anti-government forces fought each other sporadically in 2011. AQAP militants, meanwhile, took over key areas of the south. However, a US-backed offensive in April and May 2012 drove the militants out of their strongholds in Zinjibar and Jaar city, Abyan governorate, and the Azzan area in Shabwa governorate. Meanwhile, a comprehensive set of agreements, including the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Initiative and the Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition, was brokered after ten months of protest, ushering in a two-year period of political transition.

Attacks on schools
In the period from August 2009 to February 2010, attacks on and damage to schools increased in the far north during the war between the army and the Houthis in Sa’ada governorate on the border with Saudi Arabia. Mohammed al-Shamiri, head of the Sa’ada governorate education office, reported that 220 of the governorate’s 725 schools, which were all closed during the war, were completely or partially destroyed or looted. Up to 75 were almost completely destroyed. According to Ahmed Al-Qurashi, director of the NGO, Seyaj Organization for Childhood Protection (SOCP), during this period in Sa’ada governorate, schools were being targeted for attack, as were other places used to teach children while schools were closed, such as tents, mosques and houses.

By the end of 2010, some 311 schools in Sa’ada had been partially or completely destroyed because of shelling and crossfire during clashes between the parties to the conflict, but again it was not specified how many were targeted. In two separate incidents, unexploded ordnance was sighted in schools in Malaheed in Sa’ada governorate. Away from the conflict in Sa’ada, three bombs were found in a girls’ school in Aden Governorate in the far south.

During 2011, there was spike in school attacks and school-related incidents away from the Houthi conflict area, following a general increase in unrest after the protests demanding reforms. Attacks included looting, shelling, aerial bombardment, arson and intimidation. According to the UN, there were 211 incidents affecting 150 schools that year, disrupting the education of about 200,000. As noted below, both government...
and anti-government forces used schools for military purposes, which may have provoked some attacks.\footnote{1707} Elsewhere, on 19 October 2011, an Al-Sha’ab school in Ta’izz, in the southern highlands, was seriously damaged by pro-government armed men. At least seven students who protested against the entry of the armed elements into the school were injured.\footnote{1708}

In November-December 2011, there was a steep rise in reporting of attacks on schools to the UN due to rapid assessment missions conducted by the Child Protection Sub-cluster and the Yemeni Department of Education. They reported 204 incidents of schools being looted, shelled, aerially bombarded, and set on fire; education personnel being threatened; and schools being used for military purposes.\footnote{1709}

Separately, Seyaj Organization for Childhood Protection staff visited most of the 64 attacked schools they had documented being damaged or destroyed in 2011 immediately after the incidents. These included schools in Sana’a, Sa’ada, Hajja, Ta’izz, Abyan and Aden. They gathered reports of IEDs planted in schools, detonators on school doors and rocket damage. They also saw nine schools in Abyan that had been hit in airstrikes by Yemeni forces after militants linked to Al-Qaeda used them for military purposes.\footnote{1710}

In January-February 2012, 13 schools that were used as polling stations were targeted with attacks. These included armed clashes between government forces and Al-Hirak that took place inside or in the vicinity of the schools resulting in damage to the facilities, looting, or sound bombs being thrown into the school premises to prevent people from entering to cast their votes.\footnote{1711}

On 24 April 2012, a grenade was launched at a school in which IDPs were sheltering in Aden district.\footnote{1712}

Attacks on education in 2012 peaked between May and June, with 181 incidents occurring out of the 252 that were reported to have taken place that year.\footnote{1713} Half of those incidents were concentrated in Sana’a, where the government continued to fight anti-government forces intermittently, including 44 cases of bombs exploding in the vicinity of schools.\footnote{1714} In the same period, there were 78 incidents affecting Abyan’s schools as the military cracked down on AQAP fighters in the area.\footnote{1715} Those responsible included the Republican Guards, anti-government tribal groups, and Ansar Al-Sharia (a militant Islamic group connected to AQAP).\footnote{1716}

Between July and October 2012, a few isolated incidents were reported. For instance, on 27 July 2012, Houthi armed militants stormed into Omar Ibn Al-Khattab primary school where students were attending summer classes, demanding that they study the Houthi handbook.\footnote{1717} On 29 September 2012, in Abyan, a group of armed students allegedly associated with Ansar Al-Shari’a entered school facilities, burning textbooks and destroying furniture to disrupt the classes.\footnote{1718}

**Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel**

From 2009 to 2012, attacks on students, teachers and other education staff included killings, torture, assaults, illegal detention and threats of violence. Overall, 122 teachers were killed and 300 more were injured, according to the Yemeni Teachers’ Syndicate (YTS).\footnote{1719} Almost all of the killings took place in 2011 in protests and armed conflicts between tribes and Houthi rebels in Jawf governorate in the far north, according to the YTS. It is not clear how many were targeted killings. YTS documented a number of murders: Houthi rebels killed four teachers for sectarian reasons and gunmen working for a powerful tribal elder killed another teacher. The YTS also documented a further 80 other types of attack against teachers during this period, mostly committed by the Houthi rebels in Sa’ada governorate on Yemen’s northern border with Saudi Arabia, but others were committed by state armed forces or security forces.\footnote{1720} The documented violations included: imprisonment of 29 teachers, torture of 11 teachers, kidnapping of 11 teachers, and physical assaults on six teachers.\footnote{1721} Sixteen more were illegally detained or harassed. Two teachers were disappeared during protests. Houthi rebels issued death threats to five teachers, and threatened others with illegal imprisonment and permanent banishment from their home areas.\footnote{1722} Human rights organizations said Houthi rebel abuses were carried out for sectarian reasons. A media source
said that teachers and students were among the groups being targeted for arrest by Houthi rebels and that some had been arrested for refusing to chant their slogans. In some cases, Houthi rebels entered schools, held students and forced them to chant slogans. 1723

Houthi rebels continued to target leading education figures in 2012. Ebrahim Dhaiban, the YTS chairman in Sa’ada, was illegally detained by Houthi rebels on his way home from work in late November 2012. 1724 The Director of the Education Office in Sa’ada, Muhammad Abdul Rahim Al-Shamiri, received death threats and was forced to flee the city in February 2012. A threat received by text message stated: ‘Your death is very close’. He knew of no reason why he was threatened other than as a teacher who managed and supervised other teachers, at a time when teachers were being targeted. 1725 Al-Shamiri understood the threats to have come from Houthis, who had threatened him before.

Military use of schools

According to the UN, between 2009 and 2012, at least 52 schools were used for military purposes, with 16 used as bases and 36 used for storage of military weapons by combatants. 1726 Most of the incidents documented by the UN were related to either the Houthi conflict or the activities of opposing military forces during the anti-government protests.

However, information provided by a UN respondent and other sources suggest that the total number of schools used for military purposes may be much higher than the figure reported by the UN Secretary General’s annual reports on children and armed conflict for 2009-2012, as the following information shows.

In fighting between Houthi rebels and Yemeni forces in Sa’ada governorate and neighbouring areas in 2009, there were reports that dozens of schools were being used by combatants from both sides. 1727 This equated to most schools in the affected areas and halted the education of some 30,000 primary and secondary school children. 1728 The presence of combatants also resulted in some schools being attacked and 17 were completely destroyed. 1729 The Ministry of Education had to cancel the school year in the affected areas, Sa’ada and Harf Sufyan. 1730

In October 2011, the international news agency, Reuters, reported that at least 50 schools in Sana’a had closed because of the unrest that followed protests for reform. Of these, the majority were reportedly seized by armed gunmen. 1731 Similarly, Human Rights Watch reported that UNICEF and local and international NGOs had documented that armed forces and armed groups had occupied at least 54 schools in 2011. 1732

In 2012, according to a UN respondent, at least 58 schools were occupied; six of them in Hasaba, Sana’a’s capital city, were used by armed forces and various armed groups, and 52 were used by Ansar Al-Sahria for about four months in Abyan until mid-June, when the group lost control over Abyan. According to the source, the majority of these schools were heavily contaminated with explosives and became targets of attacks by opposing forces. 1733

Human Rights Watch visited some of the schools that were occupied. In March 2012, it found that two buildings at Asma’a School, a girls’ school near Change Square, were being used by between 70 and 100 soldiers of the First Armoured Division, who were living on the campus. They first moved onto the school campus in July 2011 and did not leave until August 2012, despite classes continuing at the school. At another school, Al-Faaruq School, close to the President’s residence in Sana’a, Presidential Guards set up sandbag and concrete fortifications on the roof and used them as observation points and firing positions, despite classes for 2,000 children continuing at the school. Both of these schools were subsequently vacated. 1734

There were reports in December 2012 of Houthi forces taking over an unknown number of schools in al-Saif and Haja for use as detention facilities. 1735

Child recruitment from schools

The general phenomenon of recruitment of children by armed forces and armed groups in education settings has been documented but the numbers of children recruited have not been established, nor have the
numbers recruited from schools or en route to or from school.

Shawthab Organization, a local child rights NGO, reported Houthis handing out leaflets to schoolchildren encouraging them to join the armed group, Shabab al-Mo’mineem (Believing Youth).\textsuperscript{1736} They said the recruitment campaign focused on teenagers in grades 8 to 12 on the grounds that they would be easier to influence than adult recruits.\textsuperscript{1737} Muhammad Ezan, a political analyst, noted that students and teachers were used as Houthi recruiters in Sa’ada. He added that there was no evidence of forcible recruitment or abduction.\textsuperscript{1738}

**Attacks on higher education**

**Attacks on higher education facilities**

There was one direct attack on a higher education institution during 2009-2012. On 27 November 2011, Houthis killed 20 people and wounded 70 others in an attack on a Sunni Islamist school in northern Yemen.\textsuperscript{1739} The school, Dar al-Hadith, an institute for Islamic Salafi teachings, trained Sunni preachers in the Houthi stronghold of Sa’ada. The Houthis follow Zaidism, a moderate school of Shia Islam. One teacher speculated that the attack was motivated by a fear of Sunnis converting Shias in the area.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{1740}} It was reported by the Switzerland-based human rights NGO Alkarama that the centre was under siege for two weeks before the attack, preventing the delivery of food and medical supplies.\textsuperscript{1741} One 18-year-old student was shot on 4 November 2011 while playing football with colleagues in the institute’s courtyard.\textsuperscript{1742}

An unknown number of colleges and universities were forced to close partially or entirely as a result of violence or strikes in several cities. The education college in Zinjibir, Abyan’s capital, was closed for a year after fierce battles erupted between the armed forces and militants in May 2011. Sana’a University was also affected when students with opposed political stances forcibly shut down their rivals’ classes in March 2011.\textsuperscript{1743}

**Attacks on higher education students, academics and personnel**

Between February and October 2011, 73 higher education students were killed nationally and 139 wounded, 38 of whom were permanently disabled as a result of their injuries, according to the Wafa Organization for Martyrs’ Families and Wounded Care.\textsuperscript{1744} It is not known how many of these killings and injuries occurred on campus or in the vicinity of universities, or because the victims were being targeted as students.

**Military use of higher education facilities**

There were at least two cases of the use of higher education facilities by combatants. The First Armoured Division rebel forces occupied Sana’a University in 2011, halting university life after the campus was closed in February 2011 until January 2012 when the first students started to return.\textsuperscript{1745} The rebels remained on campus, even using the cafeteria, until April 2012.\textsuperscript{1746}

From early June to December 2011, Central Security forces and Republican Guards occupied the Superior Institute for Health Science in Ta’izz. The college for pharmacists and physicians’ assistants is located next to al-Thawra Hospital on high ground.\textsuperscript{1747}

**Attacks on education in 2013**

According to local news reports, there were incidents of Houthi rebels shooting school staff, taking over schools and detaining teachers. On 21 January, a group of armed Houthi fighters threatened teachers and disrupted examinations at the School of Martyr Mansour Farasha in the Ozd Mountain area, Sa’ada governorate.\textsuperscript{1748} On 23 February, Houthi fighters shot indiscriminately into the Imam Hadi primary school in Sharmat, Sa’ada, wounding a teacher.\textsuperscript{1749} In July, Houthi rebels armed with machine guns occupied a school in Dammaj district.\textsuperscript{1750} There were incidents of Houthi fighters detaining teachers.\textsuperscript{1751} In March, Houthi rebels executed construction worker Al-Ahnomi for removing Houthi slogans from the Jayash school he was helping to build in the Maqash area of Al-Safraa district, in Sa’ada.\textsuperscript{1752} On 27 September 2013, Jabir Ali Hamdan, a teacher at the Sa’ada School in Maeen area in Razih, was imprisoned and threatened with death after he had broken a stick on which the Houthi Slogan of Al-Sarkha (“God is Great/Death to America/Death to Israel/Curse the Jews/Victory to Islam”\textsuperscript{1753}) was written. He was later released.\textsuperscript{1754}
There was also a pattern of school attacks by armed groups in other Yemeni governorates. For example, in April, an armed group shot and injured the deputy principal and a student in a school in Ta‘izz governorate. In September, the principal of the Abduljaleel Noman School, Ali Al-Sabalani, was assaulted by an armed gang in the Maenn district. In October, an armed group led by the local chief attacked a school in Mibar village, Marawia district, Hodeida governorate. The principal and some students were beaten including a 10-year-old girl. In September, a local sheikh and his bodyguards assaulted teachers, fired guns in the air and closed a school in Bani Ghuwaidi village in the Hiran district of Hajja governorate.

On 29 June, attacks took place at two examination centres in separate locations. Armed men opened fire at the Ruwaishan Examinations Centre in Dhale governorate, injuring a student in his chest. A bomb was detonated at the entrance of the Al-Zahra’a Examinations Centre in Shibam Kowkaban, a Houthi rebel stronghold in Al Mahwit governorate in the north-west.

ZIMBABWE

Hundreds of university students were unlawfully arrested or unlawfully detained during 2009-2012, and police and state security forces violently repressed several protests at universities. School teachers faced intimidation and death threats, and some schools were used as militia bases.

Context

Zimbabwe experienced ongoing political violence after the emergence in 1999 of the political party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), to challenge Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) for power. This violence was particularly intense during election periods. According to a study by the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), one in two teachers surveyed had directly experienced political violence between 2000 and 2012. Most reported that this violence took place during the school day. The Student Solidarity Trust (SST) reported 211 cases of abduction and torture of university students from 2006 to 2010.

In the build-up to the 2008 presidential elections and during their aftermath, attacks on teachers and teacher trade unionists, including killings, arrests, incarcerations, destruction of homes, torture and threats of violence, were reported. Many schools became sites for enforced political rallies in which teachers and headmasters were repeatedly and publicly threatened with death.

The political situation changed in 2008, when Morgan Tsvangirai, of the MDC, and President Mugabe came to a power-sharing agreement that lasted until elections in July 2013, which Mugabe won by a landslide.

During 2009-2012, there incidents of political pressure on students and teachers and political use of schools, mostly implicating Zanu-PF supporters, but in one reported incident MDC was involved.

For example, pupils and teachers were ordered to attend a Zanu-PF rally held at Mount Carmel School in May 2011, forcing several schools in Manicaland province to shut on a weekday. In another incident, the MDC organized a rally at Pagwashi Primary School in the Cashel Valley of Chimanimani East that was allegedly disrupted by Zanu-PF supporters, creating a situation that police warned was volatile.

Schools were reportedly used in the Zanu-PF campaign against international sanctions, despite a government directive prohibiting it. On one occasion, a senior education official in Chikomba district, Mashonaland East province, ordered that all schools be employed for signing an anti-sanctions petition and that head teachers act as unpaid polling officers to oversee the exercise.

There are no recent figures for primary or secondary enrolment. In 2011, gross tertiary enrolment was 6 per cent and the adult literacy rate was 84 per cent.

Attacks on school students, teachers and other education personnel

A compilation of media and human rights reports suggests numerous teachers faced harassment, expulsion, threats of political violence and death because Zanu-PF supporters accused them of supporting the MDC.
In 2009, local militia and tribal leaders allegedly forced schools to provide them with offices and appointed ‘youth coordinators’ and school prefects without permission from education authorities. 1775

In November 2010, PTUZ said Zanu-PF supporters led by war veterans were trying to ‘cleanse’ Mashonaland province of teachers after President Mugabe announced that elections might be held the following year. PTUZ cited the case of six teachers who were forcibly transferred to other schools in Zanu-PF strongholds and feared for their lives. There was a history of war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters accusing teachers of supporting the MDC and targeting them with political violence. 1776

In February 2011, the MDC alleged that war veteran leader Jabulani Sibanda closed schools across a whole district in Masvingo and forced teachers and schoolchildren to attend his pro-Zanu-PF meeting, where he said MDC members would be killed. He had reportedly used the same tactics in other parts of Masvingo, Mashonaland Central and Manicaland provinces over the previous year. 1777 The PTUZ confirmed that teachers in Gutu had left their jobs because of death threats from Sibanda. 1778

There were also several reports of Zanu-PF militia imposing their ideology on school curricula. In some cases, Zanu-PF leaders forced teachers to attend ‘re-education camps’, allegedly so that they could ‘experience the pain and suffering endured by liberation war heroes’. 1779 The threat of violence was ever present, as Zanu-PF set up bases in some areas to intimidate, beat and torture people who refused to comply with their demands. 1780 PTUZ claimed that history teachers found it hard to teach the subject without being accused of attacking Zanu-PF and avoided teaching ‘true history’ for their own safety. 1781 In one case, a headmaster was told that war veterans were going to visit his school to teach history. 1782

Zanu-PF supporters threatened at least one head teacher and two teachers because they accepted gifts or grants for their schools from political opponents of Zanu-PF. A head teacher at Mapor Primary School, Mutare North, fled, fearing for his life, when Zanu-PF came looking for him at the school after they learned that he had accepted funds under the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) from an MDC-T senator. 1783 Two teachers left Chatindo Primary School in Nyanga North after Zanu-PF youths threatened them for accepting five rolls of barbed wire paid for by the CDF. 1784

**Military use of schools**

Although the exact number is unknown, human rights organizations found evidence of some schools being used as bases by militia groups, including Zanu-PF youth militia, in Masvingo province, Manicaland province and several other rural areas. In one incident, Zanu-PF youth militia allegedly camped at Chikurudzo primary and secondary schools in Masvingo North, causing fear among teachers and schoolchildren by threatening to set up torture bases on the premises. 1785

In another, a militia base was set up at Chifamba Primary School in Guruve South, Mashonaland Central province, where militia members conducted night patrols and political meetings and forced people to attend Zanu-PF events. 1786 In August 2011, Zimbabwean human rights groups indicated that some 200 youth militia members were being trained at Sherenje Secondary School in Manicaland province. 1787 War veterans and the Simudza Makoni youth group, allegedly linked to Zanu-PF politician Didymus Mutasa, also reportedly seized control of Rainbow Crèche in Rusape, forcing its staff to flee. 1788

**Attacks on higher education**

Reports suggest that police and security forces used excessive violence to quell student protests on several occasions, resulting in at least two deaths and 64 injuries. 1789 For example, in September 2010, two students reportedly died after being brutally assaulted by security guards and ‘unknown assailants’ who sought to prevent students with unpaid fees from attending a graduation ceremony at Bindura University. Sixteen other students were injured, according to the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union. 1790 In a separate incident, around 10 students from Great Zimbabwe University were reportedly beaten by police for pressing other students to join a boycott of lectures. 1791
The Student Solidarity Trust reported seven cases of abduction and torture of university students from January 2009 to July 2012. In one incident, two students were organizing a protest against high fees at Masvingo Polytechnic when Central Intelligence Organisation agents allegedly arrested and tortured them. The students then had to pay an ‘admission of guilt’ fine to be released.

At least one academic was reported to have been tortured during detention by the Zimbabwean authorities. On 5 December 2012, a lecturer at Bindura University was arrested, put in solitary confinement and tortured for claiming in a research paper that police had been ordered not to arrest Zanu-PF members committing crimes during the 2008 conflict.

According to the SST, 359 students were unlawfully arrested between January 2009 and July 2012 and 349 were unlawfully detained in the same period. It is not known how many of these cases overlap.

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Source: Student Solidary Trust

In February 2010, it was reported that ten students, including four student union officers, were arrested by police and security guards during a meeting to discuss grievances at the University of Zimbabwe. In another case, police detained five student leaders after one commented that President Mugabe was delaying political progress; the students were reportedly beaten while in custody, including with whips and batons.

Attacks on education in 2013

The PTUZ reported that teachers were intimidated with threats of physical harm into supporting a particular political party during the parliamentary and presidential elections in July. The union said that in Mashonaland Central province teachers were drafted into ZANU-PF structures and forced to campaign for the party against their will. On voting day, they were told that they should plead illiteracy so that they could be ‘assisted’ to vote by ZANU-PF supporters. In Mashonaland West, the teachers were forced to withdraw their membership from the PTUZ as the organization complained about the harassment of teachers. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network reported as an illustrative critical incident during the voting process the fact that some known teachers in Chimanimani East, Manicaland, asked for assistance to vote on election day.

In two other incidents, student leaders were arrested for talking to students on campus. In January 2013, Zimbabwe National Students’ Union (Zinasu) secretary-general Tryvine Musokeri and two other Zinasu leaders were arrested at Harare Polytechnic for addressing a crowd of students. They criticized government failure to provide students with grants and loans. In February 2013, a Gweru magistrate acquitted Zinasu president Pride Mkono and his deputy, Musokeri, on charges of violating the Public Order and Security Act after they were arrested for addressing students at Midlands State University the previous year.

In another incident, on 23 April 2013, an SST advocacy officer was arrested for conducting voter education without approval of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, making a presentation on elections, but was released without charge. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network described it as incident of harassment.
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[400] As stated in the methodology section, the statistical information on enrolment and literacy rates in profiled countries should be treated with caution, especially in the case of those countries that have experienced considerable disruption due to armed conflict, insecurity or instability. Though formally correct, such statistical data may contain outdated information and may not capture with full accuracy the actual educational situation of a country.
[401] The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) indicates the number of students enrolled in a particular level of education regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population at the official age for a given level. It is therefore often a much higher figure than the Net Enrolment Ratio (NER), which represents the percentage of students enrolled at a particular level who actually belong to the official age group for that level. This study cites NER whenever possible, but for some countries and levels of education, GER is the only available figure and has therefore had to be used instead.
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1333 “N. Caucasus region permits headscarves in schools,” *RIA Novosti*, 3 September 2013.


1341 “Police, Civilians Killed as Two Blasts Hit Town in South Russia,” *RT News*, 31 March 2010.


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359 As stated in the methodology section, the statistical information on enrollment and literacy rates in profiled countries should be treated with caution, especially in the case of those countries that have experienced considerable disruption due to armed conflict, insecurity or instability. Though formally correct, such statistical data may contain outdated information and may not capture full accuracy the actual educational situation of a country.


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365 “Ras Kamboni Movement,” Mapping militant organizations website, Stanford University, accessed on 18 December 2013; and information provided by Human Rights Watch on 31 October 2013.


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377 HRW, No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia (New York: HRW, February 2012), 34.


384 Ibid., 63.


391 Information provided by a UN respondent on 4 March 2013.


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395 Ibid., 63.

According to the report, such attacks are carried out by non-state actors including the Al-Shabaab and the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army). The report states that the SPLA had launched a military offensive to consolidate its control in the South Sudanese town of Bor, where armed groups killedover 200 civilians in February 2013. The report concludes that the conflict is causing widespread suffering and domination by violence, and calls for international action to bring an end to the conflict.

In conclusion, the development of the education sector in Somalia is under threat due to the ongoing conflict. The report highlights that the education system is in dire need of support and intervention in order to ensure that children are not left behind in the conflict. The report also highlights the importance of international cooperation and support to address the challenges faced by the education sector in Somalia.


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1699 Ahmed Al-Qurashi, CEO of Seyaj, interviewed by Fuad Rajeh, 4 March 2013.

1700 Information provided by a UN respondent, 23 April 2013.

1701 UNSC, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, A/65/820-S/2011/250, 23 April 2011, para 200. This figure is based on the respondent indicating that 43% of Sa’ada schools were affected in this way. There are 725 schools in Sa’ada.


1704 Ibid.
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1728 Information supplied by a UN respondent, 23 April 2013.

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1730 Ahmed Al-Qurashi, CEO of Seyaj, interviewed by Fuad Rajeh, 4 March 2013.

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